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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the mechanisms by which groups of agents can track the 
truth, particularly in political situations.   
 
I argue that the mechanisms which allow groups of agents to track the truth 
operate in two stages: firstly, there are search procedures; and secondly, there 
are aggregation procedures.  Search procedures and aggregation procedures 
work in concert.  The search procedures allow agents to extract information 
from the environment.  At the conclusion of a search procedure the information 
will be dispersed among different agents in the group.  Aggregation procedures, 
such as majority rule, expert dictatorship and negative reliability unanimity rule, 
then pool these pieces of information into a social choice.  
 
The institutional features of both search procedures and aggregation procedures 
account for the ability of groups to track the truth and amount to social 
epistemic mechanisms.  Large numbers of agents are crucial for the epistemic 
capacities of both search procedures and aggregation procedures.   
 
This thesis makes two main contributions to the literature on social 
epistemology and epistemic democracy.  Firstly, most current accounts focus on 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions as the relevant epistemic 
mechanism that can operate in groups of political agents.  The introduction of 
search procedures to epistemic democracy is (mostly) new.  Secondly, the thesis 
introduces a two-stage framework to the process of group truth-tracking.  In 
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addition to showing how the two procedures of search and aggregation can 
operate in concert, the framework highlights the complexity of social choice 
situations.  Careful consideration of different types of social choice situation 
shows that different aggregation procedures will be optimal truth-trackers in 
different situations.  Importantly, there will be some situations in which 
aggregation procedures other than majority rule will be best at tracking the 
truth. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
 
This thesis addresses the mechanisms by which groups of agents can track the 
truth, particularly in political situations.   
 
I argue that the mechanisms which allow groups of agents to track the truth 
operate in two stages: firstly, there are search procedures; and secondly, there 
are aggregation procedures.  Search procedures and aggregation procedures 
work in concert.  The search procedures allow agents to extract information 
from the environment.  At the conclusion of a search procedure the information 
will be dispersed among different agents in the group.  Aggregation procedures, 
such as majority voting, then pool these pieces of information into a social 
choice.  
 
The institutional features of both search procedures and aggregation procedures 
account for the ability of groups to track the truth and amount to social 
epistemic mechanisms.  I identify two types of search procedure and three types 
of aggregation procedure whose respective institutional features are social 
epistemic mechanisms.  Large numbers of agents are crucial for the epistemic 
capacities of each of these mechanisms.  Interestingly, large numbers can be 
used in very different ways.  We might task different agents in a group with 
performing the same task so that if some agents fail to perform the task other 
agents will be successful in performing the task.  Instead we might task different 
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agents in a group with performing different tasks so that the total number of 
tasks competed by the group will be large.   
 
This thesis makes two main contributions to the literature on social 
epistemology and epistemic democracy.  Firstly, most current accounts focus on 
the Condorcet Jury Theorem and its extensions as the relevant epistemic 
mechanism that can operate in groups of political agents.  The introduction of 
search procedures to epistemic democracy is (mostly) new.  Secondly, the thesis 
introduces a two-stage framework to the process of group truth-tracking.  In 
addition to showing how the two procedures of search and aggregation can 
operate in concert, the framework also highlights the complexity of social 
choice situations.  Careful consideration of different types of social choice 
situation shows that different aggregation procedures will be optimal truth-
trackers in different situations.  Importantly, there will be some situations in 
which aggregation procedures other than majority voting will be best at tracking 
the truth. 
 
Background and limits of scope  
 
I do not intend to give a comprehensive stand-alone literature survey for this 
thesis.  Literature will be cited throughout the thesis whenever relevant.  Here I 
will cite a few key texts to help place the thesis in the context of existing 
literature.   
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The thesis fits within the literature on social epistemology and epistemic 
democracy.  Goldman (2010) provides a useful taxonomy of social 
epistemology.  He notes that a variety of work streams go under the heading of 
‘social epistemology’ and proposes a tripartite division of field.  Firstly, social 
epistemology can focus on individual doxastic agents (IDAs) with social 
evidence.  This aspect of social epistemology is the most continuous with 
traditional individualistic epistemology.  Here the possessor of doxastic 
attitudes is still an individual agent but the sources of evidence for these 
attitudes are social in nature, such as the testimony of other agents.  The second 
variety of social epistemology focuses on collective doxastic agents (CDAs).  
This departs from mainstream individualistic epistemology in that the possessor 
of doxastic attitudes is a group.  The final type of social epistemology is 
systems-oriented social epistemology (SYSOR).  As Goldman says, “An 
epistemic system is a social system that houses a variety of procedures, 
institutions, and patterns of interpersonal influence that affect the epistemic 
outcomes of its members.” (p.2).  “In each case [for each social system] social 
epistemology would examine the systems in question to see whether its mode of 
operation is genuinely conducive to the specified epistemic ends.  It would also 
identify alternative organizational structures that might be epistemically 
superior to the existing systems.” (p.8).   
 
The focus of this thesis is very much on this third interpretation of social 
epistemology (SYSOR).  The goal is not so much to assess whether the social 
institutions are successful at achieving their epistemic ends.  Rather the goal is 
to identify the conditions under which social institutions are successful at 
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achieving their epistemic ends and then account for why they are epistemically 
successful.  Once we have this account of why the social institutions are 
epistemically successful we will be in a position to make normative claims, both 
concerning how the social institutions in question can be improved and how the 
social epistemic mechanisms identified can be applied to other settings.   
 
There are many domains in which a social aspect of epistemology might be 
important.  Goldman (1999) points to, inter alia, science, law, democracy and 
education as being significant.  Providing an in-depth analysis of all the social 
epistemic mechanisms operating in each of these domains is beyond the scope 
of a single thesis.  Instead this thesis focuses on the political domain.  The 
choice of the term ‘political’ rather than ‘democratic’ is deliberate, as I do not 
want to exclude from consideration non-democratic political decision-making 
systems that may succeed at truth-tracking.   
 
Almost all current literature on the topic of social epistemology as applied to 
political settings falls under the heading of ‘epistemic democracy’.  The term 
largely comes from Cohen (1986), though as Cohen points out, the idea that 
political decision making is at least in part about making correct decisions, and 
that different forms of government may be better or worse at making decisions 
has a distinguished history1.  Plato’s parable of the ship2 suggests that the ship’s 
owner (the citizenry) is bigger and stronger than anyone else on board but is 
deaf and short-sighted and has no knowledge of naval matters.  The sailors 
(politicians) do not have the nautical skills to command the ship (the state), but 
                                                 
1
 Cohen (1986) cites Rousseau and Bentham.  Wolff (1996) cites Plato, Rousseau and Mill.   
 
2
 Plato (1998) s488a-189a. 
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compete with each other for the owner’s approval to take the rudder.  If this 
doesn’t work, the sailors will subdue the owner, take over the ship and embark 
on a drunken voyage.  Clearly for Plato there is a correct course that the ship of 
state should follow, and democratic forms of decision making are not suited for 
navigating this course.  For Plato, statesmanship is a craft best carried out by 
philosopher kings who have the appropriate training.   
 
Mill (1861) argues that the best form of government is one that has the greatest 
amount of beneficial consequences.  ‘A completely popular government’ is the 
only form of government fitting this description since, inter alia, “… the general 
prosperity attains a greater height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to 
the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it” 
(Chapter 3).  Again we have the idea that political decisions can be correct and 
that a form of decision making that utilises the talents of the population is most 
likely to make these correct decisions.  Mill seems to advocate a form of 
weighted majority rule (as discussed in the next chapter on this thesis): “When 
two persons who have a joint interest in any business differ in opinion, does 
justice require that both opinions should be held of exactly equal value?... One 
of the two, as the wiser or better man, has a claim to superior weight” (Chapter 
8).   
 
For Rousseau (1762) correct political decisions are those in line with the general 
will.  The “…most natural arrangement is for the wisest to govern the 
multitude” (Book 3, Chapter 5), and the form of government that encapsulates 
this is an elective aristocracy.    
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Cohen (1986) produces an epistemic interpretation of voting, which is worth 
quoting in full: 
 
“An epistemic interpretation of voting has three main elements: (1) an 
independent standard of correct decisions — that is, an account of 
justice or of the common good that is independent of current consensus 
and the outcome of votes; (2) a cognitive account of voting — that is, 
the view that voting expresses beliefs about what the correct policies 
are according to the independent standard, not personal preferences for 
policies; and (3) an account of decision making as a process of the 
adjustment of beliefs, adjustments that are undertaken in part in light of 
the evidence about the correct answer that is provided by the beliefs of 
others."  (p.34) 
 
An epistemic populist, on Cohen’s interpretation, argues that majority verdicts 
provide sound evidence about the common good (the independent standard of 
correctness).  And the Condorcet Jury Theorem is frequently used to justify this 
claim.   
 
The literature on epistemic defenses of democracy has been extended by several 
authors, including Estlund et al. (1989), Estlund (1997), Copp (1999), List and 
Goodin (2001), Anderson (2006) and Peter (2008).  Majority voting and the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem play a prominent role in most of these accounts.  
Again, I do not intend to fully survey the path that research into epistemic 
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democracy has taken over the last few years.  Authors will be cited in the body 
of the thesis whenever relevant.  Instead, I want to take the Cohen passage as a 
useful point of reference for characterising the scope of this thesis.   
 
The core concern of this thesis is the mechanisms that operate in groups of 
political agents by which those agents can track the truth.  For groups of agents 
to track the truth there must be an independent standard of correct decisions (as 
per Cohen’s (1)).  However, unlike Cohen, I do not limit the independent 
standard of correctness to the common good.  There can be some standards of 
correctness that are independent of agent’s preferences or judgements.  For 
example, it may be false that a particular nation possesses nuclear weapons.  
Whether a group of agents believe that the nation possesses nuclear weapons, or 
whether a group of agents prefer that the nation possesses nuclear weapons, has 
no bearing on the fact that the nation does not possess nuclear weapons.  There 
can be some independent standards of correctness that are the common good but 
where the judgements of agents only provide an imperfect indication of the 
common good.  For example, it might be in the interests of everyone if the 
speed limit in urban areas were to be lowered to 40kph3.  However, there may 
be considerable disagreement about this proposed policy and the votes of agents 
may be an unreliable guide to the common good.  In line with convention I term 
the content of the social choice an ‘alternative’.  By assumption this thesis is 
only concerned with social choice problems in which there is one alternative 
that is objectively correct (with all other alternatives being incorrect).  I 
generally focus on dichotomous choice problems where agents face an agenda 
                                                 
3
 For the sake of argument there would be fewer accidents, and traffic would flow more 
smoothly.   
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of two alternatives, one of which is correct, with the other alternative being 
incorrect.  What counts as an alternative will vary according to the social choice 
problem.  For example, if the social choice involves electing a political 
representative then the correct alternative might be the person uniquely 
qualified to be President.  If the social choice problem involves policy choices 
over carbon-neutral power generation then the correct alternative might be 
nuclear power.   
 
Given the reference point of a correct alternative I define three standards of 
group epistemic performance that will be of interest.  Firstly, ‘baseline 
epistemic performance’ requires that a group of agents is better than random at 
selecting the correct alternative (or avoiding the incorrect alternative).  
Secondly, ‘relative epistemic performance’ requires that a group of agents is 
more likely than a single agent to identify the correct alternative (or avoid the 
incorrect alternative).  Finally, ‘absolute epistemic performance’ requires that a 
group of agents is likely to select the correct alternative (or avoid the incorrect 
alternative).  These three standards of epistemic performance are all important if 
we are to make the case that the institutional arrangements of a group mean the 
group is successful at tracking the truth.  Furthermore if we are to make 
normative claims, on epistemic grounds, that a social institution such as 
majority rule should be implemented for political decision making then we 
should be able to show that a group using majority rule is more reliable than 
random at making the correct choice, more reliable than a single agent would be 
at making the correct social choice and likely simpliciter to make the correct 
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social choice.  ‘Tracking the truth’ is shorthand for meeting these three 
standards of epistemic performance.   
 
Also important for this thesis is the cognitive account of voting (Cohen’s clause 
(2)).  I focus on the beliefs expressed by agents and not their preferences.  There 
is a large and interesting literature on the aggregation of preferences, but this is 
separate from epistemic issues.  As Wolff (1994) has shown in his paper on the 
mixed motivation problem, if some agents vote according to their preferences 
while others vote according to their beliefs, then it is possible to have a social 
choice that is neither preferred by a majority nor believed true by a majority.  
There are two additional points that need to be made here.  Firstly, I am 
primarily interested in the competence of agents, which is measured as the 
probability that they will vote for the correct alternative.  To the extent that 
beliefs are discussed, they are characterized by the binary ‘believe an alternative 
is correct’ or ‘do not believe and alternative is correct’, as reflected in agents’ 
votes for or against an alternative.  Fine grained degrees of belief and their 
translation into voting behaviour are not discussed.  Secondly, the thesis is not 
only concerned with voting behaviour of agents.  As will be argued, there are 
more epistemic mechanisms operating in groups of political agents than merely 
the aggregation of judgments.  Searching for information in the first place and 
discussion between agents are also important.  So the cognitive account of 
voting needs to be expanded into an account according to which agents are 
interested in tracking the truth and only express their opinions or judgments (not 
their preferences).  We can further specify that agents do not engage in strategic 
behaviour.  For example, they will not knowingly express incorrect views if 
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they believe that by doing so the group as a whole is more likely to make a 
correct decision.   
 
Finally, the third component of Cohen’s conception – an account of decision 
making – will be deemed necessary but not sufficient for an account of political 
epistemic mechanisms.  If the group is to track the truth it will need a final 
judgment as to the correct alternative.  However, we need more than this.  As 
will be argued, an important part of an epistemic conception of democracy is an 
account of how information is gathered from the environment, not just how it is 
pooled after being discovered.   
 
We can consider, in principle, what epistemic mechanisms might operate in 
groups.  Steiner (1966) suggests potential group productivity (for a variety of 
group tasks, including both epistemic and physical tasks) is a function of three 
determinates: task demands, resources and processes.  Task demands include 
the nature of the task itself, what sort of resources are needed, how much 
resources are needed and how the resources must be combined.  The ‘task 
demands’ proposed by Steiner are equivalent to the ‘epistemic systems’ in 
Goldman’s terminology.  It is these institutional features which amount to social 
epistemic mechanisms.  Agents’ resources could include the intelligence and 
skill of individuals.  The processes consist of the sets of actions taken by agents 
when they perform the task.   
 
Steiner presents a taxonomy of five models of potential group productivity 
which are categorised according to the task demands: additive, disjunctive, 
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conjunctive, compensatory and complementary models.  In an additive model 
the task demands require each agent in a group to perform exactly the same 
actions and group performance will be the sum of the performance of individual 
agents.  For example, a crew of stokers may be tasked with shovelling coal into 
a steam engine.  The amount of coal shifted by the group is just the sum of coal 
shifted by each agent.  Assuming no loss in productivity due to faulty processes 
(for example agents getting in each other’s way) then as group size increases, 
group productivity increases.  An additive model can also apply in epistemic 
settings.  For example, a pub quiz team might be given a ‘word-scrambler’ 
puzzle where they are provided with a word such as ‘heredity’ and get points 
depending on how many other words they can form from the letters (such as 
‘here’, ‘red’, ‘tidy’, and so on).  As the size of a pub quiz team increases the 
combined knowledge of the team may increase and the number of points they 
get on this question may increase.   
 
In a disjunctive model, group productivity is determined by the resources of the 
most able agent.  For example, there may only be room for one agent to shovel 
coal into an engine.  The maximum level of group productivity is limited to that 
of the strongest member of the group.  In epistemic settings, a disjunctive model 
may also apply to a pub quiz team.  For example, the group may face a question 
about the 2010 World Cup.  The probability the group gets this question correct 
is limited to the competence of the group member who is supposed to be the 
expert on football.   
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In a conjunctive model the task demands require all agents in a group to perform 
a similar action.  Group productivity is limited to the ability of the weakest 
agent in the group.  For example, there may be several engines on a ship that 
must be fed coal at the same rate.  The performance of the group of stokers as a 
whole is limited to the resources or ability (the strength and stamina) of the 
weakest member of the group.  In epistemic settings, the pub quiz team may 
decide their answers to particular questions via a consensus.  The probability of 
a correct consensus on a particular question is limited by the competence of the 
least competent member of the group. 
 
The task demands of a compensatory model allow the actions of some agents in 
the group to offset the actions of other agents in the group.  For example, some 
of the stokers may shovel coal at a rate so slow it risks starving the engine, 
while other stokers shovel coal so fast it risks suffocating the engine.  On 
average the stokers shovel at just the right rate.  If the size of the crew is small 
the engine won’t receive coal at the correct rate.  However as the size of the 
crew increases the slow stokers compensate for the fast stokers (and vice versa) 
and the engine receives coal at the correct rate.  In epistemic settings, the pub 
quiz team may be asked to estimate the number of coins in a jar.  On average 
agents will have a good idea how many coins there are.  Although some agents 
may overestimate the number of coins in the jar and other agents may 
underestimate the number of coins in a jar, as the size of the group increases 
these under- and overestimates balance each other out and the group will tend to 
make the correct estimate.    
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Finally, the task demands in a complementary model can be divided and 
conducted by different agents.  For example, shovelling coal may require both 
tall stokers, who can shift coal from the tender, and short stokers who can throw 
coal to the back of the fire box.  A tall stoker would not be able to feed the fire 
properly by themselves.  A short stoker would not be able to maintain the 
supply of coal by themselves.  In epistemic settings, the pub quiz group may be 
asked how many wives Henry VIII had.  One member of the group might think 
Henry VIII had eight partners.  A different member of the group may know that 
Henry VIII had two mistresses.  Between them these two agents should be able 
to deduce that Henry VIII had six wives.   
 
Later in this thesis I will indicate which of Steiner’s models apply to the various 
social epistemic mechanisms in political settings.   
 
The processes by which groups of political agents can track the truth are 
summarised in the figure below.  The figure shows how the most basic 
epistemic elements of information and agents are transformed via search and 
aggregation procedures into a collective judgement that tracks the truth.  I also 
include in the figure an indication of which chapters in the thesis cover which 
parts of the overall process of group truth-tracking. 
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Figure 1.1: a summary of the two-staged process of group truth-tracking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
    
 
 
 
As will be argued, the key to truth-tracking by groups of political agents is, first, 
the identification of truth-conducive information by agents and, second, the 
aggregation of that information into the social choice.  Institutional features in 
each of these stages amount to social epistemic mechanisms.  However the 
thesis begins the presentation in reverse order.  This is for two reasons.  Firstly, 
the current literature on epistemic democracy often focuses on the aggregation 
procedure of majority voting, so rhetorically it makes sense to begin here.  
Secondly, understanding the inputs required for an aggregation procedure to 
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track the truth will help in the analysis of the search procedures which are 
required to generate these inputs.   
 
I will briefly summarise below the main points from the remainder of the 
chapters.   
 
Aggregation procedures 
 
A judgement aggregation procedure allows a group to generate a collective 
judgement (or social choice) based on the judgements of individual group 
members.  It can be construed as a function which assigns to each combination 
of individual judgements across the group members a corresponding set of 
collective judgements (List, 2008).   
 
There are a variety of different aggregation procedures including (but not 
limited to) dictatorship, unanimity rule and majority rule.  Under the 
aggregation procedure of dictatorship, an alternative will be the social choice if 
and only if a specific individual (the dictator) votes in favour of it.  Under the 
aggregation procedure of unanimity rule, an alternative will be the social choice 
if and only if all the agents in the group vote in favour of it.  Under the 
aggregation rule of majority rule, an alternative will be the social choice if and 
only if strictly more agents vote in favour of it than vote against it.   
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The epistemic performance of each of these three aggregation procedures is a 
function of the judgement-generating factors.  There are four judgement-
generating factors which are of interest: 
• individuals' competencies, and the distribution of competencies in the group- 
the probability that agents will vote for the correct alternative; 
• the transparency of competence- whether agents in the group or an observer 
can see the competencies of agents;  
• the independence of agents- the probability that an agent will vote for the 
correct alternative, given the votes of other agents.  If agents share information 
then they are more likely to vote in the same way; and 
• group size. 
 
The institutional features of each of the three aggregation procedures amount to 
social epistemic mechanisms.  Given certain levels of competence, transparency 
of competence and independence relations, as group size increases the 
institutional features of the aggregation procedures make it more and more 
likely that the group will track the truth.   
 
Dictatorship can meet the standards of baseline and absolute epistemic 
performance, provided that there is at least one individual agent in the group 
with high competence, whose competence is transparent.  If the competencies of 
group members are heterogeneous then increasing group size is epistemically 
virtuous as it increases the probability that the group will contain such a high-
competence individual.   
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Unanimity rule is a reliable aggregation procedure provided that we are only 
interested in avoiding an incorrect alternative as the social choice.  The 
judgement-generating factors required for the aggregation procedure of 
unanimity rule to avoid the incorrect alternative as the social choice are a large 
number of agents whose levels of competence are greater than zero and who are 
conditionally independent.  It does not matter whether the levels of agent’s 
competencies are transparent or not.  An alternative will only be the unanimity 
winner if every single agent votes for it.  As the number of agents increases, the 
probability that every single one of the agents will vote for the same alternative 
decreases.  Therefore, as group size increases, the probability that an incorrect 
alternative will receive a unanimous verdict decreases. 
 
Majority rule can meet the three standards of epistemic performance if the 
competence of agents is better than random, if the distribution of competencies 
is symmetric about the mean and agents are independent.  As group size 
increases the epistemic performance of the group improves.  These claims are 
supported by the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  In its classic form the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem states that if agents are ‘competent’ (the probability of agents 
voting for the correct alternative is homogeneous and greater than ½) and agents 
are ‘independent’, then the probability of a correct majority winner is 
monotonically increasing in group size and in the limit reaches certainty.   
 
The institutional features of majority rule also amount to a social epistemic 
mechanism.  If the probability of an agent voting for the correct alternative is 
greater than ½ there may still be a significant probability that this agent will 
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vote for the incorrect alternative.  If there is only a single agent or a small 
number of agents in the group then there may be a significant probability that a 
majority of them will vote for the incorrect alternative.  However if the group 
size is large, the probability that a majority of the group will vote for the 
incorrect alternative will be small.  The incorrect votes of the minority are offset 
by the correct votes of the majority. 
 
The Condorcet Jury Theorem – agenda size and competence  
 
The discussion in the thesis thus far will have assumed that agents are presented 
with an agenda comprising two alternatives, one correct and one incorrect.  An 
obvious concern with this simplification is that in many real-world social choice 
problems there will be more than two alternatives.  Multiple alternatives pose 
problems for the level of competence of agents.  Whereas an individual might 
be quite competent at identifying the best alternative from a set of two 
alternatives, they may have more difficulty at selecting the best alternative out 
of a set of 100, 1000 or 100,000 alternatives.  Arguably as the number of 
alternatives tends towards infinity, the competence of agents (the probability 
that they will vote for the best alternative) tends towards zero.   
 
Increased agenda size poses particular problems for the aggregation procedure 
of majority rule.  The classic Condorcet Jury Theorem states that if the level of 
competence drops below a half, the probability of a correct majority verdict 
decreases as group size increases and in the limit tends to zero.  The classic 
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Condorcet Jury Theorem cannot cope with agendas comprising more than two 
alternatives.   
 
I consider two main extensions to the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem to cope 
with multiple alternatives.  Firstly, I consider Condorcet’s own extension (as 
presented in Young (1988)) which requires a pair-wise comparison between 
each of the alternatives.  I conclude that, when implemented, this extension 
requires too much effort on behalf of agents.  I also consider the extension of 
List and Goodin (2001) which extends the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem from 
majority voting on a two-placed agenda to plurality voting on a many-placed 
agenda.  I conclude that the application of the List and Goodin extension suffers 
from the same problem discussed above, namely, that as group size increases 
the competence of agents will decrease.  The low level of agent competence 
may mean the probability of a correct plurality winner is too low. 
 
Using the insights from both the Condorcetian and List and Goodin extensions 
of the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem I argue for a mixed approach for coping 
with multiple alternatives.  A social planner can use multiple elections with 
agendas of varying sizes and groups of varying sizes to balance the competing 
demands of reducing the burden on voters (by minimising the number of 
elections they participate in) and increasing the competence of agents (by 
reducing the size of the agendas they face).   
 
I also address the ‘Disjunction Problem’, as presented in Estlund (2008).  The 
Disjunction Problem makes use of the List and Goodin (2001) extension of the 
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Condorcet Jury Theorem to multiple alternatives to challenge the fulfilment of 
the competence assumption.  The crux of the Disjunction Problem is that there 
is no principled way to determine the number of alternatives that should be on 
an agenda.  If we cannot determine the number of alternatives that should be on 
an agenda, we cannot determine the level of competence required for the 
competence assumption of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to hold.  I clarify the 
Disjunction Problem and argue that what it actually shows is that the framing of 
an agenda by a social planner can determine whether the competence 
assumption of the extended Condorcet Jury Theorem does or does not hold.  
There is no way in principle to ensure that the agenda will be set in such a way 
that the competence assumption does hold.  However I argue that any attempt to 
justify the competence assumption ‘in principle’ is misguided.  There is always 
a possibility a social choice problem will include misleading information.  The 
best hope of defending the competence assumption is identifying an appropriate 
reference class of social choice problems where the competence assumption is 
likely to hold.  Identifying a suitable reference class of problems is not 
something that can be done analytically.    
 
The generation of the inputs to aggregation procedures 
 
The existing accounts of epistemic democracy that focus on aggregation 
procedures only give conditional support to the truth-tracking ability of groups.  
They show how groups can track the truth given certain types of judgement-
generating factors.  They are silent on how these judgement-generating factors 
are themselves generated or whether they are plausible.  More particularly, the 
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existing aggregative accounts of group truth-tracking begin at the point at which 
agents already have a set level of competence, in a particular distribution, with 
certain independence relations holding, and the transparency or otherwise of 
competence pre-determined.  But it cannot be taken as given that agents will 
have information regarding the correct alternative on an agenda.  Nor can it be 
taken as given that the required independence relations will hold or that the 
transparency of competence is established.  We need an account for how the 
features of a group of agents, including competence levels, transparency of 
competence and independence relations, develop.  The truth-tracking 
institutional features of some aggregation procedures can provide a conditional 
epistemic justification for group decision making; an account of the formation 
of the judgement-generating factors will provide the antecedent to this 
conditional justification.   
 
The competence of an agent is defined as the probability that this individual 
agent votes for an alternative, given that it is correct.  The competence of an 
agent represents the probability of an event occurring, namely the probability 
that a particular agent will vote for the correct alternative.  The agent’s vote for 
a particular alternative is determined by the combination of their causal 
influences.  I utilise the taxonomy of causal factors presented Dietrich (2008).  
The causal factors determining an agents vote (and therefore the probability that 
the agent will vote for the correct alternative) can be truth-conducive or they can 
be misleading.  Truth-conducive causal factors will make an agent more likely 
to vote for the correct alternative; misleading factors will make an agent less 
likely to vote for the correct alternative.  Causal factors can be evidential or 
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background.  Evidential factors are causal relatives of the true state of the world.  
Background factors are not causal relatives of the state of the world, but 
nevertheless allow an agent to interpret evidential information.   
 
Causal factors (be they evidential or background, truth-conducive or 
misleading) can either be held privately by agents or held in common between 
agents.  If all causal factors of agents’ votes are held privately then agents will 
be independent, conditional on the state of the world.  If however agents have at 
least some evidential or background factors in common, there will be certain 
dependence relations in the votes of agents.   
 
Finally, the nature of the causal factors determining an agent’s vote will also 
determine whether an agent’s competence is transparent or not.  For example, if 
the evidence generating an agent’s competence is of a kind that can be shown to 
other agents, her competence will be transparent to other agents. 
 
At this point in the thesis I leave consideration of aggregation procedures and 
move on to search procedures.   
 
Group search procedures 
 
I provide a general framework for search procedures involving groups of agents.  
A single agent searching for an object of interest may only have a small 
probability of finding it.  But if we employ a group to search for the object the 
probability that at least one of the group members will find it can be 
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significantly higher.  I present a theorem that states under certain assumptions 
the probability that a group of agents will identify a particular object is 
increasing in group size and in the limit tends to certainty.  There are two 
different mechanisms behind the epistemic performance of a group search 
procedure.  Firstly, increasing the number of agents in the group can increase 
the probability that an agent will visit the location of the object.  Secondly, if we 
increase the number of agents visiting the same location we can increase the 
probability that the object at a particular location will be recognised by a 
member of the group.  The assumptions of the theorem are modified to produce 
extensions of the theorem. 
 
I also develop a model of a group search procedure to investigate the dynamics 
of group search.  In the model there is a set of locations, one of which contains 
the object of interest.  Individual agents engage in a search for the object by 
moving from location to location.  The locations an agent visits are determined 
by four agent-specific variables: their initial partitioning of the search space, the 
convention the agent employs for ordering the locations, the start point of their 
search and their search heuristic.  The objects an agent finds are determined by 
the locations they visit and their capacity to recognise objects at those locations.  
If there are differences in the locations visited by agents and / or differences in 
the ability of agents to recognise objects then as group size increases the 
probability that a member of the group finds the object increases and in the limit 
reaches certainty. 
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The model of the group search is reproduced in the computer program 
‘NetLogo’ and subjected to simulations.  The results of the simulations confirm 
both the formal results of the search theorem and the conceptual arguments of 
the search model: as group size increases the probability an object will be found 
tends to certainty and is increasing up to the limit.  The simulation results also 
show the impact on a group’s search performance of adjusting the agent-specific 
search variables.   
 
On its own the institutional features of a group search procedure, as presented in 
the model and backed by both the search theorem and the simulation results, 
amount to mechanisms by which groups of agents can track the truth.  In 
addition a group search procedure can link in with the aggregation procedures 
described earlier.  In the subsequent chapter I will explain how search 
procedures can be used to fill in some gaps in accounts of epistemic democracy 
which rely on aggregation procedures. 
 
The link between search procedures and aggregation procedures 
 
I claim that truth-tracking by groups of political agents occurs via two 
procedures.  Standard epistemic defences of democracy often focus on 
aggregation procedures such as majority rule, which pool the information 
individual agents have regarding the true state of the world.  I also put the case 
for groups of agents employing search procedures to find information in the first 
place.  The institutional features of search procedures and aggregation 
procedures amount to social epistemic mechanisms.   
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I provide an account of how the search and aggregation procedures link up.  
Search procedures allow groups of agents to extract information from the 
environment.  Aggregation procedures allow individual agents within a group to 
share the information they have with the wider group.   
 
The linking of search procedures to aggregation procedures fills two gaps in 
current epistemic defences of democracy that rely on aggregation procedures.  
Firstly, current accounts of aggregation procedures specify the types of 
judgement-generating factors (competence, independence, and transparency) 
required for a group to track the truth but they are silent on how the judgement-
generating factors form.  Search procedures can be used by agents to search for 
evidential and background information to develop their levels of competence.  
And diversity in the search procedures of individual agents will generate the 
dependence relations in the group.  Secondly, search procedures can be 
employed by a group to find possible alternatives and to set the agenda for a 
social choice.   
 
This chapter also gives consideration to nested social choice problems.  Any 
social choice in fact involves two procedures (a search procedure followed by 
an aggregation procedure) and there are epistemic advantages to increasing 
group size in each procedure.  But the final social choice, the alternative which 
the group judges to be the true state of the world, may in fact be the result of a 
sequence of different (two-staged) social choices including a choice over the 
topic to consider, a choice over how to assess the quality of alternatives, a 
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choice over the alternatives to place on the agenda, and finally a choice over the 
alternative to be the social choice.   
 
Once our framework for group truth-tracking joins search and aggregation 
procedures together we can consider the interaction between the two.  We can 
see how contingencies in the way a search procedure is conducted mean 
particular aggregation procedures will be optimal at tracking the truth.  
Similarly, if an institutional decision is made in advance to use a particular 
aggregation procedure then this will influence the way in which a search 
procedure should be conducted so that it generates the appropriate levels and 
distributions of competencies and independence relations. 
 
The limits of the informational environment 
 
The final substantive chapter focuses on contingencies in the informational 
environment which place restrictions on the absolute epistemic performance of 
aggregation procedures.  These issues are discussed mainly via the framing of 
majority voting and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  This is because much of the 
relevant literature focuses on the asymptotic limit of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem.   
 
Firstly I address the problem of the possibility of misleading information.  A 
small but significant literature on this topic has developed quite recently.  The 
analysis in this literature shows that the mere possibility of misleading evidence 
and background factors means the asymptotic limit of the Condorcet Jury 
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Theorem is not certainty but some value less than certainty.  This means that the 
absolute epistemic performance of majority voting may be too low: groups 
using majority voting as an aggregation procedure may not be very reliable at 
identifying the true state of the world.   
 
Secondly, I address the problem of finite information.  In some social choice 
problems there may simply be insufficient information for a group to determine 
the true state of the world, no matter what search or aggregation procedures the 
group employs.  I consider what institutional responses a group might employ to 
maximise the probability of a correct social choice when the amount of truth-
conducive information is limited.  If information is finite, the truth-conducive 
value of the information will be maximised by agents sharing the information.  
Agents can share truth-conducive information and increase their levels of 
competence.  The agents will remain independent (conditional on common 
factors) provided they have at least some background factors held privately.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Understanding the mechanisms by which groups of political agents can track the 
truth has obvious normative implications.  If it is the case that some social 
choice problems have a correct alternatives then understanding the conditions 
under which a group of agents can identify this alternative allows us to 
implement the appropriate institutional arrangements.   
 
 38 
I argue that there are two main steps or procedures operating in groups of 
political agents.  There is a search procedure by which agents identify truth-
conducive information in the environment.  Subsequently there are aggregation 
procedures which pool this truth-conducive information.  The institutional 
features of both search and aggregation procedures account for the ability of a 
group to track the truth and amount to social epistemic mechanisms.  Increasing 
group size is an important feature of all the social epistemic mechanisms and 
this fact lends support to the epistemic importance of including a large and 
diverse a group of agents in political decision making.  However the two-staged 
framework of search then aggregation, and the social epistemic mechanisms 
operating in each stage, do not necessarily support a strictly democratic form of 
decision making.  For example, while majority or plurality rule may be the 
epistemically optimal aggregation procedure in some social choice problems, 
there will be other social choice problems where expert dictatorship is optimal.   
 
The sharing of information, after the conclusion of the search procedure but 
before the aggregation procedure, can be epistemically virtuous.  Building an 
appropriate model of deliberation to fit within the framework of search and 
aggregation is a topic set aside for future research. 
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Summary of notation 
 
Here I summarise the main pieces of notation that I will employ in the 
remainder of the thesis.   
 
 = the probability of a correct social choice. 
 = the positive reliability of a group, the probability the group chooses the 
alternative given that it is correct. 
 = the negative reliability of a group, the probability the group will avoid an 
alternative given that it is incorrect. 
, , , … = variables for individual agents. 
1,2,3,…n = names for individual agents. 
 = the state of the world.   can take two values: 0 or 1. 
 = the homogeneous level of competence of agents, the probability that agents 
will vote for the correct alternative. 

 = the competence level of some unknown agent . 
 = the competence of agent 1.  
 = the average competence of a group of agents. 

 = the prior competence of agent , their level of competence before they 
receive any evidential information. 

 = the posterior competence of agent , their level of competence at time  
after they have received some evidential information. 
 = the number of agents in a group. 
, ,  … = the names for alternatives. 
!
 = the vote of agent . 
 40 
" = the number of elections. 
#$ = a background cause of an agent’s judgement, in this case cause number 1. 
#% = an evidential cause of an agent’s judgement, in this case cause number 2. 
Pr	
 = the search competence of agent , the probability that the agent moves 
to a particular location containing an object of interest. 
Pr		
|
) = the recognition competence of agent , the probability that the agent 
recognises a particular object at a location given that they move to that location. 
)
*
= the probability of a member of a group visiting the location of an object. 
+
*
= the probability of a member of a group recognising an object at a particular 
location. 
,
*
= the probability of a member of a group finding the object of interest. 
 
I employ a convention for subheadings in the thesis where first-level 
subheadings are in bold, second-level subheadings are underlined and third-
level subheadings are in italics. 
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Chapter 2: Aggregation procedures. 
 
The core concern of is thesis is the mechanisms by which groups of agents can 
track the truth.  Different agents may have different judgments as to the true 
state of the world.  This chapter sets out the particularly salient procedures by 
which individual judgements can be aggregated into a collective judgement or 
social choice, namely dictatorship, unanimity rule and majority rule.  The 
chapter establishes the probability that these aggregation procedures will 
generate a social choice that is correct and the probability they will avoid a 
social choice that is incorrect.  There are four key judgement-generating factors 
which determine the probability a given aggregation procedure will track the 
truth: the competence of agents and distribution of competencies in the group; 
the transparency of agents' competencies; the independence of agents; and the 
group size.  Given appropriate judgement-generating factors each of the 
aggregation procedures can successfully track the truth.  Importantly, there are 
certain combinations of judgement-generating factors where increasing group 
size is epistemically virtuous.  The analysis of the three aggregation procedures 
in this chapter provides an explanation for their truth-tracking ability, for how 
the institutional features of the aggregation procedures can operate as social 
epistemic mechanisms.  This includes an explanation of how the classic 
Condorcet Jury Theorem works and the importance of its competence and 
independence assumptions. 
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The framework for aggregation procedures 
 
Proponents of epistemic democracy argue that democratic forms of decision 
making are desirable in so far as they track the truth.  For epistemic democracy 
to have any purchase it must be the case that at least some political decisions are 
judgements about matters of fact, about the actual state of the world.  For 
example, whether a nation possesses a nuclear weapon or not, which form of 
power generation has the lowest costs and which presidential candidate has the 
policies that will create the most jobs are all matters of fact.  Propositions which 
describe possible states of the world are termed 'alternatives'4.  Possible 
alternatives might include, for example ‘that the nation in question does possess 
nuclear weapons’, ‘that the nation in question does not possess nuclear 
weapons’; ‘wind power is cheapest’, ‘coal power is cheapest’, ‘nuclear power is 
cheapest’, ‘gas power is cheapest’; ‘the Republican presidential candidate will 
create the most jobs’ and ‘the Democratic presidential candidate will create the 
most jobs’.  To help interpret the votes of agents we often have an agenda 
which contains a specific set of alternatives.  The agenda is common knowledge 
for all relevant parties.  An agenda might contain a complete logical partition of 
possible states of the world such as ‘that the nation in question does possess 
nuclear weapons’/ ‘that the nation in question does not possess nuclear 
weapons’.  It is possible that the agenda only contains some of the possible 
alternatives, for example ‘wind power is cheapest’/ ‘coal power is cheapest’.  If 
                                                 
4
 A policy choice may involve a series of choices over alternatives.  For the sake of simplicity I 
assume that where there is a series of choices over propositions the propositions are not 
logically interconnected (unless otherwise stated).  Where this does not hold, and there is a 
logical interconnection between propositions then we can run the risk of a discursive dilemma 
(see List, 2006).   
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the agenda only contains some of the possible alternatives then there is a risk 
that the correct alternative is not included. 
 
A political decision requires decision makers which are termed 'agents'.  Each 
agent (or voter, or juror) can express their judgement as to what they think the 
actual state of the world is, as to what they think the correct alternative is.  
Agents express their judgement by casting votes for particular alternatives.  An 
aggregation procedure5 allows a group to generate a collective judgement (or 
social choice) based on the judgements of individual group members.  It can be 
construed as a function which assigns to each combination of individual 
judgements across the group members a corresponding set of collective 
judgements (List, 2008)6. 
     
Figure 2.1: aggregation procedures. 
     
     
 
    
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 In this thesis I am interested in judgement aggregation procedures, rather than aggregation 
procedures more generally.   
 
6
 However not all aggregation procedures need be functions.  A function requires that each 
input (or combination of votes) have a unique output (social choice), but there may be some 
aggregation procedures (perhaps including some deliberation) which could have a variety of 
outputs depending on contingencies in the way the inputs are treated.  Figure 2.1 also comes 
from List (2008). 
 
Input (individual judgements) 
Aggregation procedure 
Output (collective judgement) 
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There are a variety of different aggregation procedures including (but not 
limited to) dictatorship, unanimity rule and majority rule7.  With dictatorship, 
the social choice is just the judgement of the single agent who is deemed the 
dictator.  With unanimity rule, an alternative will be the social choice if and 
only if it receives the votes of all the agents.  With majority rule, an alternative 
will be the social choice if and only if it receives strictly more than half of all 
the votes.  These three aggregation procedures are particularly salient, and often 
feature in the literature on epistemic aspects of social choice theory8.  Each 
aggregation procedure has different virtues, but the concern of this thesis is the 
epistemic virtue, the probability that the aggregation procedures will select the 
correct alternative (and avoid the wrong alternative) as the social choice9.   
 
In what follows we assume that the agenda is comprised of two alternatives, and 
that only one of these alternatives is correct (only one of the propositions 
accurately describes the true state of the world)10.   
 
To determine the epistemic performance of different aggregation procedures we 
need to, firstly, draw a distinction between positive and negative reliability.  The 
                                                 
7
 If  represents the number of agents then the number of distinct possible aggregation 
procedures for a dichotomous choice is given by the formula 2*.  So, for example, if there are 
three agents in a group then there are 2 = 256 possible aggregation procedures (Christian 
List, unpublished lecture notes).   
  
8
 See, for example, List (2008) and Bradley and Thompson (2012). 
 
9
 As for the non-epistemic (or procedural) virtues of these aggregation procedures: dictatorship 
is the only aggregation procedure that meets the conditions of Arrow’s theorem (universal 
domain, Pareto efficiency and independence of irrelevant alternatives); majority rule is the only 
aggregation procedure that meets the conditions of May’s theorem (universal domain, 
anonymity, neutrality and positive responsiveness).   
 
10
 This is equivalent to there being one correct alternative on the agenda, with the other 
alternative on the agenda being a disjunction of anything NOT the correct alternative.  The issue 
of agendas with multiple alternatives is addressed in the next chapter. 
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positive reliability, ⁺, is the probability that a group using a particular 
aggregation procedure will judge an alternative to be true given that it is true.  
The negative reliability, ⁻, is the probability that a group using a particular 
aggregation procedure judges an alternative not to be true given that it is false.  
Because positive and negative reliabilities are probabilities, they take values in 
the interval [0,1].  Given this distinction between positive and negative 
reliabilities there are four possible judgements that can be made, as shown in the 
table below: 
 
Figure 2.2: possible group judgements. 
 Judgement: true Judgement: false 
State of the 
world: true 
Positive reliability 
⁺ 
False negative 
1 − 	⁺ 
State of the 
world: false 
False positive 
1 − 	⁻ 
Negative reliability: 
⁻ 
 
For both positive and negative reliability there are three measures of group 
epistemic performance that are of interest.  Firstly, we have a measure of 
'baseline epistemic performance' which is the probability that a group will be 
better than random at picking the true alternative (avoiding the false 
alternative).  Given that we only have two possible alternatives then a group 
would have a 0.5 probability picking the correct alternative at random, so the 
measure of baseline epistemic performance requires ⁺ or ⁻ > 0.5.  Secondly, 
'relative epistemic performance' is a measure of the epistemic performance of a 
group when compared to an individual member of that group.  If we are 
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concerned with the truth-tracking ability of groups then we need groups to be 
better than individual members of the group at identifying correct alternatives/ 
avoiding incorrect alternatives.  Finally, 'absolute epistemic performance' is a 
measure of the probability the group will select the correct alternative as the 
social choice.  This takes a value in the interval [0,1], and we would need ⁺ or 
⁻ to be very close to 1 (very likely to select the correct alternative/ avoid the 
incorrect alternative) if we want to point to a group as being a successful truth-
tracker.   
 
We can summarise the six ways in which we can assess the epistemic 
performance of groups using the various aggregation procedures: 
 
Positive reliability 
Baseline  A group is better than random at selecting the correct  
alternative 
Relative  A group is better than an individual at selecting the  
correct alternative 
Absolute  A group is good at selecting the correct alternative 
 
Negative reliability 
Baseline  A group is better than random at avoiding the wrong  
alternative 
Relative  A group is better than an individual at avoiding the  
wrong alternative 
Absolute  A group is good at avoiding the wrong alternative 
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The positive and negative reliabilities of a group, and the group’s baseline, 
relative and absolute measures of epistemic performance, depend crucially on 
both the aggregation procedure the group employs and on the judgement-
generating factors to the aggregation procedure.  The inputs to an aggregation 
procedure are the judgements or votes of individual agents.  On a two-placed 
agenda the votes of agents are typically recorded as a 1 if an agent votes for the 
first alternative on the agenda and a 0 if the agent votes for the other alternative 
on the agenda (which is equivalent to not voting for the first alternative).  In an 
epistemic setting the votes of agents for or against an alternative will be 
determined by a combination of causes, including the truth-conducive 
information that an agent has received.  A social planner or observer will 
typically be unaware of all the causes of agent’s votes and as such does not 
know in advance whether a particular agent will vote 1 or 0 and whether an 
aggregation procedure will generate the correct social choice.  Instead the social 
planner may be aware of certain causal factors which generate the inputs to the 
aggregation procedure and can attribute a probability to the event of an agent 
voting correctly.  The way in which these inputs or judgements are generated 
can be classified according to a taxonomy that focuses on four variables:   
 
• individual agents’ competencies and the distribution of competencies in the 
group: the probability that each individual agent will vote for the correct 
alternative, given the state of the world; 
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• the transparency of competence: whether agents in the group can see the 
competence of other agents (or whether an observer or social planner can see 
the competence of agents);  
• the independence of agents: the probability that an agent will vote for the 
correct alternative, given the votes of other agents and the state of the world; 
and 
• group size.  
 
We will consider the judgement-generating factors to an aggregation procedure 
first, before going on to consider the aggregation procedures themselves. 
 
Judgement-generating factors 
 
Competence 
Individual agents will have a positive reliability and a negative reliability, just 
as the group does.  The positive reliability of an agent is the probability that the 
agent will judge an alternative to be true, given that it is true.  The negative 
reliability of an agent is the probability that the agent will not judge an 
alternative to be true, given that it is false.  In many cases the positive and 
negative reliabilities will be identical, but in some cases they may be different.  
For example, consider two types of non-human agents.  A scanner at airport 
security might have a high positive reliability but lower negative reliability; it 
might have a high probability of registering 'true', given the presence of a metal 
object on a passenger and a lower probability of registering 'false' given that a 
passenger does not have any metal objects on them.  The airport scanner is 
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designed to have this asymmetry between positive and negative reliability 
because the costs of a false negative (letting a knife onto a plane) are high but 
the costs of a false positive (having to ‘pat down’ a passenger) are low.  
Similarly it may also be possible to have high negative reliability and lower 
positive reliability.  For example, a test for blood alcohol may have a high 
probability of registering 'false' if it is false that a suspect has alcohol in his 
blood stream, but a lower probability of correctly registering 'true' given that a 
suspect does have alcohol in his blood stream.  In this example it may be judged 
that wrongly convicting a motorist of drunk-driving is worse than not convicting 
a drunk-driver.   
 
For the sake of simplicity we will assume that the positive and negative 
reliabilities of an agent have the same value; an agent is equally able to 
correctly judge a proposition is false, given that it is false, as they are to 
correctly judge a proposition is true, given that it is true.  Each agent  has a 
level of competence 
	, which is the probability that they will vote for the 
correct alternative.  Because the competence of agents is a probability it takes a 
value in the interval [0,1].  Under this simplification there are two possible 
judgements an individual agents can make: 
 
Figure 2.3: possible individual judgements, given identical positive and 
negative reliabilities.  
 Judgement: X Judgement:¬X 
World: X Correct: 
 Incorrect:1 − 
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The distribution of competencies in a group depends on the competencies of 
individual agents in the group.  So, for example, if our group is comprised of 
agents 1,2, … ,  then the average competence of this group depends on the 
competence of agent 1 and agent 2 … and agent . 
 
Transparency of competence 
To say that competence is transparent is to say that all agents (or an observer or 
social planner) know the competence levels of all the agents in the group and 
they know that they know the competencies.  To say that competence is opaque 
is to say that agents (or an observer or social planner) do not know the 
competencies of all the agents, and they know that they do not know the 
competencies of the agents.  This treatment of transparency involves three 
important assumptions.  Firstly, it is assumed that transparency is a binary 
notion.  Competence is either transparent or it is opaque.  Secondly, we assume 
that the transparency or opaqueness of competence is homogeneous across a 
population and is determined by the contingent circumstances of a particular 
social choice problem.  Finally we ignore cases where agents (or an observer or 
social planner) lack self-awareness of their knowledge of competence.  So we 
ignore cases where agents don't know they don't know competencies and we 
ignore cases of 'blind-sight' where agents do actually know the competencies, 
but are not aware that they know the competencies.  All three of these 
simplifying assumptions can be legitimately challenged.  There may be degrees 
of transparency, and these may be heterogeneous across the population11.  
                                                 
11
 Heterogeneous transparencies would raise interesting questions of how to attribute weights to 
different agents.  Is it better to trust an agent who you are certain has a competence of 0.6, or 
take a chance on an agent you are 0.8 confident has a competence of 0.9?   
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Furthermore there could be situations in which agents are not aware they do not 
know competencies and this could create the potential for errors12.  However, 
we are primarily concerned with cases in which groups of agents can track the 
truth.  Cases where agents know that they know the competencies and cases 
where agents know they do not know the competencies are the two types of 
social choice problem that are directly relevant to the truth-tracking ability of 
the aggregation procedures below.   
 
Independence of agents 
Agents are independent if the probability of them voting for an alternative, 
given the state of the world, is identical to the probability of them voting for an 
alternative, given the state of the world AND the vote of another agent.  The 
variable of independence captures the extent to which there is diversity in the 
voting behaviour of agents in a group.  At one extreme, where all agents are 
independent conditional on the state of the world, the vote of one agent tells us 
nothing about how another agent will vote.  At another extreme, where agents 
are entirely dependent, all agents vote identically and so the vote of one agent 
will tell us precisely how all other agents will vote.  If full-blown independence 
is violated, if the probability of an agent voting for an alternative given the state 
of the world is not identical to the probability of them voting for an alternative 
given the state of the world and the vote of another agent, then independence 
might be secured by conditionalising on the factors held in common between 
agents.  So agents will be conditionally independent if the probability of an 
                                                                                                                                            
 
12
 For example, agents might have the certain (but entirely mistaken) belief that agent  has 
competence of 1.0, and as a consequence make the wrong agent dictator.   
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agent voting for an alternative given the state of the world and any factors held 
in common between agents is identical to the probability of them voting for an 
alternative given the state of the world, any factors held in common between 
agents and the vote of another agent.   
 
Group size 
Group size, the number of agents who are permitted to express a judgement on 
an agenda, can have a significant impact on the probability that a certain 
aggregation procedure will deliver the correct social choice.  Group size is 
represented formally as n. 
 
With the taxonomy for the judgement-generating factors of the aggregation 
procedures now set out, we can move on to consider what combinations of 
judgement-generating factors are required for the different aggregation 
procedures to track the truth as group size increases. 
 
Aggregation procedures 
 
Dictatorship 
Under the aggregation procedure of dictatorship, the social choice is determined 
by one individual.  The positive reliability of the group is therefore identical to 
that of the dictator: 
 
 = 
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With dictatorship the group's negative reliability is always identical to its 
positive reliability in virtue of the assumption that an agent’s positive reliability 
is identical to the agent’s negative reliability, for all agents (including the 
dictator).   
 
If the competence of agents is transparent then the epistemically best the group 
can do is if the most competent member of the group is made the dictator.  The 
epistemically worst the group can do is if the least competent member of the 
group is made the dictator.  If the competence of agents, including the dictator, 
is not transparent then the probability of a correct social choice may simply be 
unknown.   
 
Violations of independence are not epistemically disadvantageous for the 
aggregation procedure of dictatorship.  Only a single agent gets to cast a vote 
and so the conditional probability of an agent voting correctly given the vote of 
another is irrelevant.  In fact if agent’s votes are determined by the truth-
conducive information they receive it is epistemically beneficial to share this 
information and violate independence, because in sharing information the 
competence of agents (including the dictator) increases.   
 
For the aggregation procedure of dictatorship to track the truth it is beneficial 
for individual agents to be as competent as possible.  This increases the 
probability that the agent selected at random from the group will be of high 
competence.  And if competence is transparent and we are able to select the 
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most competent agent to be dictator, then maximising the competence of the 
dictator is obviously of value. 
 
If, as is plausible, the competence of a population of agents is heterogeneous 
and ranges between 0 and 1 then as group size increases the probability of a 
correct social choice can also increase.  This is because increasing group size 
increases the probability that the group will include individuals with high 
competence.  Suppose we form a group of agents by taking samples from a 
wider population with heterogeneous competencies ranging from 0 to 1.  We 
can define the event of sampling an agent with the maximum level of 
competence as 3
.  We can assume that the probability of sampling any one 
agent who has a level of competence at the maximum level is independent of 
the event of sampling another agent who has a level of competence at the 
maximum level.  For each group of size n, ⋃ 3
 ⊆ ⋃ 3
*
6*
6 , and hence by the 
monotonicity of probability Pr	⋃ 3
 ≤ Pr	⋃ 3
*
6*
6 ).   
 
If the competence of agents’ is transparent then it is possible, ceteris paribus, to 
make a high competence agent the dictator.  In such cases, the relative and 
absolute epistemic performance of dictatorship as an aggregation procedure is 
good.  If the group contains at least one agent of high competence then making 
this agent dictator means the social choice chosen by this person is likely to be 
correct and more likely to be correct than that chosen by any of the other agents.  
Furthermore the baseline epistemic performance of the group using dictatorship 
is good since if the dictator has high competence they are more likely to select 
the correct alternative than a random choice.   
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If however the competence of agents is not transparent, then increasing group 
size may increase the probability that the competence of the dictator is the 
expected value of competence13.  However a dictator with this expected value of 
competence may not exist14.  Importantly, as group size increases the 
competence of the dictator (and therefore probability of a correct social choice) 
does not increase.  Furthermore, when competence is not transparent, the 
relative and absolute epistemic performance of the group can be poor (although 
it may be better than baseline reliability if average competence is greater than 
0.5). 
 
Henceforth I will term the aggregation procedure of dictatorship ‘expert 
dictatorship’, since I am interested in aggregation procedures that can track the 
truth and dictatorship only tracks the truth when the dictator is an expert.  The 
institutional features of expert dictatorship, namely the stipulation that the 
judgement of one agent will determine the social choice and that the most 
competent agent will be selected for this role, amount to a social epistemic 
mechanism.  Increased group size is epistemically virtuous for expert 
dictatorship since increasing group size tends to increase the level of 
competence of the expert dictator.  Under the framework of Steiner (1966), 
discussed briefly in the introduction, expert dictatorship is a disjunctive model 
of group productivity.  Only a single agent from the group performs the group’s 
task (selects the social choice) and the performance of the group (the probability 
                                                 
13
 In accordance with the law of large numbers.    
 
14
 For example, if half of all agents have a competence of 0.9 and half of all agents have a 
competence of 0.5, then the expected value of competence is 0.7.  However an agent with 
competence of 0.7 does not exist.   
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of a correct social choice) is limited to the ability (the competence) of that 
single agent.   
 
In a political setting, a form of expert dictatorship is employed where decisions 
are delegated to a Government Minister.  There may be far too many day to day 
decisions in government for the Cabinet to consider as a group.  Decisions in the 
defence portfolio will be the responsibility of the Minister of Defence.  The 
Minister of Defence will be provided with detailed briefings by his or her 
Ministry.  In addition, if the Prime Minister wants correct decisions to be made 
in this portfolio, he or she will appoint a Minister who has sufficient capability 
to make correct decisions.  As such, we should expect the Minister of Defence 
to have a high level of competence; we should expect him or her to be an expert.  
As the size of a Government’s majority in Parliament increases, the ‘pool of 
talent’ should also increase; the probability that the Government will include a 
member of exceptional ability, whom the Prime Minister can appoint as 
Minister of Defence, increases.   
 
Unanimity rule 
Under the aggregation procedure of unanimity rule, an alternative is the social 
choice if and only if every individual in the group votes for it.  The positive 
reliability of the unanimity rule, the probability that the group will select the 
correct alternative as the social choice, assuming the votes of agents are 
independent is: 
 
 =8
 ≤ 
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The higher the competence of individual agents, the more likely it is that the 
aggregation procedure of unanimity rule will select the correct alternative as the 
social choice.  The epistemic performance of the group is limited by the least 
competent member of the group therefore it is epistemically best if agents have 
as much truth-conducive information as possible.  It is better that the truth-
conducive information is spread around evenly in the group rather than being 
concentrated in the hands of just some of the agents.   
 
The transparency of competence does not have any impact on the actual ability 
of the group of agents to track the truth.  However for us to know the probability 
of a correct social choice we do need to know what the competencies of the 
different agents are.   
 
Unless the competence of agents is 1.0, increasing group size decreases the 
probability the group will identify the correct alternative i.e. increasing group 
size is epistemically harmful to the positive reliability of unanimity rule.  This is 
because the probability of a series of events occurring is less than or equal to the 
probability of the individual events occurring.  A unanimous verdict for the 
correct alternative requires all the agents in a group to vote for the correct 
alternative.  Suppose we start with a group size of one, which just includes 
agent .  The probability of a unanimous verdict for the correct alternative is: 
 
 = 
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Now we increase our group so that it is comprised of agents i and j.  For there to 
be a unanimous verdict for the correct alternative now, both agent i and agent j 
need to vote for the correct alternative.  The probability for this occurring is: 
 
 = 
 × : 
Furthermore: 
 

 × : ≤ 
 
 
Unless agent  is guaranteed to vote for the correct alternative (unless : = 1.0) 
then adding  to the group decreases the probability of a unanimous verdict for 
the correct alternative.   
 
Violations of independence (due to the sharing of information) are potentially 
epistemically advantageous for positive reliability unanimity.  Suppose the 
competence of agents conditional only on the state of the world () is 
homogeneous and  = 0.6.  If agents are probabilistically independent given the 
state of the world then the probability of a correct social choice is: 
 
 = 0.6* 
 
As  → ∞,  → 0.  If agents are probabilistically independent given the state 
of the world, then as stated above as group size increases towards infinity the 
probability of a correct social choice tends towards zero.  But if agents have 
identical information that determines their votes, then the conditional 
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probability of all  − 1 agents voting correctly given state of the world and 
given that the first agent votes correctly is 1.0.  As such, where independence is 
violated: 
 
 = 0.6 × 1.0* = 0.6 
 
Where agents are not conditionally independent (when they are probabilistically 
dependent) the probability of a correct social choice is identical to the 
probability that a single individual agent will select the correct alternative.  As 
such, increasing group size makes no difference to the probability the group will 
select the correct alternative. 
 
For positive reliability ⁺ (the probability of selecting the correct alternative as 
the social choice) the aggregation procedure of unanimity rule fails the tests of 
baseline, relative and absolute epistemic performance.  If we assume that the 
competence of agents is less than 1.0 and agents are independent then as group 
size increases the probability of a correct unanimous social choice tends towards 
zero.  As such the group will tend to be less likely than a random choice at 
selecting the correct alternative and the group will be less likely than an 
individual to select the correct social choice.  Furthermore the group will be 
unlikely simpliciter to select the correct social choice.   
 
Although unanimity rule is poor in terms of positive reliability, it does well in 
terms of negative reliability ⁻ (the probability of avoiding an incorrect 
alternative as the social choice).  If 
 is the probability that an agent will vote 
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for the correct alternative, then 1 − 
 is the probability that an agent will vote 
for the incorrect alternative.  If we assume the competence of agents is 
homogeneous then the probability that there will be a unanimous vote in favour 
of the incorrect alternative is 1 − 
*.  Therefore the probability of a group 
using unanimity avoiding the incorrect alternative as the social choice is: 
 
 = 1 − 1 − 
*	 
 
Provided that agents are not totally incompetent (provided that 
 is not zero) 
then as  → ∞,⁻ → 1 i.e. the probability of not selecting the incorrect 
alternative as the social choice tends towards certainty as the group size tends 
towards infinity.  The mechanism that drives the good epistemic performance of 
negative reliability unanimity is similar to the mechanism that drives the poor 
epistemic performance of positive reliability unanimity.  A unanimous verdict 
for the incorrect alternative requires all the agents in a group to vote for the 
incorrect alternative.  The probability of a series of events occurring is less than 
or equal to the probability of the individual events occurring, so as group size 
increases the probability of a unanimous verdict decreases towards zero.  ‘A 
unanimous verdict for the incorrect alternative/ not- a unanimous verdict for the 
incorrect alternative’ is a complete logical partition and so the probability of one 
of these events occurring is certainty.  If the probability a unanimous verdict for 
the incorrect alternative tends towards zero as group size increases, the 
probability of not having a unanimous verdict for the incorrect alternative tends 
towards certainty.   
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The ideal judgement-generating factors for unanimity rule to be successful at 
negative reliability are high competence, independence and (importantly) large 
group size.  Transparency of competence is not important for avoiding incorrect 
alternatives (though it is important for knowing how likely the group is to avoid 
incorrect alternatives).  Independence is important because if the conditional 
probability of one agent voting correctly given the state of the world and the 
fact that another agent votes correctly is 1.0, then the probability of the group 
avoiding the incorrect alternative as the social choice would be identical to the 
competence of an individual agent. 
 
In terms of negative reliability, the baseline, relative and absolute epistemic 
performance of unanimity rule as an aggregation procedure is good.  As group 
size n increases, unanimity rule will be better than random, better than an 
individual and likely to avoid the wrong alternative as the social choice.  
However there is a cost associated with negative reliability unanimity rule, 
namely that there is a high probability of no social choice.   
 
Henceforth we will term the aggregation procedure of unanimity rule ‘negative 
reliability unanimity rule’ since we are interested in the aggregation procedures 
that can track the truth.   
 
According to the Steiner (1966) taxonomy, the institutional features of 
unanimity rule would be a conjunctive model of group productivity since all 
agents have to perform the same action to get the desired outcome (all agents 
have to vote for the correct alternative for the correct alternative to be the social 
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choice).  The institutional features of the aggregation procedure of negative 
reliability unanimity rule are a social epistemic mechanism and would fit under 
the category of a disjunctive model of group productivity, since it only takes a 
single agent to vote for the correct alternative for the group to avoid the 
incorrect alternative as the social choice.   
 
Negative Reliability Unanimity Rule may be employed on criminal jury trials.  
Here it is thought the consequences of a false negative are better than the 
consequences of a false positive; that it is better to let a guilty person go free 
than to wrongly convict an innocent person.  Requiring a jury to have a 
unanimous verdict, and increasing the size of a jury from a single judge to 
twelve jurors, increases the probability of avoiding convicting the innocent.  In 
a political setting, negative reliability unanimity rule might be employed in 
cases where the consequences of a bad status quo policy are better than the 
consequences of moving to a new incorrect policy.  For example, pre-emptively 
attacking Iran on the mistaken assumption that they have nuclear weapons may 
be worse than forgoing the opportunity to attack Iran if indeed they do have 
nuclear weapons.  By insisting on a consensus on the decision to attack, and by 
including all twenty-three members of Cabinet rather just the Minister of 
Defence alone, the Government would increase the probability of avoiding a 
disastrous policy choice.     
 
 
 
 
 63 
Majority rule 
As with dictatorship, the group’s positive and negative reliabilities are identical 
under majority rule15.  Under majority rule, the social choice is the alternative 
that more than half of the individual members of a group vote for.  Under 
majority rule, the probability that the group selects the correct alternative as the 
social choice is given by16: 
 
 == 8
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If the competence of agents in a group is heterogeneous and symmetric about 
the mean then the following formula gives an approximation of the probability 
of a correct majority verdict17: 
 
 == DℎF G1 −GB* 
*G, 
 
where  is the average level of competence. 
 
In the special case in which the competence of agents is homogeneous, this is 
equivalent to18: 
                                                 
15
 Note that here we are still concerned with the probability of securing a majority of votes for 
the correct alternative – this allows us to assess the ability of a group using a judgement 
aggregation procedure like majority rule to identify the true state of the world.  As Romeijn and 
Atkinson (2011) note, it is also possible to calculate the probability that an alternative is correct, 
given that the alternative receives a majority of the votes.  Here the larger the absolute size of 
the majority for an alternative, the more likely that that alternative is the correct one on the 
agenda.   
 
16
 Owen, G., Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. (1989).  Here N is the set of all possible combinations 
of votes and S is the subset of N such that the total number of correct votes is greater than ½.  
 
17
 Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) Theorem V. 
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ℎFG1 −GB* 
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where  is the homogeneous level of competence. 
 
For majority voting to track the truth the competence of voters does not 
(necessarily) need to be transparent (though as we will see below, transparency 
helps).  However if competence is not transparent then we will not know 
whether or not the majority verdict is reliable19.  If the competence of agents is 
transparent then we can improve the epistemic performance of the aggregation 
procedure of majority rule by employing weighted voting.  If the competencies 
of agents are heterogeneous,  is maximised by assigning weights to individual 
voters as follows20: 
 
H
 ∝ log 
1 − 
 
 
Therefore, if we apply weights to the votes of agents according to the 
competence of agents, the probability of a correct majority verdict is given by21: 
 
 == 8
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18
 Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L (1983) Theorem I. 
 
19
 See the treatment in Dietrich, F.  (2008). 
 
20
 Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) Theorem XIII. 
 
21
 Bradley, R. and Thompson, C. (2012), adapted from Owen, G. Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. 
(1989). 
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The epistemic success of majority voting is explained by the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem (CJT).  The classic CJT applies to social choice problems in which 
simple majority voting is used to determine the social choice when there are two 
alternatives on an agenda, one of which is objectively correct.  The CJT has two 
assumptions: 
 
• Competence: the probability that agents will vote for the correct alternative is 
homogeneous, greater than ½ and less than 1. Formally  = 1 > Pr	! =
|) > 1/2; 
• Independence: the probabilities of any two agents voting for the correct 
alternative are independent, conditional on the state of the world.  
 
The classic CJT result comes in two parts: 
 
• Non-asymptotic CJT: the probability that the group will select the correct 
alternative is monotonically increasing as the group size increases;  
 
• Asymptotic CJT: in the limit as group size tends towards infinity, the 
probability of a correct majority verdict tends towards certainty.  Formally, 
	lim*→U  = 1.  
 
A simple proof for the asymptotic CJT can be found in the appendix of Dietrich 
(2008).  It is unclear whether a proof for the non-asymptotic CJT has been 
published previously, but Dietrich and Spiekermann (unpublished a) includes 
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such a proof.  The classic CJT has been extended from homogeneous 
competence to heterogeneous competence: Theorem V of Grofman et al. (1983) 
states that if the distribution of individual competencies is symmetric then we 
obtain results analogous to the classic CJT by substituting average competence 
for homogeneous competence.  Grofman et al. (1989) prove that in the limit, as 
n→∞, the asymptotic CJT holds for populations with heterogeneous 
competence, irrespective of the distribution of competencies, provided that the 
average competence is greater than 1/2.  No proof of the non-asymptotic CJT 
for heterogeneous competencies has yet been published, and this is a weakness 
in the literature.  
 
For the non-asymptotic CJT to hold for groups with heterogeneous 
competencies, we need a plausible interpretation of the symmetry clause in 
Theorem V of Grofman et al. (1983).  Let * be the average competency of a 
group of  agents and * be the probability that a group of n agents will select 
the correct alternative via majority rule.  The first interpretation of symmetry is 
that the distribution of competencies in a group with  members,  + 2 
members,  + 4 members...are symmetric but that * ≠ * ≠ *Y....  In 
other words, the distribution of competencies is symmetric within any given 
group, but the average competence varies as group size varies.  This cannot be 
the interpretation of symmetry that Grofman et al. intended as the following 
example shows.  Suppose there is a group of three agents whose competencies 
are 0.5, 0.6, 0.7.  The average competency is * = 0.6, meaning that the 
competence assumption of the CJT holds, and the distribution of competencies 
is symmetric about the mean.  The probability of this group generating a correct 
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majority verdict is * = 0.65, so the group does better than an average member.  
But the individual with a competence of  = 0.7 outperforms the group, and 
the non-asymptotic CJT does not hold.  If we start with a group size of one 
agent, comprised of the agent with competence of  = 0.7, then as we increase 
group size to three, the probability of a correct majority verdict is not 
monotonically increasing in group size. 
 
The second interpretation of the symmetry requirement in Theorem V is that 
1/2 < ₁ + ₂/2 = ₃ + ₄/2 = ₅ + ₆/2 =. . .. In other 
words, the distribution of competencies is symmetric within any given group, 
and the average competence remains constant as group size varies.  But again 
this cannot be the interpretation of symmetry intended.  Although the non-
asymptotic CJT holds under this second notion of symmetry, it is an extremely 
restrictive condition.  This notion of symmetry requires that exactly the right 
combination of pairs of agents is added to the group at the same time so as to 
maintain the average competence as group size increases.  It is implausible that 
this would occur. 
 
A third possible interpretation of the symmetry requirement is that agents are 
drawn independently from the same symmetric meta-distribution with expected 
value of competence >1/2.  For example the meta-distribution could have a 
uniform distribution on [0.2,1.0].  This is the interpretation that Ben-Yashar and 
Paroush (2000) seem to take when they modify the classic CJT.  They argue that 
"...in reality competence is not a conspicuous characteristic of individuals and 
very seldom can be estimated." (p.191).  Instead of the non-asymptotic CJT 
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comparing the group epistemic performance against the competence of each 
individual member of the group, they compare the group epistemic performance 
with the expected value of an individual group member's competence.  They 
prove that if each group member has a competence greater than 1/2 then the 
likelihood of a correct majority verdict is greater than the probability of a 
correct choice, chosen by an individual sampled at random.  However this is 
weaker than the monotonicity of the non-asymptotic CJT which as well as 
implying that a group will be more reliable than an individual, also implies that 
a larger group will be more reliable than a smaller group.   
 
Later in this thesis I argue that there may be cases where the competence of 
individual agents is transparent.  We may know the long run accuracy of an 
agent's votes in a relevant reference class of social choice problems.  As such 
we may have a good idea of the probability that they will choose the correct 
alternative.  However the long range accuracy of an agent's votes only gives an 
indication as to an agent's actual level of competence.  As such we cannot be 
certain that a given agent will in fact have the competence to outperform the 
group.  Nevertheless there may be other cases in which agents can prove to 
other agents what their competence is.  In these cases, the interpretations of 
heterogeneous competence for the CJT set out above are of no use.  The non-
asymptotic CJT does not hold for groups with heterogeneous and transparent 
competence because the probability of a correct majority verdict is not 
monotonically increasing in group size22.   
                                                 
22
 We can see this by again considering the example of a group with competencies (0.5, 0.6, 
0.7).  If the group starts with the agent with  = 0.7 then adding group members decreases the 
probability of a correct majority verdict. 
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It is important to see how the majority voting operates as a social epistemic 
mechanism.  To do so we will need to see what types of judgement-generating 
factors are required for this aggregation procedure to track the truth.   
 
Group size 
There are various proofs for the classic asymptotic CJT23.  The asymptotic CJT 
is often explained intuitively by the example of coin tosses24 (and I present this 
explanation later in this chapter).  A proof for the classic non-asymptotic CJT 
has only recently been presented in Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. 
(unpublished a).  Here I present an intuitive explanation of the classic non-
asymptotic CJT.  The following set of diagrams is intended as a pedagogical 
contribution to articulating how the mechanism behind the non-asymptotic CJT 
works.   
 
Suppose we have an agenda with two alternatives, with one of the alternatives 
being correct.  A vote will be taken to determine which of the two alternatives 
will be the social choice, and the vote will be decided by majority rule i.e. an 
alternative must receive more than 1/2 of the votes if it is to be the winner.  We 
assume that the competence of voters is homogeneous and 0.6 i.e. voters have a 
60% chance of voting for the correct alternative and a 40% chance of not voting 
for the correct alternative.  The votes of any two agents are assumed to be 
                                                 
23
 See for example, Ladha, K. (1992) and Dietrich, F. (2008).  
 
24
 See for example, List, C. and Goodin, R.E. (2001) and Estlund, D.M. (2008). 
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independent, conditional on the state of the world25.  If we only have one agent 
'1′ then there are only two logically possible ways in which that agent could 
vote, as seen below: 
 
Figure 2.4: the possible votes of a single agent. 
 1 
a ✓ 
b X 
 
'✓' means the agent voted for the correct alternative and 'X' means the agent 
voted incorrectly for the wrong alternative (equivalent to incorrectly not voting 
for the correct alternative).  We can use the table above to determine the 
majority winner.  In the first row the correct alternative received all of the votes, 
in the second row the correct alternative received none of the votes.  The table 
below highlights the rows in which the correct alternative is the majority 
winner: 
 
Figure 2.5: the majority winner, given a single agent. 
 1  
a ✓ Winner 
b X  
 
Because we have an assumed level of competence, we know the likelihood of 
each of the logically possible outcomes, as follows: 
                                                 
25
 Given these assumptions, the framework of the classic CJT applies. 
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Figure 2.6: the probability of a majority winner, given a single agent. 
 1  
a 0.6 Winner 
b 0.4  
 
The probability that the correct alternative will be the winner is then 0.6. 
 
But suppose we now have three agents.  The logically possible combinations of 
votes are now as follows: 
 
Figure 2.7: the possible combinations of votes, given three agents. 
 1 2 3 
a ✓ ✓ ✓ 
b ✓ ✓ X 
c ✓ X ✓ 
d ✓ X X 
e X ✓ ✓ 
f X ✓ X 
g X X ✓ 
h X X X 
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If there are three voters, then for the correct alternative to be the majority 
winner it must receive at least two of the votes.  The table below highlights the 
rows in which the correct alternative receives at least two votes: 
 
Figure 2.8: the majority winner, given three agents. 
 1 2 3  
a ✓ ✓ ✓ Winner 
b ✓ ✓ X Winner 
c ✓ X ✓ Winner 
d ✓ X X  
e X ✓ ✓ Winner 
f X ✓ X  
g X X ✓  
h X X X  
 
As can be seen from the table there are four possible combinations of votes (i.e. 
✓✓✓, ✓✓X, ✓X✓, or X✓✓) that will result in the correct alternative 
being the majority winner.  Because we have an assumed level of competence, 
we can calculate the likelihood that any given combination of votes will occur.  
For example, the probability that all three voters vote correctly is the probability 
that voter 1 votes correctly AND voter	2	votes correctly AND voter 3 votes 
correctly.  This is given by the probability that voter 1 votes correctly, TIMES 
the probability that voter 2 votes correctly TIMES the probability that voter 3 
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votes correctly.  These calculations are shown in the table below, just for the 
rows in which the correct alternative is the majority winner. 
 
Figure 2.9: the probability of a majority winner, given three agents. 
 1 2 3  
a 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 × 0.6 × 0.6 = 0.216 
b 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 × 0.6 × 0.4 = 0.144 
c 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 × 0.4 × 0.6 = 0.144 
d 0.6 0.4 0.4  
e 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 × 0.6 × 0.6 = 0.144 
f 0.4 0.6 0.4  
g 0.4 0.4 0.6  
h 0.4 0.4 0.4  
 
What then is the probability that the correct alternative is the winner?  There are 
four logically possible combinations of votes that will generate the correct 
alternative as the winner, so the correct alternative is the winner if it receives the 
votes of 1, 2 and 3; OR it receives the votes of	1 and 2 but not 3; OR the votes 
of 1 and 3 but not 2; OR it receives the votes of 2 and 3 but not 1.  This is given 
by the probability it receives the votes of 1, 2 and 3; AND it receives the votes 
of 1 and 2 but not 3; and so on.  This calculation is given immediately below: 
 
 = 0.216 + 0.144 + 0.144 + 0.144 = 	0.648	
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So with three voters the probability they will identify the correct alternative is 
0.648, compared with 0.6 for an individual agent.   
 
In fact we can see the general rule for calculating the probability that the best 
alternative will be the majority winner26.  We can do this in three steps. 
 
The probability for a given possible combination of votes occurring is given by:   
 
G1 − *G 
 
I.e. if there are ℎ number of voters who vote correctly there will be  − ℎ voters 
who vote incorrectly.  The probability of this combination of votes is given by 
multiplying the probabilities of the correct votes by the probabilities of the 
incorrect votes.  But there can be several different ways of getting the same 
number of correct versus incorrect votes (for example to get two correct votes 
from three voters).  To get a group of ℎ correct votes from a wider group of 
agents of size  we use the following abbreviation:   
 
DℎF 
 
This corresponds to: 
 
                                                 
26
 This treatment echoes Estlund (1994), but in fewer steps and reverse order. 
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!ℎ!  − ℎ! 
 
So we have: 
DℎF G1 − *G 
 
Finally we can specify that we want to add together all possible combinations of 
votes where there is a majority in favour of the best alternative.  The following 
gives a sum of all these values: 
 
=*GB*  
 
So finally we have: 
 
= DℎF G1 − *G
*
GB*
 
 
The simple calculations above illustrate the non-asymptotic version of the CJT.  
As the number of voters increases (from one to three) the probability that the 
correct alternative is the majority winner also increases.  The probability that the 
group will select the correct alternative is monotonically increasing as the group 
size increases.  As a group of two or more agents is greater in size than a group 
of one agent it follows that a group using majority rule is more likely than an 
individual to select the correct alternative.   
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To see micro-level the impact that adding more voters has on the result it is 
perhaps worth exploring what happens when we move from three to five voters.  
When we have five instead of three voters, the number of possible combinations 
of votes increases to 32, as shown below: 
 
Figure 2.10: the possible combinations of votes, given five agents.   
 1 2 3 4 5 Winner 
1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Winner 
2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 Winner 
3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 Winner 
4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 Winner 
5 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 Winner 
6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 Winner 
7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 Winner 
8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 X 
9 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 Winner 
10 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 Winner 
11 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 Winner 
12 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 X 
13 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 Winner 
14 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 X 
15 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 X 
16 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 X 
17 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 Winner 
18 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 Winner 
19 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 Winner 
20 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 X 
21 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 Winner 
22 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.4 X 
23 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 X 
24 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 X 
25 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 Winner 
26 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 X 
27 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 X 
28 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 X 
29 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 X 
30 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 X 
31 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 X 
32 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 X 
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Here, with five voters, the probability that the correct alternative wins a 
majority of votes27 is  = 0.68256.  Each of the rows in our original table in 
figure 2.8 has split into four sub-types.  Take the first row (a) from our original 
table in figure 2.9.  Here all voters vote correctly (and the probability for them 
doing so is 0.216).  If we now have five instead of three voters, then there are 
four possibilities.  The two additional voters 4 and 5 could continue the pattern 
and both vote correctly (figure 2.10, line 1).  Or the first new voter 4 could vote 
correctly and the second new voter 5 could vote incorrectly (figure 2.10, line 2), 
or the other way round, with 4 voting incorrectly and the 5 correctly (figure 2.9, 
line 3).  Finally it is possible that both of the two new voters 4 and 5 will vote 
incorrectly (figure 2.9, line 4). 
 
The effect of adding new voters is a matter of fine graining. There is greater 
diversity in the logically possible combinations of votes (32 instead of 8).  Just 
as many of the possible combinations of votes result in the correct alternative 
being the majority winner (exactly half).  Most of the combinations of votes 
have no change in outcome compared with the situation with three voters.  But 
some do - see lines 8, 12, 13, 20, 21, and 25.  In line 8 for example, agents 1 and 
2 vote correctly, but 3 votes incorrectly.  If there were just these three voters 
then the correct alternative would be the majority winner (as is seen in row b of 
the original table).  But with the addition of two voters 4 and 5, who both vote 
incorrectly, the result with five voters is a majority for the incorrect alternative.   
 
                                                 
27
 I present the results of the sample calculations with five decimal places so that the impact of 
increasing group size can be seen.  Of course, it should not be thought that this level of precision 
is possible when applying these results to real social choice problems.   
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Three of the rows in the table for five voters (figure 2.10) result in a shift from a 
correct winner to an incorrect winner (compared with three voters, figure 2.9):  
lines 8 (c.f. b), 12 (c.f. c) and 20 (c.f. e).  Three of the rows result in a shift from 
an incorrect winner to a correct winner: lines 13 (c.f. d), 21 (c.f. f) and 25 (c.f. 
g).  In effect these 'flips' balance each other out, there are just as many 'good' 
flips as there are 'bad' flips.  But what is interesting is that the good flips are 
more likely to occur than the bad flips.  Compare line 8 with line 21.  Line 8 
delivers a bad flip (compared to line b in the table for three voters).  It has two 
correct votes and three incorrect votes, so the probability of this combination of 
votes occurring is 0.6² × 0.4³ = 	0.02304.  Line 21 delivers a good flip 
(compared with line f in the table for three voters).  It has three correct votes 
and two incorrect votes, so the probability of this combination of votes 
occurring is 0.6³ × 0.4² = 	0.03456.  A shift from the correct alternative losing 
to the correct alternative winning is more likely to occur than a shift from the 
correct alternative winning to the correct alternative losing.  In fact if we 
subtract the increased probability of the correct alternative winning from the 
increased probability of the correct alternative losing, we get: 3 × 0.03456 −
3 × 0.02304 	= 	0.03456.  This accounts for the increase in the probability 
of a correct winner between three voters and five voters i.e.  0.68256 −
	0.648	 = 	0.03456 
 
Another way to see the underlying effect of the CJT is to consider the 
decisiveness of agents.  An agent is decisive if changing her vote can change the 
result of the election.  Let's consider the cases in which agent 1 is decisive.  If 
there are three voters, then agent 1 is decisive in 4/8 of the cases.  If there are 
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five voters, then agent 1 is decisive in 10/32 of the cases.  Increasing the 
number of voters decreases the importance of any given voter.  Any given voter 
can act erratically (vote for the wrong alternative), and if there are small 
numbers of voters the erratic vote of a given agent will have a big influence on 
the final result.  But if there are a large number of voters, then the erratic vote of 
a given voter can be weeded out by the influence of other voters.  Where there 
are large numbers of voters, erratic behaviour (voting incorrectly) can still 
impact on the outcome, but for this to occur, significant numbers of voters all 
need to act erratically together.  But where there are large numbers of voters, the 
probability of sufficiently large numbers of voters all acting erratically together 
is quite small.  This is what is meant by large numbers 'weeding out noise'. 
 
The impact on  of increasing  is illustrated in the graph below, assuming the 
competence and independence assumptions hold: 
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Figure 2.11: the probability of a correct majority verdict, as group size 
increases.   
 
 
 
Thus far we have been addressing the non-asymptotic CJT and seen why  is 
monotonically increasing in .  To understand the CJT fully we need to 
understand why it is that for the asymptotic CJT the upper limit of  is 
certainty.  The statistical phenomenon underlying the CJT is the law of large 
numbers (LLN).  The LLN can be stated as follows: 
 
The average value for a series of trials tends towards the expected 
value as the number of trials increases.   
 
We can see the law of large numbers in action when we toss a coin.  The 
expected value of a fair coin is 0.5 heads.  If we toss the coin a small number of 
times then we would not be surprised if we had something very different to 0.5 
heads.  But as the number of tosses increases we would increasingly expect 
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something very close to 0.5 heads.  If we had an infinite number of coin tosses 
we would expect exactly 0.5 of them to be heads. 
 
The expected value of an agent voting correctly is the homogeneous level of 
competence .  Suppose  = 0.6.  As group size increases it becomes 
increasingly likely that exactly 0.6 of the group will vote correctly.  In fact if we 
had an infinite number of voters exactly 0.6 of them would vote correctly.  0.6 
of voters in favour of the correct alternative is clearly a majority in favour of the 
correct alternative so as group size tends towards infinity the probability of a 
correct majority verdict tends towards certainty.   
 
Majority rule, as a social epistemic mechanism, is a compensatory model of 
group productivity according to the Steiner (1966) taxonomy.  As group size 
increases, the agents voting correctly offset the incorrect votes of a minority of 
agents.   
 
In a political setting, majority rule may be employed for passing legislation in 
parliament.  At least some of legislation passed in parliament can be incorrect or 
incorrect.  For example, if the rationale for banning a certain recreational drug is 
that this will reduce the number of drug-related deaths then it is a matter of fact 
whether the change in legislation will be effective or not28. The United 
Kingdom’s bicameral Westminster Parliament is comprised of the lower, 
democratically elected, House of Commons and the upper, appointed, House of 
Lords.  Members of the lower house are subject to party whipping and so the 
                                                 
28
 Identifying whether the legislation has been effective or not is a different and more difficult 
matter.   
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competence and independence assumptions of the CJT do not apply and it 
cannot be argued that the mechanism of majority rule allows the group to track 
the truth.  However, legislation must also be passed by the House of Lords.  As 
of 2012, the House of Lords was comprised of 308 members of the Government 
and 253 members of the opposition.  In addition there are 184 cross-benchers, 
24 Lords Spiritual and 19 non-affiliated members.  The Government’s majority 
in the House of Lords is between 55 and 98 (depending on how the Lords 
Spiritual and unaffiliated members vote),  If party whipping occurs and 
members vote according to non-epistemic grounds then, just as in the lower 
house, we cannot use the CJT to argue that the legislation passed by the House 
of Lords will be correct.  However, the ostensive justification for including 
cross-benchers is that these members bring with them a wealth of experience 
from a variety of different areas of public life.  The cross-bench members of the 
House of Lords are expected to cast their votes according to their best 
judgment.  We should expect the judgements of cross-bench members to be 
independent (given the diverse backgrounds) and for the members to have 
competence levels better than random (given their experiences and successes in 
life)29.  And the number of cross-benchers is sufficient to off-set the 
Government majority whose votes are cast on non-epistemic grounds.  By 
employing the judgement aggregation procedure of majority rule, and by 
increasing the number of cross-benchers, we should expect important pieces of 
legislation passed by the House of Lords to be correct.   
                                                 
29
 The judgements of the cross-benchers may not be independent if these agents have common 
information.  However, as Dietrich (2008) notes, independence in agent judgements can be 
regained by conditionalising on common factors.  There may be some difficult or misleading 
issues that the House of Lords faces which means the average competence level of the members 
is less than ½.  However, these issues cannot be the norm and we should expect the competence 
assumption of the CJT to hold in most cases.   
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Competence 
Recall that for the CJT results to hold, the average probability of an agent 
correctly voting for the correct alternative must be > 0.5.  Here I illustrate the 
impact both of competence below 0.5 and increasing competence. 
 
In the initial calculations above, it was assumed that competence was  = 0.6.  
If individual agents instead have competence  = 0.4 three such agents only 
have a  = 0.352 probability of selecting the correct alternative as the social 
choice via majority rule.  If the competence of agents is less than 0.5, then as 
the number of agents increases, the probability that the group will select the 
correct alternative via majority rule tends towards zero30. 
 
As the level of competence of agents increases, the probability that the group 
will select the correct alternative also increases.  For example, three agents with 
a competence of  = 0.6 have a  = 0.648 probability of selecting the correct 
alternative.  Three agents with competence of  = 0.7 have a  = 0.784 
probability of selecting the correct alternative.   
 
Independence 
The independence assumption of the CJT requires that the votes of individual 
agents are probabilistically independent, conditional on the state of the world.  
Ladha (1992), Estlund (1994), and Kaniovski (2010) all consider the impact of 
violations of the independence assumption, of shared information and correlated 
                                                 
30
 See Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) Theorem I. 
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votes.  Ladha argues that the probability a majority verdict is correct is inversely 
related to the average correlation.  Estlund argues that the presence of common 
influences does not easily rule independence in or out, and in fact deference to 
more competent opinion leaders can be epistemically virtuous.  Kaniovski 
argues that a negative correlation between the votes of agents increases the 
probability of a correct majority verdict, while positive correlation decreases the 
probability of a correct majority verdict.  In this section of the chapter I merely 
illustrate the impact that violations of independence can have on the social 
epistemic mechanism underlying the CJT.   
 
There is a family of independence conditions, ranging from weaker to stronger, 
which capture different dependence structures.  All independence conditions 
conditionalise on the state of the world and may then conditionalise on 
additional factors.  The 'full blown' or standard independence assumption of the 
CJT requires that the votes of different agents are probabilistically independent, 
given the state of the world.  Factors (including pieces of information) which in 
part determine the votes of agents, and which are held in common between 
agents, may lead to correlations in the votes of agents and violations of the 
standard independence condition.  But a weaker independence condition may 
still be met if agents' votes are independent, conditional on any common factors 
and the state of the world. 
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We can define the following: 
•  = Pr	! = |) is the probability that agent 	 votes for the correct 
alternative, given the state of the world. 
• | = Pr	(! = |, ! = 1) is the probability that agent 1	 votes for the 
correct alternative given the vote of agent 2	and the state of the world.   
 
The standard independence assumption requires, that  = | i.e. the fact that 
agent 2 votes correctly or incorrectly in no way effects the vote of agent 1.  This 
must be true for all the agents.  The votes of agents will be determined by the 
factors they possess (including, but not limited to truth-conducive evidential and 
background information).  If no agents have factors in common then standard 
independence holds.  If some agents have vote-determining factors in common 
then standard independence will be violated.  Where standard independence 
holds, the probability of three agents with  = 0.6 selecting the correct 
alternative via majority rule is  = 0.648. 
 
Now we can see what impact violating the standard independence assumption 
has.  Let's consider a situation in which agents 2 and 3 follow precisely what 
agent 1 does, because they have identical vote determining factors in common.  
This is illustrated in figure 2.12 below. 
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Figure 2.12: the probability of a correct majority winner, given dependent 
voters.    
 1 2 3  
a ✓ ✓ ✓ Winner 
b ✓ ✓ ✓ Winner 
c ✓ ✓ ✓ Winner 
d ✓ ✓ ✓ Winner 
e X X X  
f X X X  
g X X X  
h X X X  
 
As we can see there are now only two possible combinations of votes: three 
votes for the correct alternative or three votes for the incorrect alternative.  
Agent 1 has a 0.6 chance of voting for the correct alternative, whereas the 
conditional probability of 2 voting correctly given that 1 votes for the correct 
alternative is 1.0.  This is also true of agent 3.  Therefore the probability of the 
correct alternative being the majority winner is: 
 
 = 0.6 × 1.0 × 1.0 = 	0.6 
 
This result is identical to that for a single agent.  The impact of violating the 
standard independence condition is equivalent to a reduction in the number of 
voters.   
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When agents are independent of other agents conditional on the state of the 
world and on common factors we can still see an effect from increasing 
numbers of agents.  Suppose agents 2 and 3 are not independent of agent 1 
given the state of the world.  Formally, Pr	!, = |) ≠ Pr	(!, = |, !).  
However agents 2 and 3 are independent of agent 1 conditional on the state of 
the world and common factors h,, .  Formally, Pri!, = j, h,, k =
Pr	(!, = |, h,, , ! = 1).  The common factors lead to a bias of agents 2 
and 3 that is 0.1 in the direction of agent 1’s vote.  So, for example, the 
probability of agents 2 or 3 voting correctly given that 1 has voted correctly is 
+0.1 greater than the unconditional probability31 of agents 2 or 3 voting 
correctly of ,, = 0.6.  Similarly the probability of agents 2 or 3 voting 
correctly given that 1 has voted incorrectly is −0.1 less than the unconditional 
probability of agents 2 or 3 voting correctly.  The probability of agents 2 or 3 
voting incorrectly given that 1 has voted correctly is −0.1 less than the 
unconditional probability of agents 2 or 3 voting incorrectly.  Finally the 
probability of agents 2 or 3 voting incorrectly given that 1 has also voted 
incorrectly is +0.1 greater than the unconditional probability of agents 2 or 3 
voting incorrectly.  This is summarised in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Or to be precise the probability of agents 2 or 3 voting correctly conditional just on the state 
of the world.   
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Figure 2.13: the probability of agent 2 and agent 3’s votes. 
 
 ✓ X 
✓ 0.7 0.3 
X 0.5 0.5 
 
This dependence transfers into the overall probability that the correct alternative 
will be the majority winner.   
 
Figure 2.14: the probability of a correct majority winner, given dependencies 
between agents.  
 1 2 3  
a 0.6 0.7 0.7 Winner
 0.6×0.7×0.7= 0.294 
b 0.6 0.7 0.3 Winner
 0.6×0.7×0.3= 0.126 
c 0.6 0.3 0.7 Winner
 0.6×0.3×0.7= 0.126 
d 0.6 0.3 0.3  
e 0.4 0.5 0.5  
f 0.4 0.5 0.5 Winner
 0.4×0.5×0.5= 0.1 
g 0.4 0.5 0.5  
h 0.4 0.5 0.5  
			 = 	0.294 + 	0.126 + 	0.126 + 0.1 = 	0.646	
Agent
 1's
 v
ote
 
2 or 3's vote 
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With the standard independence assumption fulfilled, the probability of a 
correct winner is  = 0.648.  If standard independence is violated and agents 
are not conditionally independent, the probability of a correct winner is  =
0.6.  With violation of standard independence, but with agents independent, 
conditional on common factors, the probability of a correct winner drops to 
 = 0.646 in these sample calculations.  This reduced epistemic performance 
can be interpreted as agents being less able to compensate for the mistakes of 
other agents, given that they share some of the vote determining factors that 
lead the other agents to vote for the incorrect alternatives.   
 
It is also possible to construct examples to show how in some cases violations 
of standard independence are epistemically virtuous.  Suppose we have a group 
of three agents whose competencies are as follows: , ,   = 0.7,0.6,0.6.  
As can be seen, one of the agents is more competent that the other two.  Without 
any deference the probability of a correct majority winner is  = 0.696. 
 
Now suppose that the two less competent agents defer to their more competent 
colleague to degree 0.1.  This is represented in the figure below: 
 
Figure 2.15: the probability of agent 2 and 3’s votes 
 
 ✓ X 
✓ 0.7 0.3 
X 0.5 0.5 
 
Agent
 1's
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ote
 
2 or 3's vote 
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This dependence transfers into the overall probability that the correct alternative 
will be the majority winner, as follows.   
 
Figure 2.16: the probability of a correct majority winner, given some 
dependence between voters.   
 1 2 3  
a 0.7 0.7 0.7 Winner
 0.7×0.7×0.7= 0.343 
b 0.7 0.7 0.3 Winner
 0.7×0.7×0.3= 0.147 
c 0.7 0.3 0.7 Winner 
0.7×0.3×0.7= 0.147 
d 0.7 0.3 0.3  
e 0.3 0.5 0.5  
f 0.3 0.5 0.5 Winner
 0.3×0.5×0.5= 0.075 
g 0.3 0.5 0.5  
h 0.3 0.5 0.5  
 = 0.343 + 0.147 + 0.147 + 0.075 = 0.712 
 
If this group of three agents vote independently the probability of a correct 
majority is  = 0.696.  If they partially defer to the more competent group 
member the probability of a correct majority is  = 0.712, a clear 
improvement.  The epistemic improvement can be interpreted as follows.  
Deference means agents have less ability to compensate for the errors of other 
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agents (since agents will tend to make the same mistakes), but the deference 
itself generates gains in competence.  The gains in competence mean agents are 
less likely to vote incorrectly and less likely to need other agents to compensate 
with correct votes.  The gain in competence more than off-sets the drop in 
compensating ability.   
 
It is important to note that the extent to which truth-conducive information 
affects competence and the extent to which shared information affects 
conditional probabilities of voting correctly are both big topics.  More detailed 
treatments are given in Ladha (1992) and Estlund (1994).  However, we can 
make four general points here.  Firstly, various violations of independence mean 
that the probability of voting correctly is no longer equivalent to competence 
.  
We can no longer use the value of an agents competence in the calculations for 
determining the probability of a correct majority verdict because how an agent 
votes depends on how other agents vote.  Instead we would need to use the 
value of an agent’s competence, given the common factors or votes of other 
agents (we would need to use the value of an agent’s competence conditional on 
the common factors).  Secondly, violations of standard independence are 
epistemically permissible (there is still value in increasing group size), provided 
that when we conditionalise on common factors and the state of the world there 
is still some randomness left in the votes of agents i.e. provided that the 
probability of voting correctly given the vote of another agent (or common 
factors) is not 0 or 1.  For agents to be independent conditional on the state of 
the world and on common factors they need to have at least some information 
held uniquely by them and not shared by other agents.  Being independent 
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conditional on common factors means there is at least some chance that an agent 
will vote correctly when other agents vote incorrectly, so as to compensate for 
the incorrect votes.  Thirdly, ceteris paribus violations of independence are 
epistemically bad.  If agents are entirely dependent then as we have seen  = 
 
and increased group size makes no different to the probability of a correct 
majority verdict.  Ceteris paribus,  is maximised when there are no violations 
of independence.  Finally violations of independence can in some cases be 
epistemically advantageous if they increase an agent's competence level.  The 
extent to which this is the case will depend on the assumptions made in 
particular cases.  While violations in independence mean agent 1 is less able to 
compensate for the incorrect vote of agent 2, violations of independence can 
also increase the competence level of 2 such that 2 is less likely to vote 
incorrectly and less likely to need 1 to compensate with their vote.   
 
I will consider the issue of violations of independence again in chapter 4 of this 
thesis, where I consider in greater detail how the judgement-generating factors 
of competence and independence form, and in chapter 7 of this thesis where I 
consider information sharing as a response to the problem of finite information.   
 
Summary 
 
Different aggregation procedures have the ability to track the truth as group size 
increases given certain judgement-generating factors.  In other words they 
provide a conditional epistemic justification for group decision making.  We can 
see a summary of the requirements in the table below.   
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Figure 2.17: a summary of the judgement-generating factors required for the 
aggregation procedures to track the truth.   
 (Expert) 
Dictatorship 
Majority 
Rule 
(Negative 
Reliability) 
Unanimity 
Rule 
Transparency 
of competence 
levels 
Important Not crucial, 
but 
desirable 
Irrelevant 
Competence 
levels, 
including 
distribution 
Important Important, 
especially 
distribution 
Important 
Independence Harmful Important Important 
 
We can make a number of comments at this point.  All three aggregation 
procedures recommend high levels of agent competence.  For us to justify the 
truth-tracking ability of majority rule we require a certain distribution of 
competencies in the group - either homogenous or symmetric about the mean - 
but we do not necessarily require the competencies of agents to be transparent 
(although this would be desirable as we could employ weighted majority rule).  
Dictatorship, on the other hand, does not require any particular distribution of 
competencies.  It can be successful at tracking the truth if only one member of 
the group has any truth-conducive signals whatsoever.  However, for 
dictatorship to be epistemically successful the competence of agents must 
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necessarily be transparent.  Independence is important for both majority rule (as 
justified by the CJT) and negative-reliability unanimity rule. 
 
Aggregation procedures are a feature of political processes.  Expert dictatorship, 
negative reliability unanimity rule and majority rule give conditional support to 
the truth-tracking ability of groups, and amount to social epistemic mechanisms.  
Given certain judgement-generating factors (levels, distributions and 
transparencies of competence; and independence of agents) groups employing 
these aggregation procedures can have good baseline, relative and absolute 
group epistemic performance.  But the challenge is to account for the robustness 
of the antecedent of this conditional justification.  We need to provide a model 
for how the inputs required for the epistemic success of these aggregation 
procedures are feasible.  This is discussed in depth in subsequent chapters.   
 
Majority voting, the CJT and law of large numbers feature prominently in 
epistemic defences of democracy.  As such there is an extensive literature on the 
CJT, including extensions and critiques (some of which I covered in this 
chapter, some of which will be discussed in subsequent chapters).  If it is to be 
argued that, given certain inputs, groups can use the aggregation procedure of 
majority voting to track the truth then we need to assess whether the literature 
on the CJT places further restrictions on the epistemic performance of majority 
voting as an aggregation procedure.  We begin this task in the next chapter.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the challenge that increased agenda size poses for the CJT.   
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Chapter 3: The Condorcet Jury Theorem - 
agenda size and competence. 
 
The discussion in the previous chapter on judgement aggregation procedures 
assumed that the agenda for a social choice comprised two alternatives, one 
correct and one incorrect.  An obvious concern with this simplification is that 
very many real-world social choice problems have more than two plausible 
alternatives, and a social planner may not be able to identify the one correct 
alternative in advance in order to set a two-placed agenda.  In addition, 
increasing agenda size may decrease the competence level of agents, the 
probability that individual agents will vote for the correct alternative. 
 
Increasing agenda size poses particular problems for the judgement 
aggregation procedure of majority rule and the classic Condorcet Jury 
Theorem.  In this chapter I consider extensions of the classic Condorcet Jury 
Theorem to cope with multiple alternatives.  I argue that existing extensions to 
the classic Condorcet Jury Theorem run the risk of either requiring too much 
effort on the part of the agents, or they risk decreasing the competence of 
agents.  I argue for a mixed approach for extending agenda size beyond two 
alternatives, with multiple elections, agendas containing multiple alternatives 
and varying group sizes.   
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I also address the challenge posed to the Condorcet Jury Theorem by David 
Estlund's Disjunction Problem.  The Disjunction Problem makes use of varying 
agenda size to contest whether it is possible, in principle, to justify the 
competence assumption holding.  I carefully analyse the Disjunction Problem 
and argue that at best the Disjunction Problem shows how the framing of an 
agenda by a social planner can impact on whether the competence assumption 
does or does not hold.  However the Disjunction Problem, as a criticism of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem, relies on a straw-man argument.  No one should 
attempt such an in principle justification for the competence assumption holding 
in particular social choice problems.   
 
Agenda size 
 
Very many social choice problems will have more than two possible 
alternatives.  There can also be an objective quality ordering over that set of 
alternatives: some of the alternatives will be good, some will be bad and some 
will be neutral.  For example if a group has a unique agreed goal of reducing 
carbon emissions, then a poor policy alternative would be to reduce the tax on 
petrol (people will drive more if driving is cheaper, increasing emissions).  A 
policy alternative of encouraging hydrogen powered cars may be neutral if the 
hydrogen fuel is produced from fossil fuels.  A policy alternative of encouraging 
fuel efficient cars may be a good alternative, but not as good at reducing carbon 
emissions as an alternative of producing all energy via nuclear fission (see 
figure 3.1 below). 
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Figure 3.1: a quality ranking of alternatives.   
 
The set of possible alternatives and the objective quality ordering over that set 
are matters of fact.  But the issue we are dealing with is an epistemic one.  
Agents do not have immediate access to this objective quality ordering and this 
can be for a variety of reasons.  Firstly, the alternatives may not be presented in 
a ready-made quality ordering and alternatives could be mixed up with non-
alternatives.  Agents need to do some work to separate out the relevant 
alternatives (for example those that could have an effect on carbon emissions) 
from those alternatives that are irrelevant to the issue at hand (for example, 
alternatives that are more to do with improving health care).  Once agents have 
identified and separated out the alternatives they also need to sort them into 
their appropriate quality ordering if they are to select the best one32.  But this 
initial level of opaqueness may be relatively easy for individual agents to deal 
                                                 
32
 To be clear the concern of this thesis is social choice problems where there is one uniquely 
correct alternative.  As such, even when there is quality ordering over a set of alternatives, it is 
not necessary for a group to identify the complete quality ordering.  It is only necessary to 
identify which alternative is strictly better than all the others. 
Increasingly bad alternatives Increasingly good alternatives 
 
Neutral 
:decrease 
tax on petrol 
Y:nuclear 
fission 
:hydrogen 
powered 
cars 
 :fuel 
efficient cars 
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with, or it may be something that a social planner (such as an electoral official) 
can do in setting an agenda.   
 
The second level of epistemic difficulty arises because the intrinsic quality of 
alternatives may not be clear and the sheer number of alternatives may create 
further opaqueness.  Even experts may have some difficulty in determining the 
intrinsic quality of some alternatives.  For example, the extent to which fuel 
efficient cars will reduce emissions depends on a variety of factors including the 
design of the car engines, the price of fuel and how people respond to 
incentives.  As a result it can be very difficult to predict the outcome of such a 
policy.  Also, it seems plausible that a given individual's ability to identify the 
best alternative decreases as the number of alternatives increases.  Whereas an 
individual might be quite competent at identifying the best alternative from a set 
of five, they may have more difficulty at selecting the best alternative out of a 
set of 100, 1000 or 100,000.  Arguably the following thesis is prima facia 
plausible: 
 
As the number of alternatives tends towards infinity the competence of 
agents, the probability that they will vote for the best alternative, tends 
towards zero.   
 
The extent to which this thesis is true - the degree to which competence 
decreases as the number of alternatives increases - is an empirical matter and is 
likely to depend on the contingent circumstances of a particular social choice 
problem.  But consider the example from figure 3.1 above regarding alternatives 
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for dealing with climate change.  Agents might have a competence of  = 0.3, 
they may have a 30% chance of voting for the correct alternative of nuclear 
fission.  This uniquely correct alternative could be further refined into more 
specific alternatives.  Let's call these finer grained alternatives for nuclear 
fission ‘reactor type A’, ‘reactor type B’, ‘reactor type C’ and ‘reactor type D’.  
The objective quality ordering over these alternatives is: reactor type A > 
reactor type B > reactor type C > reactor type D.  The probability of voting for 
one of the finer grained alternatives of nuclear fission must sum to 0.3; the 0.3 
probability of voting for the correct alternative must be divided among the finer 
grained alternative when they are placed on the agenda.  So unless agents have 
zero probability of voting for reactor type B, reactor type C and reactor type D, 
then as the correct alternative is refined into more specific alternatives, 
competence drops.  This second level of epistemic opaqueness provides a 
potential niche for employing the epistemic power of groups. 
 
With the aggregation procedure of majority rule the problem of increasing 
agenda size is particularly acute.  If agenda size increases, the competence of 
agents can decrease.  If the competence of agents drops below a half (i.e. 
 < 0.5) then the probability of an agent voting for any one of the incorrect 
alternatives will be greater that 0.5.  The classic CJT states that when  < 0.5 
the probability of a correct majority verdict is monotonically decreasing in 
group size and in the limit tends to zero33.  In other words, the increasing 
number of alternatives and associated impact on agent competence levels means 
                                                 
33
 See Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) Theorem I. 
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majority voting harms a group’s ability to track the truth; increasing group size 
is an epistemic disadvantage.   
 
The problem is that the classic CJT is simply silent on social choice problems 
where there are more than two alternatives.  The set of possible political social 
choice problems that only involve two alternatives is likely to be a very small 
subset of the set of all possible political social choice problems.  Therefore, thus 
far, we only have a very limited justification for majority voting as a mechanism 
by which groups of agents can track the truth. 
 
Here I outline a number of extensions of majority rule and the classic CJT to 
cope with more than two alternatives.  Firstly, there are the Condorcet and 
Borda extensions, as discussed by Young (1988).  The other major extension 
comes from List and Goodin (2001) who extend the classic CJT to plurality rule 
over many alternatives.  I will discuss each of these in turn. 
 
Condorcet and Borda extensions of the dichotomous CJT 
Here I follow the treatment in Young (1988), where the author goes to 
considerable effort to clarify and reconstruct Condorcet’s own approach for 
extending majority rule beyond two alternatives.   
 
Condorcet’s own extension of majority rule to cover multiple alternatives 
requires that each possible combination of alternatives is voted on in a pairwise 
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fashion34.  For example, if there are three alternatives ₁, ₂ and ₃ then three 
elections need to occur: ₁	!. ₂, ₂	!. ₃ and ₁	!. ₃.  If an alternative 
(₁, ₂ or ₃) is the majority winner in every pairwise comparison then it is 
likely to be the best alternative.   
 
It is unclear why pairwise sequential voting should track the truth.  Young 
(1988) is primarily concerned with procedures for identifying the correct quality 
ordering or ranking rather than identifying the one best or correct alternative.  
However here I provide a brief justification for why Condorcet’s own extension 
to multiple alternatives is likely to generate the correct winner in a series of 
pairwise choices.  Suppose that the objective quality ordering over alternatives 
is  >	 > 	₃	, meaning that  is the uniquely best alternative.  The 
probability that  will be the majority winner (Prn) is given by: 
 
Prn = Prn	 >  × Prn	 >   
 
In other words the probability that alternative  will be the majority winner in 
all pair-wise comparisons is given by the probability that  will be the majority 
winner in a comparison against  Prn >  times the probability that  
will be the majority winner in a comparison against   Prn >  .   
 
Similarly the probabilities that the incorrect alternatives  or   are the 
majority winners over all other alternatives are as follows: 
                                                 
34
 Note again that we are not interested in generating a complete quality ordering over all the 
alternatives, just identifying the uniquely best alternative.  Therefore we ignore Condorcet’s and 
Borda’s proposals for generating a complete quality ordering over multiple alternatives. 
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Prn = Prn	 >  × Prn	 >   
Prn  = Prn	 >  × Prn	 >  
 
If the competence and independence assumptions of the classic CJT hold then it 
is more likely that there will be a correct majority winner than an incorrect 
majority winner in each pair-wise choice.  Where the two CJT assumptions 
hold, the probability of a correct majority winner will be  > 0.5.  Where the 
competence and independence assumptions hold, the probability of an incorrect 
majority winner is  < 0.5.  Therefore the probability of the three different 
alternatives being the majority winner in every pairwise comparison is 
respectively: 
 
Prn = > 0.5 × > 0.5 
Prn = < 0.5 × > 0.5 
Prn  = < 0.5 × < 0.5 
 
As can be seen the correct alternative  is more likely to win a majority in all 
pairwise comparisons than any of the other alternatives are.  It is unclear what to 
do when no alternative wins every pairwise comparison or where there are 
cyclical majorities.  Young proposes a modified solution to Condorcet’s own 
proposal for resolving cyclical majorities when we are interested in complete 
rankings.  Young’s solution is to reverse the ordering of the pairwise 
comparison of alternatives that have the least combined plurality.  If we apply 
this solution to the problem of finding the uniquely best alternative then to 
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overcome cyclical majorities we pick the pairwise comparison that had the 
lowest margin of victory and reverse the verdict.  This is justified by Grofman et 
al. (1983) Theorem III “For  > 0.5, the larger the size of the majority in favour 
of an alternative, the more likely is that alternative to be the correct one” 
(p.265).  If no alternative wins every pairwise comparison we should reverse the 
result with the lowest margin of victory, since this is least likely to be correct. 
 
We can use Condorcet’s own approach to ensure that, where there are multiple 
alternatives, every possible alternative is considered by the voting group.  As a 
consequence the resultant social choice is almost certainly likely to be the best 
alternative (assuming the competence and independence assumptions of the CJT 
are met and that there are sufficient numbers of voters).  It follows that majority 
rule continues to meet the standards of baseline, relative and absolute epistemic 
performance for social choice problems involving multiple alternatives.  As 
group size tends towards infinity the uniquely best alternative is almost certain 
to be selected by the group and the group is more likely than an individual or a 
random choice to select the best alternative.   
 
But there is a problem with this extension of the CJT to underwrite the 
epistemic performance of majority rule.  It demands that we have a pair-wise 
comparison between every possible combination of alternatives.  With even 
modest numbers of alternatives we will require a lot of elections.  The precise 
formula for determining the number of elections is: 
 
" = 1 − 2  
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where " is the number of elections and  is the number of alternatives.  So if, 
for example, there are 100 possible alternatives we will need 4,950 elections.  If 
there are 1000 possible alternatives then we will need 499,500 elections.  Even 
nearly five thousand elections (for one hundred possible alternatives) is a 
significant burden to place on voters.   
 
A simpler way of achieving a pair-wise comparison between every alternative is 
not to run " = oo  elections but rather to ask agents to provide their 
judgement of the quality rankings over the alternatives.  For example, an agent 
could rank the alternatives (correctly) as  >  >  .  From this information 
it is clear that if this agent were forced to make a series of pairwise comparisons 
between each of the alternatives they would cast a vote for  > ,  >   
and  >  .  The advantage of asking for rankings rather than a series of 
pairwise judgements is that it requires less effort on behalf of agents: agents 
only need to fill out one (possibly lengthy) ballot sheet.  There is little point in 
agents participating in a pairwise comparison of 	!.   when it has already 
been determined that they would vote for  >  and  >  .  Moreover, 
asking each agent for a ranking of alternatives avoids possible inconsistency on 
behalf of the agent, for example it prevents an agent from voting for  >  
when they have already voted for  >  and  >  .   
 
If agents provide a social planner with a complete quality ordering then it is 
possible to use an aggregation procedure other than the Condorcet winner.  
Instead we can employ a Borda count.  Under a Borda count, the alternative that 
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is ranked last in an agent’s ordering receives no points.  The alternative that is 
ranked second to bottom receives one point, the alternative ranked third to 
bottom receives three points, and so on.  The winning alternative is the one that 
receives the most points.  Importantly, the Borda winner is more likely to be the 
correct social choice than the pair-wise Condorcet winner is35.   
 
Even if we choose to employ a Borda count to cope with multiple alternatives, 
this can still place significant burdens on the voters.  It takes little time to rank 
three alternatives in order of quality.  Sorting 25 possible alternatives into the 
apparent quality ordering may take considerable time and effort.  Ranking 100 
or 1000 alternatives would be an unfair task to impose on most agents. 
 
The beauty of the standard CJT framework of a dichotomous choice is that 
agents are only required to cast one judgement, namely for the alternative they 
judge to be the best.  Fortunately there is an extension to majority voting to cope 
with multiple alternatives that preserves this simplicity.   
 
The List and Goodin extension of the CJT to plurality voting over multiple 
alternatives 
List and Goodin (2001) extend the classic CJT from majority voting over two 
alternatives to plurality voting over many alternatives.  Under the aggregation 
procedure of plurality rule, an alternative is the social choice if and only if it 
receives strictly more votes than any of the other alternatives.  As discussed in 
                                                 
35
 See Young (1988).  According to Young’s arguments if agent competence is high and group 
size is sufficiently large then any reasonable decision rule is likely to generate the correct social 
choice.  However if competence is close to 0.5, the Borda count is epistemically superior to a 
pairwise Condorcet choice. 
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the previous chapter, the classic CJT result relies on the law of large numbers.  
Suppose we have a fair coin.  In the long run we should expect this coin to give 
us heads roughly half of the time.  If we were to toss the coin just a few times - 
say ten times - then we would not think it unusual to get 6, 7 or 8 heads.  But if 
we toss the coin a thousand times then we are very unlikely to get 600, 700 or 
800 heads.  As the number of tosses increases it becomes increasingly likely 
that we will get heads half of the time.  The competence assumption of the CJT 
requires that on average voters select the better of two alternatives slightly more 
than half of the time.  Therefore as the number of voters increases it becomes 
increasingly likely that the better of two alternatives will receive slightly more 
than half of all votes.  If the better of two alternatives receives slightly more 
than half of the votes it will be the majority winner.  Therefore as the number of 
voters increases it becomes increasingly likely that the better of two alternatives 
will be the majority winner. 
 
The List and Goodin result also rests on the law of large numbers and flows 
naturally from the classic two-alternative case.  Suppose we now have three 
alternatives - ₁, ₂ and ₃.  ₁ is the best alternative and voters have a 
competence of  = 0.4 i.e. agents have a 40% probability of correctly voting for 
₁ as the best alternative.   Voters have a 0.3 probability of selecting ₂ and a 
0.3 probability of selecting ₃ as the best alternative.  As the number of voters 
increases it becomes increasingly likely that ₁ will receive 40% of the vote 
whereas ₂ and ₃ will receive 30% of the votes each.  ₁ will not be the 
majority winner because ₁ receives 40%, less than the >50% required to be the 
majority winner.  Not − ₁	¬ ≡ ₂	⋁	₃ receives 60% of the vote and so 
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if this was a simple pair-wise comparison between the correct ₁ and incorrect 
¬₁, the incorrect ¬₁ would be the majority winner.  But ₁ will be the 
plurality winner as ₁ receives more votes than any other alternative (on the 
three-placed agenda ₁ receives 40% of the votes, which is more than the 30% 
₂ receives and more than the 30% ₃ receives).   
 
We can use the List and Goodin extension of the CJT to ensure that every 
possible alternative is considered by the voting group, by placing every possible 
alternative on the same agenda.  We can state the extended CJT as follows.  
Suppose we have a social choice problem where plurality voting will be used to 
identify the correct alternative as the social choice from a set of  possible 
alternatives.  The extended CJT has two assumptions: 
 
• Extended competence: the probabilities that agents will vote for the correct 
alternative are homogeneous and greater than the probability that they will vote 
for any of the other alternatives; 
• Independence: the events of any two agents voting for the correct alternative 
are independent. 
 
The extended CJT36 result comes in two parts: 
 
• Non-asymptotic extended CJT: the probability that the group will select the 
correct alternative is monotonically increasing as the group size increases; 
                                                 
36
 List and Goodin (2001) focus on the extended asymptotic CJT and provide a formal proof for 
this result.  The extended non-asymptotic CJT is illustrated with sample calculations in their 
paper.   
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• Asymptotic extended CJT: in the limit as group size tends towards infinity, the 
probability of a correct plurality verdict tends towards certainty. 
 
Plurality rule then becomes a replacement for majority rule as a democratic 
aggregation procedure37.  Plurality rule exhibits the virtues of good baseline, 
relative and absolute epistemic reliability.  Provided that the extended 
competence and independence assumptions hold and provided the group is of a 
sufficient size then a group employing plurality rule is more likely than random, 
more likely than an individual and likely simpliciter to select the correct 
alternative as the social choice38.   
 
The use of the List and Goodin extension of the CJT to support the epistemic 
performance of democratic aggregation procedures runs up against the problem 
discussed earlier in the chapter, namely as the number of alternatives increases 
the competence of agents may decrease.  Note that, unlike in the classic CJT, 
the problem is not that competence levels will drop to a level such that the 
extended CJT competence assumption does not hold.  Rather the concern is that 
because competence levels are so low, the probability of a correct plurality 
winner will be too low.  
                                                 
37
 Plurality rule is very similar to majority rule.  In both cases every agent gets to cast a vote.  In 
both cases, the vote of more than one agent but fewer than every agent is required to determine 
the social choice.  The difference between plurality and majority voting is over the threshold for 
an alternative being the social choice.  Majority voting requires strictly more than half of all 
votes be in an alternative's favour if it is to be the social choice.  Plurality voting has a lower 
threshold for determining the social choice, it merely requires than an alternative receive more 
votes than any other alternative if it is to be the social choice. 
 
38
 List and Goodin (2006) generalise May’s Theorem from majority rule to plurality rule.  
May’s Theorem shows that majority rule is the only aggregation procedure that satisfies four 
important democratic virtues including universal domain, anonymity, neutrality and positive 
responsiveness.  With the two List and Goodin results (2001, 2006) we have good reason for 
claiming that plurality rule should be the default democratic aggregation procedure: it can track 
the truth and it preserves important democratic virtues.   
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There are many ways in which competence could decrease as the agenda size 
increases.  The rate at which competence decreases is likely to depend on the 
type of social choice problem.  Here I will consider one possibility for how 
competence decreases as agenda size increases.  Under the ‘ratio’ rule, the ratio 
of competence to the probability of voting for a given incorrect alternative 
remains constant irrespective of agenda size39.  The basic intuitive justification 
for the ratio rule is that an agent’s ability to identify the best alternative (their 
competence) depends on their ability to distinguish correct from incorrect 
alternatives.  Agents’ probabilities of voting for the correct alternative remain 
proportional to their probabilities of voting for the incorrect alternatives.   
 
We will assume that the competence assumption of the extended CJT holds, so 
that probability of agents voting for the correct alternative is greater than the 
probability of them voting for any of the incorrect alternatives.  Furthermore we 
can make the simplifying assumption that the probabilities of voting for any of 
the incorrect alternatives are identical (that error is distributed evenly over the 
incorrect alternatives).  This is stricter than the List and Goodin competence 
assumption, which only requires that the probability of voting for the correct 
alternative is greater than the probability of voting for any of the wrong 
alternatives, and which allows for the probabilities of voting for the different 
wrong alternatives to vary.  This simplifying assumption is made both for the 
sake of rhetorical clarity and for the sake of ease of calculations.   
 
                                                 
39
 I also assume that error is distributed evenly over the incorrect alternatives so that the 
probability of voting for one incorrect alternative is identical to the probability of voting for any 
other given incorrect alternative.    
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If  is the competence of agents (the probability that they will vote for the 
correct alternatives) and  is the ‘incompetence’ of agents (the probability that 
they will vote for each of the incorrect alternatives) then the following ratio 
remains constant irrespective of agenda size40: 
 
u =  
 
Because of our assumption that the probabilities of voting for any of the 
incorrect alternatives are identical, we know that: 
 
 = 1 −  − 1  
 
where  is the number of alternatives.  Therefore41: 
 
u =  − 11 −   
 
There could be infinitely many different variations of the ‘ratio’ rule because 
there are infinitely many possible values for the ratio ε.  Again, the extent to 
which voter competence decreases as the number of alternatives increases is an 
empirical matter and will depend on the contingent circumstances of particular 
social choice problems.  Nevertheless, if it is the case that voter competence 
                                                 
40
 Note that  ≠ 1 −  but rather  +  − 1 = 1. 
 
41
 Equivalently, vwvw = xo.  Here we can see that agent competence levels on a given agenda 
depend both on the number of alternatives on the agenda and on the value of the ratio variable u. 
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does decrease as the number of alternatives increases, then this flows through 
into the probability that the best alternative will be selected as the social choice.  
If the number of alternatives  increases, then the competence of agents 
decreases.  If at the same time the number of agents  remains constant then the 
probability  of a correct plurality verdict decreases.  We can counteract the 
drop in the probability of a correct plurality verdict, caused by increasing 
numbers of alternatives and the associated drop in agent competence levels, by 
increasing the number of agents.  The extended CJT implies that as we increase 
the number of agents (who have a fixed level of competence, given the number 
of alternatives on the agenda) then  increases.  But there will come a point at 
which the numbers of agents required to compensate for the drop in competence 
levels exceeds the number of voters that can reasonably be assumed to exist.   
 
A mixed approach to extend the CJT 
In sum, the problem with applying the earlier extensions to majority rule of 
Condorcet and Borda is that they place too much of a burden on voters; the 
problem with applying the List and Goodin extension is that it requires more 
voters than can reasonably be assumed to exist.  As such these extensions of the 
CJT, which allow for more than two alternatives on the agenda, each face 
practical problems.  However, we can use the insight gained from these 
extensions to show that it is feasible to increase the number of alternatives on an 
agenda and still retain the truth-tracking ability of democratic aggregation 
procedures.  The Condorcetian extension (as presented by Young) adjusts the 
variable of the number of elections.   The List and Goodin extension adjusts the 
variable of the size of the agenda.  Although not canvassed in either extension, 
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we could also adjust the number of voters involved with each election.  In 
effect, we have three variables at our disposal which we can use to balance out 
the challenges posed by increased numbers of elections, increased agenda size 
and finite voters.   
 
If a series of pairwise elections will require too many elections, we can increase 
the size of each agenda to reduce the number of elections.  We can also reduce 
the burden on individual agents by reducing the group size in each election so 
that an agent only has to cast a vote on some (not all) of the agendas   
 
If a large agenda size means that competence will drop too low, we can boost 
competence by reducing the size of the agenda and having more elections. 
 
As I have stressed previously, the extent to which voter competence decreases 
as the number of voters increases is an empirical matter.  It is also an empirical 
matter as to how many alternatives there are and how many agents there are.  
The trade-offs between the number of voters, number of elections and size of 
agendas will therefore need to be made on a case by case (or type by type basis) 
and more general results will be questionable.  However I will now provide a set 
of examples and sample calculations to show how this mixed approach to 
extending the CJT to multiple alternatives can be superior in some 
circumstances to both the Young and the List and Goodin extensions. 
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A comparison of CJT extensions via sample calculations 
Suppose we have 25 possible alternatives, one of which is objectively the best 
and 1001 voters.  We have four approaches for generating the social choice, and 
we are looking for the approach that is most likely to select the objectively best 
alternative as the social choice (while minimising the burden placed on voters).  
The four approaches are: majority voting and the classic CJT; the Condorcetian 
extension; the List and Goodin extension; and my mixed approach. 
 
Majority voting and the classic CJT 
Here we are restricted to a simple pairwise vote between two alternatives.  
Because there are only two alternatives I will make the simplifying assumption 
that voter competence  = 0.6.  The probability that the best alternative (from a 
set of 25 alternatives) will be the social choice is the probability that the best 
alternative makes it on to the agenda, multiplied by the probability that the best 
alternative will be selected in the pairwise vote (given that it is on the agenda).  
If there is no special way of setting the agenda, then we can assume that it is a 
random chance that a given alternative will secure a place on the agenda42.  The 
probability that any given alternative (including the objectively best alternative) 
makes it onto the agenda is 1/25 + 1/24.  The probability that 1001 
voters with  = 0.6 select the better of two alternatives on an agenda is43 
 = 1.0. 
 
                                                 
42
 Of course it is implausible that the two places on the agenda would be set by a random lottery.  
Nevertheless there remains a question of how the agenda for a single pairwise choice would be 
set, how multiple alternatives can be weeded down to the two alternatives permitted by the 
classic CJT.  I address the problem of agenda setting later in the thesis. 
 
43
 The value of 1.0 is approximate and involves rounding.  Under the standard CJT the 
probability of a correct majority verdict approaches (but does not reach) certainty.   
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Therefore, if we employ standard majority rule and the classic CJT, then the 
probability that the best alternative will be the social choice is 1/25 +
1/24 × 1.0 = 	0.082 .  The group has roughly an 8% chance of selecting the 
best alternative in this example where there are multiple alternatives.  As such, 
where there are multiple alternatives, majority voting is slightly better than 
random at selecting the correct alternative (8% rather than 4%); a group 
employing this aggregation procedure is slightly better than an individual at 
selecting the best alternative (8% rather than 4.9%); but an 8% probability of 
selecting the correct alternative is surely far too low for the group to be 
considered likely to identify the correct alternative.  As such majority voting 
lacks absolute epistemic performance. 
 
The Condorcetian extension 
The Condorcetian extension, on a strict interpretation, requires that we consider 
each possible combination of alternatives in a pair-wise fashion.  If we do this 
then the number of elections required is: 
 
y2525 − 12 z = 	300	 
 
Arguably 300 elections are too much of a burden to place on each of our 1001 
voters.  We could reduce the burden placed on voters by instead asking them to 
provide a complete ranking over the 25 alternatives and then either looking for 
the alternative that is a majority winner in every pair-wise choice (which still 
requires the social planner to consider the outcome of 300 elections), or the 
social choice could be determined by a Borda count.  Whichever aggregation 
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procedure is employed, requiring agents to provide a complete quality ordering 
over 25 alternatives is still a significant burden, given the minimal requirements 
placed on voters by plurality rule. 
 
If we employ the Condorcetian pairwise criterion, then the probability of a 
correct social choice is  = 1.0. 
 
The List and Goodin extension 
Here we have one election with 25 alternatives where we look for a plurality 
winner.  Because we now have 25 alternatives on the agenda rather than 2, I am 
assuming that voter competence at identifying the best alternative will decrease 
from the 0.6 value seen in the classic CJT case, in line with the ratio rule.  For 
the majority voting case with two alternatives on the agenda  = 0.6, 	 =
0.4.  Therefore: 
 
u =  =
0.6
0.4 = 1.5 
 
The competence for the 25 alternative case is therefore44: 
 
u =  =
0.05882	
0.03992 = 1.5 
 
Given these assumptions, where the probability of an agent voting for the 
correct alternative is  = 0.05882 and the probability of any agent voting for 
                                                 
44
 Notice that  + 24 = 0.05882 + 240.03992 = 1. 
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each of the incorrect alternatives is  = 0.03992, the probability that a group 
of 1001 voters will select the best alternative using plurality rule is 0.766.  A 
group using plurality rule is more likely than random (4%) and more likely than 
an individual agent (6%) to select the correct alternative.  But the 77% 
probability of selecting the correct alternative is still some way from a group 
being guaranteed to select the correct alternative as the social choice.   
 
A mixed approach 
Here we can employ the insights gained from the Condorcetian and List and 
Goodin extensions.  We have at our disposal many possible combinations of 
numbers of elections, sizes of agendas, and sizes of voters cohorts which we can 
use to simultaneously balance the burden placed on voters and the need to 
increase the probability that the best alternative will be the social choice.  One 
approach is to split the 25 alternatives into 5 groups of 5 alternatives and hold 
plurality elections on each of these sub-agendas involving all voters.  The 
winning alternative from each of these sub-elections can then go forward for a 
final agenda to select the social choice.  This is illustrated in figure 3.2 below. 
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Figure 3.2: a mixed approach for multiple alternatives.   
 
 
 
Because we have agendas comprising 5 alternatives, competence according to 
the ratio rule is as follows45:   
 
u =  =
0.27272
0.18181 = 1.5 
 
Given these assumptions, the probability that a group of 1001 voters will select 
the best alternative from an agenda of 5 alternatives is46  = 1.0.  And the 
probability that the best alternative, from a set of 25 alternatives, will be the 
social choice is given by the probability that it is selected in the first sub-
election, multiplied by the probability that it is selected in the final election:  
1.0 × 1.0 = 1.0.  With the mixed approach employed here we are close to 
                                                 
45
 And notice also that  + 4 = 0.27272 +4(0.18181=1.0. 
 
46
 Here again this value of 1.0 is approximate and involves some rounding.   
, ,  , Y, { 
|, }, ~, ,  
 
, ,  , Y, { 
 
|, }, ~, ,  
 
, ,  , Y, { 
 
?, ?, ?, ?, ? 
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certain to select the correct alternative as the social choice and agents only have 
to cast votes in 6 elections to generate it.  This mixed approach has 
demonstrated baseline, relative and absolute epistemic performance: the mixed 
approach is more likely than random, more likely than an individual and likely 
simpliciter to generate the correct alternative as the social choice.   
 
In sum, we have at least four ways of coping with an agenda greater than two 
alternatives.  The performance of the different approaches for dealing with 
multiple alternatives is summarised below.  I include both the probability of a 
correct social choice () and the number of elections (e) required for each 
approach. 
 
Figure 3.3: a summary of the approaches for coping with multiple alternatives.   
 P e 
Majority voting  0.082 1 
Condorcetian 
extension 
1.0 300 
List and Goodin 
extension 
0.766 1 
A mixed 
approach 
1.0 6 
 
A mixed approach, of varied numbers of elections, agenda size and group size is 
the most successful at preserving the epistemic performance of democratic 
aggregation procedures like majority or plurality voting (while at the same time 
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reducing the burden on voters).  The epistemic performance of the mixed 
approach could be improved even further.  If the competence of agents is 
heterogeneous and transparent we can task different agents with voting on the 
agenda that they are most competent on, and prevent them from voting on 
agendas where their competence is low or they have a bias.  We may also be 
able to set the sub-agendas in such a way as to make the quality of alternatives 
more transparent (for example by avoiding placing similar alternatives on the 
same agenda).   
 
It is important to stress that the precise combinations of numbers of elections, 
agenda sizes and voter cohort sizes that are optimal is a contingent matter.  
Given the assumptions of initial voter competence of 0.6 and the ratio rule, we 
get the results in figure 3.3 that advocate a mixture of six elections on agendas 
of five alternatives using plurality rule.  However, if the competence of agents is 
more resilient to increases in agenda size then a single election on an agenda 
containing all the possible alternatives (the List and Goodin 2001 model) will 
do just as well as a mixed approach.   
 
To know what combination of agenda size and number of elections is optimal 
requires knowing something about how competence degrades as the number of 
alternatives increases.  Having multiple elections generates little epistemic loss 
but does place additional burdens on agents.  When there are multiple elections, 
as per the mixed approach, then the probability that the correct alternative will 
be the social choice is the probability that the correct alternative wins each 
election where it is placed on the agenda.  Therefore the probability of a correct 
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social choice is the product of the probabilities that the correct alternative wins 
each election.  As the number of elections facing the correct alternative 
increases, the probability that it will be the final social choice decreases.  
However, provided that the probability the correct alternative will win each 
election is high (because of high agent competence levels on a small agenda), 
the product of these probabilities is high and extra elections do not pose a 
significant epistemic problem.  There are however clear epistemic gains to 
multiple elections with smaller agendas.  By allowing the same agents to vote 
on several agendas we in effect increase the number of high competence agents 
in the group.   
 
The disjunction problem 
 
The standard extension to the classic CJT to cope with agendas of more than 
two alternatives is the List and Goodin extension.  This extension addresses the 
obvious criticism of the classic dichotomous CJT, that it is only applicable in 
limited circumstances.  But the extension of the CJT to agendas of multiple 
alternatives may generate further vulnerability.  The 'Disjunction Problem' 
makes use of the extension of the CJT to multiple alternatives to challenge the 
fulfilment of the competence assumption47.   
 
                                                 
47
 For clarification, the discussion in the first half of this chapter considered the problem of how 
competence levels can decrease as agenda size increases.  It was assumed that the competence 
assumption of the extended CJT still held no matter how many alternatives there were (that the 
probability of voting for the correct alternative was still greater than the probability of voting for 
any other alternative, no matter how many alternatives there were).  The Disjunction Problem, 
by contrast, argues that we have no justification for the extended CJT competence assumption 
holding.   
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David Estlund sets out the Disjunction Problem in chapter 12 of his 2008 
Democratic Authority: a Philosophical Framework.  The book as a whole 
argues in favour of an epistemic proceduralist defence of democracy.  
According to epistemic proceduralism, political decisions are legitimate and 
agents are obliged to follow them because the procedures that generated these 
decisions tend to produce correct decisions.  For the thesis of epistemic 
proceduralism to hold, it is necessary to provide a mechanism or justification for 
why it is that political or democratic decisions tend to be correct.  Majority or 
plurality voting and the CJT would seem like a natural fit with epistemic 
proceduralism, but Estlund provides a series of criticisms of the CJT as a 
mechanism to underwrite epistemic proceduralism.  The Disjunction Problem is 
a new criticism.  My concern here is not epistemic proceduralism, but is rather 
whether the Disjunction Problem really is a problem for the CJT.   
 
To present the Disjunction Problem clearly it is helpful to fill in some of the 
detail missing in the exposition provided by Estlund.  Firstly Estlund argues that 
the CJT competence assumption requires that agents have a level of competence 
that is better than random.  Suppose we have  alternatives on an agenda.  
Agents’ homogeneous level of competence, the probability that they vote for the 
correct alternative, is represented as .  Random competence, the probability 
that an agent would vote for the correct alternative on an agenda by chance, is 
defined relative to the agenda size.  So if there are  alternatives on the agenda 
random competence is  = 1/.  Firstly let’s consider the classic dichotomous 
CJT.  For the classic dichotomous CJT  = 2 and  > 1/ if and only if 
 > 1/2.  Therefore the classic CJT competence assumption does indeed 
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require better than random levels of competence.  However things are different 
for the extended CJT.  For the extended CJT,  ≥ 2 and the competence 
assumption requires that the probability of voting for the correct alternative is 
greater than the probability of voting for any of the other alternatives.  If the 
competence levels of agents are less than or equal to random (if  = 1/ or 
 < 1/) then it is not the case that agents are more likely to vote for the 
correct alternative than for any of the incorrect alternatives and the competence 
assumption does not hold.  Therefore if the extended competence assumption 
holds, competence levels will be better than random.  However the converse 
does not hold: if agent’s levels of competence are better than random it does not 
necessarily follow that agents are more likely to vote for the correct alternative 
than any other alternative and it is not necessarily the case that the extended 
CJT competence assumption holds.  Consider an agenda with five alternatives, 
where alternative  is the correct alternative.  The agent’s probabilities for 
voting for each of the alternatives are as follows: 
 
Pr	!" =  = 0.3  
Pr!" =  = 0.4  
Pr!" =   = 0.1  
Pr!" = Y = 0.1  
Pr!" = { = 0.1  
 
Since there are five alternatives on the agenda, random competence would be 

o = { = 0.2.  Since the probability of voting for the correct alternative  is 
 = 0.3 > 0.2, agents have better-than-random levels of competence.  However 
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since the probability of agents voting for the correct alternative is not greater 
than the probability of voting for the correct alternative (agents are more likely 
to vote for the incorrect alternative ) the competence assumption of the 
extended CJT does not hold. 
 
So, better than random levels of competence are necessary but not sufficient for 
the extended CJT competence assumption to hold.  Establishing that 
competence levels are better than random does not establish that the competence 
assumption holds48.  To interpret the Disjunction Problem charitably, we could 
say that the extended competence assumption requires at least better-than-
random levels of competence.  If we cannot establish that agents have at least 
this level of competence then we cannot establish that agents are more likely to 
vote for the correct alternative than to vote for any other alternative.   
 
The second point of exposition required before the Disjunction Problem can be 
presented is an argument for  > 1/, an argument for why we can assume that 
agents are more likely than random to vote for the correct alternative.  The 
argument is essentially that agents would have a random level of competence if 
they just guess what correct alternative is, for example if they allocate their vote 
by tossing a -sided dice.  If agents have the smallest amount of truth-conducive 
information, if they have even the slighted idea what the correct alternative is, 
then  > 1/.  It seems trivial to assume that a moderately capable agent would 
                                                 
48
 Except in the special case where error is distributed evenly across the incorrect alternatives.  
An agenda of size  = 2 is such a special case, since there is only one incorrect alternative and 
so all the error is distributed evenly on this one incorrect alternative.   
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be more likely than random to vote for the correct alternative.  Let’s term this 
argument the ‘random competence’ argument.   
 
Once we have established that the extended competence assumption requires at 
least better-than-random levels of competence and once we have an argument 
for competence levels being better than random, the Disjunction Problem has its 
target.  The crux of the Disjunction Problem is that there is no principled way to 
determine the number of alternatives that should be on an agenda for a social 
choice and therefore that there is no reason to assert that the competence 
assumption of the CJT holds.   
 
The Disjunction Problem can be presented in two ways.  Firstly, suppose that 
initially  = 10 i.e. our agenda is comprised of alternatives ₁, ₂, . . . , ₁₀.  
Better-than-random competence levels would require competence  > 1/10.  
But suppose at a later stage 9 of the original 10 alternatives are joined in a 
disjunction so that ′ = 2 i.e. our agenda is now ₁, ₂′ where ₂′ = ₂ ∨ ₃ ∨
. . . ₁₀.  With a revised agenda better-than-random levels of competence now 
require competence ′ > 1/2.  The two agendas (of 10 or 2 alternatives) are 
logically equivalent.  Merely as a result of revising the way in which we 
describe the agenda, our assumed level of competence has increased from 
 > 1/10 to  > 1/2.  It may seem unremarkable that an agent would have a 
better than 1/10 chance of voting for the correct alternative on an agenda but 
merely as a result of reframing the description of the choice an agent is assumed 
to have a better-than 50% chance of voting for the correct alternative – quite 
high, given that there could be more than 10 alternatives on the agenda. 
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Equivalently we could start with an agenda of  = 2.  Better-than-random 
levels of competence require competence  > 1/2.  But we could represent one 
of these two alternatives as a disjunction of 9 alternatives, meaning ′ = 10 i.e. 
our agenda is now ,  , … ,  .  Better-than-random competence now requires 
′ > 1/10.  Merely as a result of revising the way in which the agenda is 
presented, the assumed level of competence has decreased from  > 1/2 to 
 > 1/10. 
 
The concern behind the Disjunction Problem is not trivial.  Estlund cites an 
example of blind men and an elephant.  A group of blind men are allowed to 
touch an animal and are then asked whether it is an elephant or not.  In such a 
binary choice competence should be  > 1/2.  But not being an elephant is 
equivalent to being a hippopotamus, or being a rhinoceros, or being a mule, or 
being a horse and so on.  While it may initially seem obvious that an agent will 
be better than random at determining the correct alternative from an agenda of 
elephant/ not elephant, it seems implausible that they will have a better than 
50% chance of correctly identifying that the animal is an elephant, given all the 
other possible animals it could be.   
 
The Disjunction Problem is misguided 
The random competence argument in favour of the CJT competence assumption 
holding is very weak.  Firstly, establishing that agent’s levels of competence are 
better than random does not establish that the extended CJT competence 
assumption holds (except in the special case where error is distributed evenly 
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across incorrect alternatives).  It is therefore difficult to see why anyone would 
advance the random competence argument in support of the CJT competence 
assumption holding.   
 
Secondly, knowing the size of an agenda does into license anyone to infer 
anything about the competence level of an agent.  It is too crude to place all 
social choice problems with the same agenda size into the same category and 
assume that agents will have a level of competence better-than-random.  There 
will be some social choice problems with  alternatives on the agenda where 
agents have no relevant information whatsoever, where competence is  = 1/ 
and the extended CJT competence assumption does not hold.  There will also be 
some social choice problems with  alternatives where agents receive 
misleading information such that competence  < 1/ and the extended CJT 
competence assumption does not hold.  Finally for agenda size  there will be 
some social choice problems where agents have truth-conducive information 
such that competence is  > 1/, where agents are more likely to vote for the 
correct alternative than any incorrect alternative and therefore where the 
extended CJT competence assumption does hold.  The random competence 
argument for the CJT competence assumption holding is absurd since defining a 
reference class according to agenda size  is far too crude.   
 
Thirdly, we can present a reductio argument against the random competence 
argument.  Assume that the random competence argument justifies the CJT 
competence assumption holding.  According to the random competence 
argument the competence assumption holds in all cases.  We know as an 
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empirical fact that in some social choice problems the competence assumption 
does not hold (because of biases in agents or misleading information received 
by agents).  Therefore the random competence argument cannot be correct.   
 
Given these three criticisms of the random competence argument, the emphasis 
that Estlund places on the random competence argument as the defence of the 
CJT competence assumption seems like a straw-man argument.   
 
Estlund states “…without that assumption [the random competence argument], 
or some substantive support for the competence assumption, the jury theorem 
gets us nothing.” (p.230).  If the random competence argument was successful 
then it would have provided a sufficient (but not necessary) justification for the 
CJT competence assumption holding.  It does not follow that if the random 
competence argument is defeated the competence assumption does not hold.  At 
worst, the failure of the random competence argument simply means the 
competence assumption is currently without support.  As Estlund acknowledges, 
there may be other arguments for the competence assumption holding and I will 
present one such argument later in this chapter.   
 
Agenda setting: the concentration of error and dispersal of ‘competence’ 
The presentation of the Disjunction Problem in terms of random competence is 
something of a red-herring.  As shown above, it is true that if the CJT 
competence assumption holds then agent’s level of competence is better than 
random.  However what the Disjunction Problem actually highlights is how the 
framing of a social choice problem by a social planner can affect whether the 
 128 
CJT competence assumption holds or does not hold.  The CJT competence 
assumption may fail to hold if error is concentrated on one alternative, or if 
competence is dispersed across several alternatives.   
 
The concentration of error 
Suppose that as a matter of fact the animal in the next room is an elephant and 
the social planner fixes the description of the one correct alternative on the 
agenda as ‘elephant’.  Whether the CJT competence assumption holds or not 
depends on whether agents are as likely or more likely to vote for another 
alternative that is incorrect.  And whether agents are as likely or more likely to 
vote for another alternative that is incorrect in turn may depend on how many 
incorrect alternatives there are on the agenda. 
 
Suppose  = 7.  For example the agents may face the following agenda: 
 
The animal in the next room is: 
 an elephant; or 
 a hippopotamus; or 
  a rhinoceros; or 
Y a mule; or 
{ a horse; or 
| a dog; or 
} none of the above. 
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Suppose that the probabilities for voting for each of the alternatives are as 
follows: 
 
Pr	!" = ""ℎ = 0.3  
Pr	!" = ℎ = 0.1  
Pr!" = ℎ#" = 0.1  
Pr!" = " = 0.1  
Pr!" = ℎ" = 0.1  
Pr!" =  = 0.1  
Pr!" = "		ℎ"	!" = 0.2  
 
Here the extended CJT competence assumption holds – agents are more likely 
to vote for the correct alternative ‘elephant’ than they are to vote for any of the 
incorrect alternatives.   
 
Now suppose that instead the agenda is comprised of two alternatives as 
follows: 
 
The animal in the next room is: 
 an elephant; or 
	none of the above. 
 
The competence of an agent on this revised agenda should remain at  = 0.3.  
The revised agenda is logically equivalent to the original agenda, and the 
revised agenda does not give the agent any more information than the original 
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agenda, so the probabilities of an agent voting for the correct alternative on each 
agenda should be the same.  If agent competence is  = 0.3 then all of the agent 
error 1 − 0.3 = 0.7 is concentrated on one incorrect alternative as follows: 
 
    Pr!" = ""ℎ = 0.3 
    Pr!" = ¬""ℎ = 0.7 
 
Therefore it is not the case that agents are more likely to vote for the correct 
alternative than any incorrect alternative and so the CJT competence assumption 
does not hold. 
 
The social planner, in setting an agenda, controls how the error of an agent will 
be distributed across the incorrect alternatives.  If she restricts the number of 
incorrect alternatives on the agenda then she may concentrate the error of agents 
to such an extent that the agent is more likely to vote for the incorrect than 
correct alternative.  There is no principled way for a social planner to set an 
agenda, in such a way as to avoid concentrating error on a specific incorrect 
alternative, to such an extent that the extended CJT competence assumption 
does not hold.   
 
The dispersal of ‘competence’ 
Suppose the social planner adjusts the description of the one correct alternative 
on the agenda.  Whether the CJT competence assumption holds or not depends 
on whether agents are more likely to vote for the correct alternative than they 
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are to vote for an incorrect alternative, and this in turn depends on how refined 
the description of the correct alternative is. 
 
Suppose  = 2.  For example, agents might be facing the following agenda: 
 
The animal in the next room is: 
 an elephant; or 
	none of the above. 
 
Suppose the competence of agents in this case is  = 0.6.  Given that there are 
only two alternatives on the agenda, it follows that the error is concentrated on 
one incorrect alternative and the probability of voting for the incorrect 
alternative is 1 − 0.6 = 0.4.  Here agents are more likely to vote for the 
correct alternative than any other alternative and so the CJT competence 
assumption holds.   
 
Suppose that the description of the correct alternative is further refined.  The 
alternative of ‘elephant’ is equivalent to the alternative of ‘African bush 
elephant or African forest elephant or Asian elephant’.  Now agents face the 
following agenda: 
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The animal in the next room is: 
 an African bush elephant; or 
 an African forest elephant; or 
  an Asian elephant; or 
Y	none of the above. 
 
It is an open question how the ‘competence’49 is dispersed when the correct 
alternative is split into more refined alternatives.  Agents have a 0.6 probability 
of correctly identifying the alternative as an elephant.  It may be the case that 
agents are just as able to correctly identify the animal as an African bush 
elephant as they are to correctly identify the animal as an elephant.  In such a 
case, the CJT competence assumption holds.  However it is more plausible that 
agents are less able to correctly identify the animal as an African bush elephant 
than they are to correctly identify the animal as an elephant.  As such the 0.6 
probability of voting for the correct alternative of ‘elephant’ must be dispersed 
across the more refined alternatives of ‘African bush elephant’, ‘African forest 
elephant’ and ‘Asian elephant’.  Where there are four alternatives on the agenda 
it is possible the ‘competence’ is distributed as follows: 
 
Pr	!" = #	ℎ	""ℎ = 0.3  
Pr!" = #	"	""ℎ = 0.15  
Pr!" = 	""ℎ = 0.15  
 
                                                 
49
 The term ‘competence’ is presented in scare quotes since competence is defined as the 
probability of voting for the correct alternative.  If this probability is distributed across some 
alternatives that are incorrect then it is somewhat misleading to describe it as competence.   
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Agents still have a 0.4 probability of voting for the incorrect alternative of 
‘none of the above’ hence it is not the case that agents are more likely to vote 
for the correct alternative than any other alternative and the extended CJT 
competence assumption does not hold.  There is no principled way for a social 
planner to set an agenda in such a way as to avoid dispersing the ‘competence’ 
of agents across alternatives to such an extent that the extended CJT 
competence assumption does not hold.   
 
An open-ended agenda 
The way in which a social planner sets an agenda can determine whether or not 
the CJT competence assumption holds.  The framing of the agenda may result in 
agent error being concentrated on a particular alternative to such an extent that 
agents are more likely to vote for an incorrect than the correct alternative.  
Similarly, the framing of an agenda may result in a description of the correct 
alternative that is so refined that agents have low probability of voting for it and 
agents are instead more likely to vote for an incorrect alternative.   
 
If setting an agenda in advance can mean the competence assumption of the 
extended CJT does not hold the social planner might choose to present agents 
with an open-ended agenda.  However, an open-ended agenda brings with it 
additional problems.   
 
Suppose agents are told that the social choice problem is to identify the animal 
in the next room, but they are not told what the animal might be.  One by one 
the blind men are allowed to enter the room and touch the animal.  When they 
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leave the room the agents cast their votes for what they judge the animal to be.  
Suppose the five agents cast their votes as follows: 
 
 
Agent : Rhinoceros 
Agent : Rhinoceros 
Agent : African bush elephant 
Agent : African forest elephant 
Agent : Asian elephant 
 
What is the plurality winner in this example?  Or more to the point, what is the 
animal in the next room likely to be given the judgements expressed by agents?  
This seems like an open question.  On one interpretation of the votes the 
alternative ‘rhinoceros’ is the plurality winner and so the animal in the next 
room is probably a rhinoceros.  On a different interpretation the alternative 
‘elephant’ is the plurality winner and so the animal is probably an elephant.  The 
problem with an open-ended agenda is that we cannot objectively interpret or 
make use of the information agents have secured via their searches.  In the 
absence of an agenda shared by all the agents we do not know whether agents 
were voting on a tacit two placed agenda of:   
  
  The animal in the next room is: 
     an elephant; or 
     not an elephant. 
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in which the plurality winner is ‘elephant’; or if agents were voting on a tacit 
two-placed agenda of:  
 
The animal in the next room is: 
    a rhinoceros; or 
      not an rhinoceros. 
 
in which case the plurality winner is ‘not rhinoceros’; or if agents were voting 
on a tacit four-placed agenda of: 
 
The animal in the next room is: 
    a rhinoceros; or 
     an African elephant; or 
      an African bush elephant; or 
    Y an Asian elephant. 
 
in which case the plurality winner is ‘rhinoceros’.   
 
Different agents may also have been voting on different tacit agendas.  In the 
absence of a set agenda there is no objective way of counting votes for a 
particular alternative and no objective way of counting votes against a particular 
alternative.   
 
As an aside, it is tempting to see Condorcetian mechanisms at work in ordinary 
choice problems.  But the lack of a single, shared agenda for agents means such 
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applications are tenuous.  For example, when visiting foreign cities it is nice to 
sample the best of the local cuisine.  A useful heuristic for finding the best local 
cuisine is to go to the restaurant where most of the locals seem to go.  Setting 
aside the problem of information cascades50 and group think51 this heuristic 
seems like an instance of the CJT in action.  Suppose that there are a number of 
restaurants in the city centre, that the local people are able to make good but 
imperfect judgements regarding the quality of a restaurant and that the locals 
make independent decisions where to dine.  The extended CJT implies that as 
the size of the dining population increases the probability that the best restaurant 
has more diners than any other restaurant increases.  However this reasoning 
requires us to interpret an agent’s presence in a restaurant as their judgement 
that this restaurant provides the best local cuisine.  Some locals may choose a 
restaurant on that basis, but other locals may choose a restaurant because it is 
the cheapest or because it has the best wine list or because it has the best view.  
Again, without a single shared agenda the CJT framework is simply 
inapplicable.   
 
The Disjunction Problem is misguided.  However the analysis of the 
Disjunction Problem does highlight the problem of agenda setting and we are 
immediately placed on the horns of a dilemma.  A social planner can choose to 
either set an agenda in advance or not set an agenda in advance.  If a social 
                                                 
50
 An information cascade might occur as follows.  Suppose the first agent makes an 
independent judgement of a restaurant’s quality.  A second agent chooses the restaurant because 
they can see the first agent dining there.  The third agent chooses the restaurant because they can 
see two other diners there, and so on.  Although it may seem that a number of different diners 
have made independent judgments of the restaurant’s quality in fact all but one of the 
judgements depend on one agent.   
 
50
 Group think might occur if a number of diners actually hate the restaurant, but they stay in the 
restaurant because they don’t want to be seen as an outsider.   
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planner were to set an agenda in advance there is no way in principle to avoid 
concentrating the error of agents on a particular incorrect alternative, or to avoid 
dispersing ‘competence’ across several alternatives, such that the CJT 
competence assumption does not hold.  If the social planner does not set an 
agenda in advance then there is no way to objectively count the number of votes 
for particular alternatives and therefore there is no objective plurality winner.  
Neither of the options is attractive.   
 
An argument for the CJT competence assumption holding 
No one should argue that the CJT holds unconditionally.  The CJT only asserts 
that if the independence and competence assumptions hold then the probability 
of a correct social choice is monotonically increasing in group size and in the 
limit tends towards certainty.  The CJT only gives conditional support to the 
truth-tracking ability of democratic decision making.  The CJT could only 
support an epistemic defence of democratic decision making if the antecedent of 
the conditional holds i.e. only if the competence and independence assumptions 
hold.  Estlund is quite right to state that "...the assumption that voters are better 
than random is not freely available, but would need some argument" (p.231).  
He is right to demand a separate argument for the competence assumption 
holding if we want to use the CJT as a justification for an epistemic defence of 
democratic decision making.   
 
What should we expect from a defence of the CJT competence assumption?  We 
should not expect the CJT competence assumption to hold in all social choice 
problems.  Agents may have systematic biases in particular types of social 
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choice problem.  For example, agents may have a bias in favour of the status 
quo; as such they may choose to re-elect a President even when the opposition 
candidate is superior.  Even when agents are facing a type of social choice 
problem where they do not have systematic biases there remains a possibility 
that they will receive misleading information.  For example, jury members may 
be carefully selected to avoid agents with biases.  However the jury may be 
presented with inaccurate witness statements that lead them to wrongly convict 
an innocent defendant.  Where agent competence is worse than random 
(because agents have systematic biases or because they have received 
misleading information) the probability of a correct plurality winner is 
decreasing in group size and in the limit tends towards zero52.  If we want to 
employ the CJT for an epistemic defence of democracy we need to show that 
the competence assumption holds most of the time, in the relevant types of 
cases.   
 
The original formulation of the Disjunction Problem in terms of random 
competence made the mistake of looking for an in-principle justification of the 
competence assumption holding.  Similarly, the reformulation of the 
Disjunction Problem showed that we cannot guarantee in-principle that the 
social planner has framed the agenda in such a way that the competence 
assumption holds.  But this is only a concern if we want an in-principle 
justification for the competence assumption holding.  Given the variety of 
different circumstances involved in different social choice problems an in-
                                                 
52
 See the presentation of the classic CJT in Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) 
Theorem I. 
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principle justification of the competence assumption which applies to all social 
choice cases is not credible.   
 
Instead, the best hope for justifying the claim that the CJT competence 
assumption holds is to identify as closely as possible the type of social choice 
problem where the competence assumption does hold.  For example, it would be 
wrong to argue that the competence assumption holds in all jury trials since 
there is empirical evidence that juries sometimes make mistakes.  Furthermore it 
would be wrong to argue that the CJT competence assumption holds in most 
jury trials since this is too coarse a reference class.  Rather, it could be argued 
that the competence assumption holds in most jury trials where there is careful 
selection of jurors to avoid biases, where there are proper rules of evidence and 
where the police have collected sufficient evidence.  We know that the CJT 
competence assumption tends to hold in a reference class of social choice 
problems such as this since very few of the verdicts are overturned on appeal.  If 
we can show that the circumstances of a particular social choice problem are 
like those of the reference class of problems where the CJT competence 
assumption tends to hold, then we have a justification for the competence 
assumption holding in the particular case.   
 
A consequence of this defence of the CJT is that the asymptotic limit to the 
probability of a correct social choice is not certainty but the probability that the 
social choice problem is non-misleading (a value greater than 0.5, but less than 
certainty).  This issue is considered again in chapter 7. 
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Summary 
Multiple alternatives posed a particular problem for the classic CJT and 
majority rule.  We can vary the number of elections and size of agendas to 
ensure the sheer number of possible alternatives does not degrade the 
competence of agents too much.  As such, discussions in the thesis that presume 
a dichotomous choice are just a rhetorical convention: it is more straightforward 
to discuss dichotomous choice situations and it should be taken as given that the 
discussions apply to cases where there are multiple alternatives.   
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Chapter 4: The generation of the inputs to 
aggregation procedures. 
 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of how the judgement-generating factors of 
competence, independence and transparency should be interpreted and an 
analysis of how these form.  In the process we will consider a taxonomy of the 
causal factors of an agent’s judgement, including truth-conducive evidential 
and background information, that generate the variables of competence and 
independence and that are in turn pooled by the aggregation procedures.  The 
taxonomy takes the distinctions from Dietrich (2008) as its starting point.  
However, the taxonomy in this chapter differs in two respects.  Firstly, there is a 
matter of emphasis.  It is not just the truth-conducive evidential information that 
is crucial in forming an agent’s competence.  The truth-conducive background 
facts, such as a good education, are just as (if not more) important in forming 
the competence of an agent.  Secondly, the taxonomy in this chapter shows how 
the competence and independence relations of agents develop over time.  While 
we are most interested in the competence levels and independence relations of 
agents at the time at which they cast their votes, we should also be concerned 
with how these variables develop over time.  This is particularly important for 
expanding the account of how agents track the truth into a two stage process of 
the search for information followed by the pooling of information via 
aggregation procedures.   
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The problem 
 
Aggregation procedures generally, and majority voting in particular, play a 
prominent role in existing accounts of epistemic democracy, in defences of 
democratic decision making on the basis of its capacity to track the truth.   
The inputs to an aggregation procedure are the judgements of individual agents, 
recorded as votes for or against an alternative.  These judgements are 
determined by factors such as the competence of agents, the independence of 
agents and transparency of agent’s competencies.  The three different 
aggregation procedures of expert dictatorship, negative reliability unanimity 
rule and majority rule can track the truth given certain types of judgement-
generating factors.   
For example the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) tells us that as group size 
increases, majority voting will be more likely than random, more likely than an 
individual and likely simpliciter to track the truth if the average level of 
competence is greater than 1/2, the distribution of competencies in the group is 
symmetric about the mean and the votes of agents are independent.  It does not 
matter whether the competence of agents is transparent, though if competence 
were transparent we could apply weights to the votes of agents in proportion to 
their competencies and increase the probability of a correct majority verdict.  
 
The existing accounts of epistemic democracy that focus on aggregation 
procedures only give conditional support to the truth-tracking ability of groups.  
They show how groups can track the truth given certain types of judgement-
generating factors.  They are silent on how these judgement-generating factors 
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are themselves generated or whether they are plausible.  More particularly, the 
existing aggregative accounts of group truth-tracking begin at the point at which 
agents already have a set level of competence, in a particular distribution, with 
certain independence relations holding and the transparency or otherwise of 
competence pre-determined.  But agents do not have high competence a priori; 
it cannot be taken as given that agents will have information regarding the 
correct alternative on an agenda.  Nor is it the case that the required 
independence relations will hold a priori or that the transparency of competence 
is established.  We need an account for how the features of a group of agents, 
including competence levels, transparency of competence and independence 
relations, develop.  The truth-tracking institutional features of some aggregation 
procedures can provide a conditional epistemic justification for group decision 
making; an account of the formation of the judgement-generating factors will 
provide the antecedent to this conditional justification.   
 
Providing an account of how the judgement-generating factors for aggregation 
procedures form will also improve our analysis of the epistemic power of the 
aggregation procedures.  The truth-tracking ability of an aggregation procedure 
is due to a combination of the institutional features of the aggregation procedure 
and the inputs to the aggregation procedure.  We can see the impact that the 
institutional features of the aggregation procedure have on the ability of a group 
to track the truth by noting that different aggregation procedures (such as expert 
dictatorship, negative reliability unanimity rule and majority rule) will have 
different probabilities of generating the correct social choice, given the same 
inputs (given the same group of agents with set levels of competence, 
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independence relations and transparency or otherwise of competence).  We can 
see the impact that the inputs to the aggregation procedure have on the ability of 
a group to track the truth by noting that the probability of a correct social choice 
will vary if we keep the aggregation procedure (like majority rule) fixed, but we 
change the judgement-generating factors (for example we increase the 
competence of agents, or we change the independence relations).  In sum, the 
truth-tracking ability of aggregation procedures is due to both the way in which 
the institutional features of aggregation procedures pool the information 
dispersed in the judgements of individual agents (i.e. the social epistemic 
mechanisms) and to the amount of information contained in the judgements of 
the individual agents themselves.   
 
In the following sections, I set out precisely how the judgement-generating 
factors of competence, independence and transparency of competence are 
generated.  In doing so it should become clearer how the variables should be 
interpreted and what features of real-world social choice problems they capture.  
This explanation also requires that we give consideration to the ‘informational 
environment’ the agents face: the set of possible causes of agents’ votes, 
including the truth-conducive evidential and background information available 
to them.   
 
Competence 
 
The competence of an agent is defined as the probability that this individual 
agent votes for an alternative, given that it is correct.  Formally competence 
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conditional on the state of the world is defined as 
 = Pr!
 = | , ∀{1,0}, 
where 
 is the probability that agent  will vote for the correct alternative, !
	 is 
the vote or judgement of agent  and  is the state of the world (which can take 
values 1 or 0).  Because competence is a probability, it belongs to the interval 
[0,1].  All truth-tracking aggregation procedures recommend that groups contain 
at least some agents with high levels of competence.   
 
Interpreting competence 
The competence of an agent represents the probability of an event occurring, 
namely the probability that a particular agent will vote for the correct 
alternative.  The probability captures an epistemic uncertainty an observer or 
modeller or social planner has over that event occurring.  In any real social 
choice problem with a correct alternative (such as an election or a jury trial) 
each agent (each voter or juror) will either cast a vote for the correct alternative 
or they will cast a vote for the incorrect alternative53.  The agent’s vote for a 
particular alternative is determined by the combination of their causal 
influences.  If the observer were aware of all the causal influences of an agent, 
all randomness in the agent’s vote would disappear and the agent would vote for 
the correct alternative with a probability of either 0 or 1.  But the observer is not 
aware of all the causal influences on an agent’s vote, and which of the two 
events will actually occur (whether the agent will vote for the correct alternative 
or the agent will vote for the incorrect alternative) is not known in advance to 
the observer.   
 
                                                 
53
 Abstentions are ruled out. 
 
 146 
Precisely how agent competence is interpreted does not matter for the formal 
results, but it is of philosophical interest.  If we address the question of how to 
interpret agent competence we must also address the question of how the level 
of agent competence is assessed.  Edelman (2002) sets our three different 
interpretations of how randomness enters a CJT model: the random model, 
pooling model and aggregation model.  Each of these interpretations takes the 
perspective of a social planner or observer, that is someone who can ‘observe’ 
the voting behaviour of agents, and who may be in a position to make 
institutional decisions over which judgement aggregation procedure to employ.  
Under the random model, the votes or judgements really are like the tosses of a 
coin: to say that an agent has a competence level of  = 0.6 is to say that there 
is some objective randomness in the agent’s vote.  As Edelman notes, if we 
accept the random model, then if the election was repeated and an agent were to 
cast their vote again on the same agenda the agent may well vote differently this 
time.  The interpretation of agent competence as an objectively random process 
seems inapplicable to the cases addressed in this thesis.  If agents are faced with 
an agenda with one correct alternative, if agents have gathered evidence to 
inform their judgement and then cast their vote in line with what they honestly 
believe to be the true state of the world, then we would expect agents to vote in 
exactly the same way every time the elections is re-run.  As the random model 
of competence is irrelevant for our purposes, we can ignore the question of how 
agent competence levels are determined under this model54. 
 
                                                 
54
 Estlund (2008) and List and Goodin (2001) both explain the CJT with reference coin tosses, 
but I take it that these explanations are intended only as analogies.  The coin toss examples are 
ideal for explaining the law of large numbers, which underlies the CJT, even if it is implausible 
to think of human agents as objectively random devices.  
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According to the polling model, the particular problem a group faces is held 
fixed but there is uncertainty over which individuals will comprise the group.  
To say that agent competence is  = 0.6 is to say that 60% of the wider 
population will cast their votes for the correct alternative (and 40% of the 
population will vote for the incorrect alternative).  If we take random samples 
from the wider population to form the voting group then there is a 60% chance 
that a given agent will vote correctly.  As Edelman notes, this model makes no 
assumption that the voters have any information whatsoever about the true state 
of the world which generates their judgements.  The polling model might be 
appropriate for non-epistemic social choices, for example where a group needs a 
collective decision over whether to prioritise education or health spending and 
agents merely express their preferences.  However, in the epistemic social 
choice problems considered in this thesis the polling model is inapplicable and 
we can again put to one side the question of how agent competence levels are 
determined.   
 
According to the aggregation model, the composition of the group is held fixed, 
but there is some uncertainty over the particular problem the group will face.  
To say an agent has a competence level of 
 = 0.6 is to say that, of all the 
problems in a suitable reference class that agent faces, the agent gets 60% of 
them right.  If it is possible to tell what the true state of the world is (after agents 
have cast their votes and independently of the social choice outcome) then it is 
possible to determine the competence level of agents.  Here a social planner 
need only determine the long range success of a particular agent at casting 
correct votes to determine that agent’s competence level.  For a judge on a 
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panel, for example, we might determine their competence level by determine the 
proportion of their judgements that were overturned on appeal.   
 
The interpretation of agent competence that I advance, that of the subjective 
assessment of a social planner, is consistent with Edelman’s aggregation model. 
Furthermore the aggregation model of agent competence seems most relevant to 
the epistemic setting in which the CJT is applied.  However, the aggregation 
model requires some expansion.  The aggregation model as currently presented 
does not, as Edelman claims, provide an account of how the information 
dispersed in the judgements of individual agents is pooled or aggregated into the 
social choice.  Just as in the pooling model, it is conceivable with Edelman’s 
interpretation of the aggregation model that the votes of agents are determined 
by entirely non-informational causes.  The fact that an agent votes correctly in 
60% of cases does not mean that the agent has received truth-conducive 
information that makes them vote for the correct alternative in 60% of cases, 
and misleading information that means the agent votes incorrectly in the 
remaining 40% of cases.  It could be that the agent casts their vote exclusively 
in line with their preferences (their preferred alternative happens to coincide 
with the correct alternative 60% of the time).   
 
By considering how the social planner might determine the level of agent 
competence, we can see how judgement aggregation procedures such as 
majority rule can actually operate as information pooling mechanisms.  A social 
planner might determine the competence level of agents by assessing the agent’s 
long range frequency of voting for the correct alternative in a suitable reference 
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class of problems.  However with this approach we face the problem of 
determining what a suitable reference class is.  For example, how do we assess 
the competence level of a particular judge on a panel that is about to consider an 
important murder case?  Do we look at the proportion of their career decisions 
upheld?  Or do we look at the proportion of their recent decisions upheld?  Or 
do we consider the proportion of their decisions on murder trials that were 
upheld?  Whichever approach we take, there remains the risk that the next 
murder case the judge faces is nothing like the previous cases they have faced 
and so the judge’s previous performance is not a reliable indicator of future 
performance.   
 
There are two further ways (other than assessing the long range performance of 
agents) in which a social planner might assess the competence level of agents.  
Ladha (1992) explicitly talks of majority rule as a mechanism to “…assimilate 
decentralised information about the alternatives.” (p.619).  In Ladha’s example, 
a group has to decide whether the bias on a coin is such that the probability of 
heads is 0.6 or 0.3 (one of these is the true state of the world).  Each agent 
privately observes a certain number of tosses of the coin before casting their 
judgement as to the bias of the coin.  Edelman (interpreting Ladha) states that  
“…his [Ladha’s] description is essentially that of my aggregation model in 
which the issues correspond to the private information gotten by each voter 
from the flipping of the coins.” (p.335).  However, Edelman’s interpretation is 
misleading.  The private set of coin tosses observed by each agent means that 
each agent receives a different set of evidence.  Each agent faces the same issue, 
namely determining the bias on the coin.  A more accurate interpretation of 
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Ladha’s example is that the social planner will see the set of coin tosses that 
each agent observes.  But neither the agent nor the social planner can predict 
whether the set of coin tosses witnessed by the agent will be representative of 
the coin bias or not55.  The randomness enters the model, not because the make-
up of the group is uncertain or the issues the group faces is uncertain, rather it is 
uncertain whether the evidence itself is misleading or truth-conducive.  
Nevertheless, this interpretation of competence does account for why majority 
rule (among other judgement aggregation procedures) act as information 
pooling mechanism.  Both the agent and the social planner are aware of all the 
information that generates the judgements of the agents (the private sets of coin 
tosses), and which is then pooled in the social choice. 
 
A second way in which a social planner might assess the competence level of 
agents is if they observe the evidence that an agent receives, but are uncertain 
how this will influence the way in which the agent votes.  This uncertainty 
might occur because the social planner is unaware of the other (non-evidential) 
factors influencing an agent’s vote, or because the social planner is aware of all 
the factors influencing the agent’s vote but is unaware of how these factors 
interact in an agent’s internal deliberation.  This interpretation of the 
randomness in an agent’s vote seems most natural to apply to the social choice 
problems that are the concern of this thesis.  For example, a detective might 
know that a defendant is guilty of murder.  The detective knows the evidence 
that was put to the jury.  However the detective does not know how the jury will 
                                                 
55
 Again, by the law of large numbers, if the set of coin tosses observed by the agent is large 
then the average number of heads will tend to be very close to the actual bias of the coin.  But if 
the set of coin tosses observed by the agent is small, it is less likely to be close to the actual bias 
of the coin.    
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interpret the evidence and how compelling the evidence will be in determining 
the jurors’ judgements.  Similarly, a political pundit may know which 
presidential candidate will create the most jobs56.  The pundit may also know 
(or at least have some idea of) the information voters have received about the 
candidates.  However, the pundit does not know how the voters will make use 
of this evidence when deciding how to vote.  Again, because the social planner 
in these examples can see some of the information dispersed among the 
different agents in the group it makes sense to talk of judgement aggregation 
procedures pooling this information into the social choice. 
 
If the aggregative model of how to interpret agent competence is expanded to 
allow for the social planner to be aware of some but not all of the information 
influencing an agent’s vote, then the secondary question of how the social 
planner determines the value of an agent’s competence becomes more 
important.  On the one hand it seems entirely plausible to suggest that a social 
planner could assess the competence of an agent as  = 0.6 if the social 
planner can see the evidence the agent has received.  There is subjective 
randomness in the votes of agents (competence is not 1 or 0) precisely because 
the social planner is not certain how the agent will vote.  On the other hand, 
different social planners witnessing the same agent receiving the same piece of 
evidence may come to different conclusions as to what the competence of the 
agent is.  This issue is significant and too broad to address here.  However, I 
will gesture in the direction of a solution.  As models of consensus formation 
such as the Lehrer - Wagner model imply, provided that the social planners can 
                                                 
56
 Let’s suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the objectively correct alternative in a 
presidential election is the candidate who will create the most jobs.   
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share their judgements as to an agent’s level of competence, and provided that 
each social planner respects the view of every social planner then eventually all 
social planners will agree on what the level of an agent’s competence is given 
the information the agent has received.   
 
If an agent is to vote for the correct alternative the agent must have some causal 
factor which makes them vote for the correct alternative.  For the observer to be 
justified in the assumption that the competence of an agent is 0.5 < 
 < 1, the 
social planner must be aware of some of the causal factors that influence an 
agent towards voting for the correct alternative, but not be aware of all the 
causal factors influencing an agent’s vote.   
 
A taxonomy of causal factors 
The causal factors influencing an agent’s vote will be many and varied.  An 
agent may vote for a particular alternative for non-cognitive reasons, for 
example they may just have a gut instinct that a particular alternative is correct.  
Environmental factors may also have a causal influence on votes.  For example, 
poor lighting may make it difficult for a voter to read their ballot paper.  Losing 
the World Cup may make the voter more pessimistic when they cast their vote.  
The background of an agent may have an influence on an agent’s judgement.  
For example, an agent with degrees in mathematics or science will develop 
skills that mean they are very likely to vote for the correct alternative in a 
mathematical problem.  An agent who lacks a formal education in mathematics 
would be less likely to vote correctly in such a problem.   
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Often the causal factors influencing an agent’s vote will be informational in 
nature.  Casting a vote involves expressing a judgement as to the correct 
alternative.  This is an inherently cognitive activity which will be influenced by, 
inter alia, what the agent has seen and read and discussed with their friends, 
combined with what they have learned over the course of their life.   
 
It will help to develop a taxonomy of the types of causal factors that influence 
an agent’s vote.  We can take as a foundation the taxonomy provided in Dietrich 
(2008) where distinctions are drawn between the evidential/ non-evidential, 
common/ private and truth-conducive/ misleading factors influencing agents’ 
votes.  In particular I want to place emphasis on the importance of non-
evidential, private, truth-conducive causal factors in forming the competence of 
agents while still preserving some notion of independence.  I also want to 
emphasise that while the competence of agents at the time they cast their votes 
is of primary concern, we may also be interested in how the competence of 
agents develops over time.   
 
Evidential/ non-evidential factors 
It should be relatively easy to draw a line around a given set of evidential 
factors.  They are "…generally observable facts that support the correctness of 
an alternative including the specific nature of the alternative ...and several 
observable events" (Dietrich, 2008, p.4).  The evidential factors can also be 
interpreted as the indirect causal relatives of the state of the world.  So in a jury 
trial, if the true state of the world is that the defendant is guilty of murder, the 
evidence such as fingerprints left at the crime scene, the DNA evidence and the 
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witness statements are all indirect causal descendants of the act of murder and 
they all indicate which alternative (guilt/ innocence) is correct.  In addition, the 
receipt for the purchase of the murder weapon is also a causal relative of the 
state of the world, given that the purchase of the weapon was one of the causal 
factors leading to the act of murder57.  Note that evidential signals are not direct 
causal descendants of the state of the world, because no agent has direct contact 
with the state of the world.  An agent’s contact with the state of the world is 
mediated via chains of causes.  For example, suppose the defendant placed their 
fingers on the knife they used in the murder and dropped it as they left the 
scene.  A police officer later found the knife and carefully placed it in a bag.  It 
was taken to a crime lab where a technician carefully dusted the object and 
lifted off a complete image of a fingerprint.  This evidence was then compared 
with a background database of fingerprints to find a match with the suspect.  
This information was finally placed before the jury at the trial.  Although a juror 
has access to this piece of evidence, which was caused by the state of the world 
(the act of murder), the evidence does not provide a direct causal link to the 
state of the world as the juror only receives the evidence via a long chain of 
causes. 
 
Non-evidential factors are any causal factors on an agent’s vote that are not 
evidential.  Non-evidential causal factors carry no information as to which 
alternative is correct and are not causal descendants of the state of the world.  
"One may regard non-evidential circumstances as factors that affect whether 
                                                 
57
 It is important to note that I class causal relatives, and not just causal descendants, of the state 
of the world as evidential factors.  The purchase of the murder weapon was a cause of the act of 
murder and not a causal consequence of the act of murder.  But information regarding the 
purchase of the murder weapon does indicate what the true state of the world (guilt or 
innocence) is. 
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voters observe evidential circumstances and how they interpret them." (Dietrich, 
2008, p.4).  Although non-evidential factors carry no information on which 
alternative is correct, although they are not generally observable facts that 
support the correctness of an alternative, they do affect agents in their voting 
behaviour.  For example, the education of jurors should not be considered as 
part of the evidential circumstances.  The fact that a juror happens to have a 
biochemistry degree makes it neither more nor less likely that the defendant is 
guilty, and the fact that a juror has a degree in biochemistry was not caused by 
the fact that the defendant is guilty.  However, if the trial includes evidence 
about DNA traces left at the crime scene, then the fact that a juror happens to 
have a biochemistry degree means that they are more likely to understand the 
evidence and vote for the correct alternative.  It is in this sense that the non-
evidential factors may affect the way in which an agent interprets evidential 
factors and in doing so influence the way they vote.  Terming these factors 
‘non-evidential’ factors downplays the significant causal influence they can 
have.  Instead I will term the factors ‘background’ factors to distinguish them 
from the evidential factors that are causal descendants of the state of the world.  
Background factors include the education of an agent, their life experiences that 
affect their decision making, and more general propositions they learn which 
help them interpret evidence.  Background factors include any non-evidential 
factor that has a causal influence on an agent’s vote.    
 
The distinction between evidential and background causal factors is important 
for two reasons.  Firstly, agents need both types of causal factors if their 
 156 
competence is to be sufficiently high.  Secondly, there may be different amounts 
of evidential and background causes available.   
 
Agents need both background information and evidential signals for their 
competence to be greater than 0.5 in a dichotomous choice.  Evidential 
information includes the nature of the agenda agents are facing, for example 
whether the agents are asked to vote ‘guilty/ not guilty’ or ‘elephant/ not 
elephant’.  If agents do not have this basic piece of evidence and instead are 
voting on an agenda of ‘x/¬x’ or ‘1/0’ then they have no indication which 
alternative is correct and the probability that they will vote for the correct 
alternative will be 0.5.  If agents do have at least some evidential information, 
such as the nature of the agenda, they still need at least some appropriate 
background factors for them to make use of the evidence.  For example, an 
agent who does not understand that ‘innocent’ is a synonym for ‘not guilty’, or 
an agent who does not know what an elephant is would also only have a 0.5 
probability of voting for the correct alternative even if they were told the 
content of the agenda.  In the absence of background information agents will be 
unable to properly interpret the evidence.  In the absence of evidential signals 
the background information is of no use in identifying the correct state of the 
world.   
 
For the group as a whole, having a large number of diverse evidential signals 
and having a large amount of diverse background information are both 
important.  The larger the quantity of evidence and the more varied the evidence 
available to the group, the easier it will be for the group to identify the correct 
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state of the world.  The larger the quantity and more varied the background 
information in a group, the better the group will interpret the evidential 
information.  Ceteris paribus it is epistemically virtuous to include as many 
different agents in a group as feasible; both because of the evidential 
information they can contribute to the group and because of the background 
factors they can contribute.  These claims hold provided of course that this 
information and these factors are non-misleading.   
 
There may be social choice problems where the amount of evidence is limited.  
For example, in a criminal trial there may only be a small handful of witnesses 
to an act of murder.  In a Presidential election, the amount of information on 
which voters can judge candidates could be limited to manifesto documents, 
official biographies, and the content of speeches and debates made during the 
campaign.  In these cases we rely on the larger pool of background factors to 
appropriately interpret the limited amount of evidence.  Similarly there may be 
social choice problems where the amount of background information is limited 
but the amount of evidential information may be more substantial.  For 
example, a group of climate scientists may all use similar techniques and have 
similar training.  Including more scientists in the group is only likely to improve 
their understanding of climate change if these new scientists are able to make 
new observations, if they are able to obtain extra pieces of evidence.   
 
We can consider the competence of agents in certain reference classes of social 
choice problems (including a reference class with just one specific social choice 
problem).  The reference class of problems could be drawn narrowly or widely, 
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and the competence of different kinds of agents will vary according to reference 
class.  There may be some agents who have a consistently high level of 
competence in a narrow reference class of social choice problems.  For 
example, a homicide detective may have an extremely high level of competence 
at judging whether someone is guilty of murder, and may also have a high level 
of competence in the slightly broader reference class of criminal cases 
generally.  However this detective may have a much lower level of competence 
at judging who the best Presidential candidate is.  There may also be agents who 
have a consistent level of competence over quite a broad range of social choice 
problems.  For example, a five year old child may have a consistently low level 
of competence across a wide range of social choice problems.  Similarly an 
individual who has graduate degrees in both physics and moral philosophy may 
have such a comprehensive level of education that they have a consistently high 
level of competence across a very broad range of social choice problems.  In 
each of these cases the extent to which an agent will have high or low levels of 
competence in a narrow or broad reference class of social choice problem is 
largely due to the agent’s background causes.  Having a broad range of 
background information (or background factors more generally) means that an 
individual is able to correctly interpret evidential information in a broad 
reference class of social choice problems.   
 
We can represent the causal influences on an agents’ vote in diagrams58.  Note 
the causes should be interpreted as instantiations of random variables.  Figure 
                                                 
58
 Here I follow the same format for causal diagrams employed in Dietrich and Spiekermann 
(unpublished a, b) except that here the causes should be interpreted as instantiations of random 
variables. 
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4.1 shows all the causes of an agent 1′ vote and so here the vote of agent 1 will 
be deterministic59: the agent will vote for the correct alternative with either 
probability 1 or probability 0, conditional on the causes.  In these figures,  is 
the state of the world, #% is an evidential cause and #$ is a background cause.  
The direction of cause is represented with arrows. 
 
Figure 4.1: an example of a complete causal network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 represents the causal influences on the vote of agent 1 from the 
perspective of an observer or social planner who is aware of (and includes) 
some but not all of the causes.  Here there is some randomness in the vote of 
agent 1.   
 
 
                                                 
59
 Assuming there are no objectively random causes of an agent’s vote. 
 
x 
#Y$ 
! 
# % #{$ #% #% #|$ #*$ … 
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Figure 4.2: an example of a causal network, from the perspective of an 
observer.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Truth-conducive and misleading causal factors 
Any causal factor, be it evidential or background, can either be misleading or 
non-misleading.  This distinction comes from Dietrich (2008).  It is important to 
stress what is meant in this thesis by these terms.  A misleading factor is one 
that will tend to make an agent vote incorrectly (decrease their competence).  A 
non-misleading or truth-conducive factor is one that will tend to make an agent 
vote correctly (increase their competence).  Misleading factors can be evidential 
(such as planted DNA evidence) or non-evidential (such a head cold souring a 
juror’s mood).  Non-misleading/ truth-conducive factors can also be evidential 
(such as actual DNA evidence left at the crime scene by the perpetrator) or non-
evidential (such as a juror’s degree in biochemistry).  A summary of the 
taxonomy of causal factors influencing an agent’s vote is provided in the figure 
below: 
 
x 
! 
# % #{$ 
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Figure 4.3: a summary of the taxonomy of causal factors influencing an agent’s 
vote. 
Evidential signals Truth-conducive 
Misleading 
Background factors Truth-conducive 
Misleading 
 
Acquiring causal factors, and updating competence 
No evidential signal and very little in the way of non-evidential background 
factors will be possessed by agents a priori.  Agents cannot have information 
about the state of the world without having contact with it.  Agents may have 
some non-evidential information innately, but arguably most of the background 
information agents possess comes from them learning over time.   
 
Over time agents obtain non-case-specific background factors, either through 
formal education or more generally from their experiences over their lifetime, 
which can influence the way they make later decisions.  We can define the prior 
competence of agents, 
, as the probability of an agent voting for the correct 
alternative given their current set of background factors but in the absence of 
any evidential factors whatsoever.  This represents the competence of an agent 
at a time before they have considered the specific social choice problem and 
more particularly before they have discovered the content of the agenda.  If we 
accept that in the absence of any evidential factors whatsoever60 agents are 
                                                 
60
 Including the absence of even the details of the agenda agents are facing.  Here we are 
applying the Principle of Insufficient Reason. 
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neither more nor less likely to vote for the correct alternative, then it is plausible 
that the prior competence of an agent in a dichotomous choice situation is 

 = 0.5.   
 
The competence of agents will vary as they receive new causal factors.  We can 
term the competence of agents after they receive at least some evidential signal 
(such as the details of the agenda) the agent’s posterior competence and we can 
apply a time index to the competence of agents.  For example the competence of 
an agent  at time 1,2. . .  is 
, 
, … , 
.  Formally we can state the posterior 
competence of an agent  at time 1 as 
 = Pr	!
 = |, #$ , #%), where #$ are 
the prior background factors of agent , and #% is an evidential cause such as the 
content of the agenda61.  Agents can receive additional information (or more 
generally can be influenced by additional causal factors) once they have 
received an initial evidential signal (such as the content of the agenda).  For 
example, if an agent  subsequently received a further background cause #$ then 
their revised competence would be 
 = Pr	!
 = |, 
, #% , #$).  If the agent 
then received a further evidential signal # % then their revised competence would 
be 
 = Pr	!
 = |, 
, #% , #$ , # %).   
 
The more causal factors that are conditionalised on, the less randomness there 
will be in the vote of the agent, conditional on these factors and the state of the 
world.  In the limit, if all causal factors of an agent’s vote are conditionalised on 
there will be no randomness in the vote of the agent and he or she will vote for 
the correct alternative with probability 1 or 0. 
                                                 
61
  is also conditional on the state of the world. 
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Consider two examples of how agents’ competencies will vary over time.  
Firstly suppose the social choice involves choosing the next Presidential 
candidate, where the correct alternative is the candidate who will be best at 
managing the economy.  At time  an agent may be told the date of the 
Presidential election and be told who the Republican and Democratic candidates 
are.  At time  the little evidential information agent 1 has, combined with their 
prior background information, means they will have a posterior competence 
strictly greater62 or less than 0.5.  Subsequently (at time ) agent 1 watches a 
Presidential debate where a candidate claims that lowering taxes for the wealthy 
will stimulate economic growth.  This is an evidential signal; a piece of 
information which indicates which of the candidates would be best at managing 
the economy.  The agent who receives this signal could subsequently (at time 
 ) consult economic textbooks to see whether the statement of the candidate 
withstands scrutiny.  The economic literature assessing the impact of tax cuts on 
economic growth is a background factor; it does not directly imply which is the 
better Presidential candidate on the agenda, however an agent who gains this 
background information will be better able to interpret the evidential signal 
from the debate.  If the economic literature does imply that cutting taxes 
increases growth then this indicates the candidate does have some economic 
proficiency and so is likely to be the best candidate.  Alternatively, if the 
literature implies that tax cuts do not increase growth, then the candidate either 
                                                 
62
  > 0.5 if the information regarding the agenda is accurate and agent  has truth-conducive 
prior background information, for example, that Democratic candidates tend to manage the 
economy best.  
 < 0.5 if the agenda information is accurate but the agent has misleading prior 
background information, for example, that Republican candidates tend to manage the economy 
best. 
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doesn’t understand economics or is dishonest.  Either way, the fact that the 
agent sought out and received extra background factors means their 
competence, their probability of voting for the correct alternative, has increased 
in this case63.   
 
Similarly in a jury trial, the jurors already know the defendant is charged with 
murder.  Given their prior background factors this evidential factor means their 
posterior competence at time  will be strictly greater or less than 0.5.  For 
example, juror 1 may already have the truth-conducive background knowledge 
that most murder suspects are guilty and this factor, combined with the evidence 
that the agent is on the jury for a murder trial, means juror 1’s initial posterior 
competence will be  > 0.5.  A different juror 2 may have misleading 
background experiences that lead them to distrust the police.  As such their 
background factor, combined with the evidence that they are sitting on a jury 
trial, means their initial posterior competence will be  < 0.5.  The 
background experiences of juror 2 mean they are less likely to vote for the 
correct verdict.  Later in this trial the prosecutor may introduce a new piece of 
evidence, such as the fact that the fingerprints of the suspect were found at the 
crime scene.  The defence lawyer may also introduce more background 
information, such as the testimony of an expert witness who argues that 
fingerprint evidence is misleading.  The competence of these agents (the jurors) 
will vary over time as they receive more evidential information and more 
background information.   
                                                 
63
 For example, hearing a candidate state that lowering taxes for the wealthy will stimulate 
economic growth may be a misleading piece of evidence i.e. it increases the likelihood an agents 
will vote for the incorrect candidate (the candidate who makes the statement).  However, 
receiving the background information from the economic textbook allows an agent to see that 
the statement from the candidate is misleading.   
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As noted above, causal factors, be they evidential factors or background factors, 
can be misleading or non-misleading/ truth-conducive.  The time-indexing of 
agent competence levels allows us to articulate more clearly the misleadingness 
or truth-conduciveness of causal factors.  A causal factor # received at time 
 + 1 is misleading if 
 > 
.  For example, if jurors hear an expert witness 
who wrongly suggests that DNA evidence is infallible, their competence may 
decrease.  A causal factor is truth-conducive if 
 < 
.  For example, if 
jurors are presented with more true evidence that additional fingerprints were 
left by the defendant near the crime scene then this may increase agent 
competence levels.  
 
How agents update their competence, how they translate their prior competence 
into posterior competence given background and evidential causal factors, is 
open to debate.  It seems plausible that the strength of a causal factor (and 
whether it is truth-conducive or misleading) will depend on the combination of 
information an agent has, both in terms evidential signals and background 
information.   For example consider again two agents, a lay person with a basic 
science education and a professor of chemistry, who receive the same evidential 
signal regarding climate change.  If the evidential signal points to the correct 
state of the world, then the background information of the professor of 
chemistry (all that they have learnt during their education and years of research) 
allow them to extract significant gains in competence out of the evidential 
signal, meaning their posterior competence may be high.  The lay person may 
have a much lower posterior competence given the same evidential signal 
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because they lack the background factors required to interpret the evidential 
signal appropriately.   
 
It also seems plausible that signals have decreasing marginal contributions to 
competence.   So if agents have competence close to 0.5, any causal factor will 
have a significant impact on that agent's posterior competence.  If competence is 
closer to 0 or 1 then further additional signals may have less of an impact.  For 
example, the first witness a juror hears may convince them to vote (correctly) 
for guilt.  The 41st witness may have less of an impact on a juror.   
 
Although the competence of agents will vary over time, it is the competence of 
agents at the time when they cast their votes that matters for the aggregation 
procedures.  However the model of the competence of agents, indexed to time, 
is important for two reasons.  Firstly it is more realistic than the static model of 
competence implied by current aggregation accounts.  Secondly, it will be 
important later in the thesis where I provide a model of how agents search for 
the evidential and background factors to generate their competence.   
 
The distribution of competencies in a group depends on the competencies that 
different agents develop, which in turn depends on the evidential and 
background factors that individual agents receive.  If we can account for how 
different agents obtain evidential and background information, we can account 
for the final distribution of competencies within the group.   
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Independence 
 
The independence of agents, the probability that an agent will vote for the 
correct alternative given the vote of another agent, is important for some 
aggregation procedures.  Informally, independence relations capture the extent 
to which agents will tend to vote in the same way or tend to vote differently.  
Formally, agent  is independent of agent  if 
 = Pr!
 = | = Pr	!
 =
|, !: = 1 and 
 = Pr!
 = | = Pr	!
 = |, !: = 0.  If agents are 
independent then the fact that one agent votes a certain way makes it neither 
more nor less likely that a second agent will vote for the correct alternative, 
given the state of the world.  I have argued that the probability that an agent 
votes for the correct alternative is determined by the evidential signals they 
receive combined with the background factors they have.  If two agents share at 
least some background or evidential factors then independence will not hold, 
conditional just on the state of the world.  For example if the shared factors are 
truth-conducive then the fact that one agent votes correctly increases the 
probability that the second agent votes correctly i.e. Pr!
 = | <
Pr D!
 = , !: = 10F.  Examples where shared evidential or background 
causal factors will impact on independence relations are shown in figure 4.14 a, 
b and c.  Common or shared factors are shaded grey64.  In figure 4.14a agents 
share an evidential factor.  In figure 4.14b agents share a background factor.  In 
figure 4.14c agents share both evidential and background causal factors. 
 
                                                 
64
 This again is in line with the convention employed in Dietrich and Spiekermann (unpublished 
a, b).  However in my diagrams the causes should be interpreted as instantiations of random 
variables.   
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Figure 4.4: examples of causal networks where agents share causal factors.   
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
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Independence can be secured, even if agents share some evidential signals or 
background information, if we conditionalise on all causal factors held in 
common.  So in our three examples independence is secured as follows: 
 
a) Pr! = |, #% = Pr	! = |, #% , ! = 10); 
Pr! = |, #% = Pr	! = |, #% , ! = 10)  
 
b) Pri! = j, #$k = Pr	! = |, #$ , ! = 10; 
Pri! = j, #$k = Pr	! = |, #$ , ! = 10  
 
c) Pri! = j, #% , #$k = Pr	! = |, #% , #$ , ! = 10; 
	Pri! = j, #% , #$k = Pr	! = |, #% , #$ , ! = 10  
 
If independence holds after we conditionalise on common factors then there 
remains a concern that conditionalising removes all randomness from the 
subsequent votes of agents65.  The probability of agent  voting correctly 
conditional just on the state of the world may be greater than 0 and less than 1 
i.e. 0 < Pr!
 = | < 1, but the probability of agent  voting for the correct 
alternative given the common factors may be either 0 or 1 i.e. 
Pri!
 = j, #
,:% k = 01.  By conditionalising on factors we capture all the causal 
influences on an agent’s vote and remove all subjective uncertainty as to how an 
                                                 
65
 A concern noted by Dietrich (2008). 
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agent will vote.  This lack of randomness in the conditional competence of 
agents poses a problem for some of the aggregation procedures.  In some 
aggregation procedures it is epistemically desirable for agents to vote 
differently.  For example, in majority voting if one agent votes for the wrong 
alternative it is desirable that another agent votes for the correct alternative.  If 
the conditional probability of the second agent voting correctly given the 
incorrect vote of the first agent is : = Pri!: = j, !
k = 0, then the 
probability of a correct majority verdict will not change as group size increases.  
For agents to be conditionally independent, while retaining some randomness in 
their votes, the agents must have some evidential signals or background 
information held uniquely or privately66 by them, which is not conditionalised 
on67.  In the examples shown in figure 4.14, the votes of agents in (a) and (b) 
retain some randomness after conditionalising on common factors because we 
are aware that each agent has some private causal factors that are not 
conditionalised on.  But in 4.14c, after the common factors are conditionalised 
on there may be no randomness in the votes of agents since the agents may not 
hold any causal factors privately. 
 
We can summarise the revised taxonomy of information in the figure below: 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
66
 Again the distinction between public and private factors comes from Dietrich (2008).   
 
67
 The interplay between competence and independence is addressed again in chapter 7.   
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Figure 4.5: a revised taxonomy of causal factors.   
 Public/ common Private 
Evidential 
signals 
Truth-conducive Truth-conducive 
Misleading Misleading 
Background 
factors 
Truth-conducive Truth-conducive 
Misleading Misleading 
 
It seems implausible that in real world social choice problems every agent 
would have identical background factors and identical evidential signals, and so 
the votes of agents will always be independent conditional on the common 
factors68.  Within a group of agents there may be small clusters of agents with 
nearly identical factors.  For example, a subgroup of agents who went to the 
same school, studied the same subjects at university and entered the same 
profession will have very similar background factors and as such will interpret 
evidential signals in similar way.  The selection of group members from the 
wider population needs to be careful not to capture clusters of similar agents.  If, 
for example, a jury is comprised of individuals with the same background then 
they will do no better than a single juror at correctly interpreting the evidence 
presented to them and arriving at the correct verdict. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 Not even identical twins raised in the same household have identical vote-determining causal 
factors, since they will have at least some different experiences during their life which will 
impact on their votes.    
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Transparency 
 
Following the definition provided in chapter 2, competence is transparent if 
every agent knows the competence of every other agent and they know that they 
know the competencies.  Competence is opaque if agents do not know the 
competencies of other agents and they know that they do not know the 
competencies.  We could also interpret transparency from the perspective of the 
social planner or observer.  Competence is transparent if the social planner can 
see the level of competence of all the agents, and competence is opaque if the 
social planner cannot see the level of competence of all the agents.  The 
transparency of competence will be a contingent matter: in some social choice 
problems competence will be transparent; in other social choice problems 
competence will be opaque.  Here I present three conditions under which 
competence will plausibly be transparent.  Firstly, there may be cases of 'zero-
knowledge proofs', where agents can communicate their level of competence 
without sharing evidential signals.  For example I can prove that I know the 
phone number of a friend simply by giving the friend a call.  I don't have to pass 
on my evidence (the friend’s phone number) in order to prove my competence.   
 
Secondly, competence may be transparent because an agent is aware of the 
specific evidential and background factors that generate their competence and is 
able to show these signals to other agents.  Alternatively, competence may be 
transparent because a social planner is aware of the specific evidential and 
background factors that generate agent competencies.  For example, an agent 
may have a high competence at judging the time of their flight departure 
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because they have a ticket with the departure time printed on it.  They can show 
this ticket to their friends to prove they know the departure time.  Note that this 
type of transparency can involve the sharing of the evidential signals between 
agents, with a corresponding impact on independence relations.  This associated 
impact on independence may or may not have an impact on the epistemic 
performance of the group depending on the aggregation procedure employed.   
 
Finally, competence may be transparent when agents are able to establish their 
competence via their long range success at selecting the correct alternatives in a 
suitable reference class of social choice problems.  For example, an agent might 
have made the correct prediction in 9/10 of recent national elections, and as 
such would be expected to be highly competent at predicting the winner of the 
next election.  The competent agent can communicate their competence without 
sharing their evidential signal, in that they can provide proof of their previous 
success without showing on what grounds they will make their next prediction.  
However this method of communicating competence is not completely reliable.  
There is a risk that future elections are not like previous elections and so the 
previous performance of agents might provide no justification for their future 
performance.   
 
The next two chapters will consider search procedures by which groups of 
agents find vote-determining causal factors.  We might use the notion of a 
search procedure here to draw a distinction between the second two notions of 
transparency of competence.   If competence is transparent because agents can 
show the causal factors generating their level of competence then this is ex post 
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(after search) transparency of competence.  However if competence is 
transparent on the basis of an agent’s long range success at selecting the correct 
alternatives in a suitable reference class of social choice problems, then we are 
employing an et ante (prior to search) notion of agent competence.  Here the 
competence of an agent is the expected ex post competence of an agent, 
formally: 
 = ∑ Pr	# 	Pr	!
 = |, #$ , # ) , where #  is a causal factor 
that may or may not be discovered by an agent.   
 
Importantly, if competence is transparent, then agents ( or a social planner) will 
be able to select the aggregation procedure that is optimal at tracking the truth.  
If competence is transparent, if the evidential signals can be shared, and if the 
background information of agents is roughly equivalent, then agents should all 
be in agreement as to the correct alternative (see Bradley 2006).  If instead 
evidential signals cannot be shared but competence is none the less transparent 
then the group is still able to make institutional decisions to maximise the 
probability of a correct verdict.  If, for example, many agents have competence 
greater than 1/2, weighted majority rule will be the optimal aggregation 
procedure.  If, on the other hand, only one agent has high competence the 
optimal aggregation procedure is to make the high-competence agent the expert 
dictator69. 
 
Now that we have an explanation of how the causal factors received by agents 
generate their competence, independence relations and transparency, I will set 
out some examples of causal networks to show the type of judgement-
                                                 
69
 Strictly speaking weighted majority rule is equivalent to expert dictatorship where only one 
agent has 
 ≠ 0.5.   
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generating factors they produce and the type of judgement aggregation 
procedure that would be appropriate.   
 
Examples of causal networks and their impact on competence and 
independence  
 
Note that in the following examples we will assume that all causes (evidential 
and background) are truth-conducive/ non-misleading.  Unless stated otherwise 
the diagrams do not represent all the causes, only those causes the observer or 
social planner is aware of.  The causes should be interpreted as instantiations of 
a generating random variable. 
 
In figure 4.6 below we have the perfect setting for majority rule.  Each agent 
(represented by the votes !, !, ! ) has an evidential cause and a background 
cause.  For example, voter 1 receives evidential factor h% and background factor 
h{$.  Each cause is private; no cause is shared by agents. 
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Figure 4.6: a causal network where each agent has private background and 
evidential factors.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 4.7 there is only one evidential cause which is shared by all agents.  
However, each agent has a private background cause with which to interpret the 
evidence, so the majority rule would still be an appropriate aggregation 
procedure.  This example models a jury trial.   
 
Figure 4.7: a causal network with common evidence, but private background 
factors.   
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In figure 4.8 every agent has the same background factors, but different agents 
receive different pieces of evidence.  Here majority voting would be an 
appropriate aggregation procedure.  An example of this type of causal network 
might be where a group of climate scientists all have identical background 
education and training, but are able to make different experimental 
observations.    
 
Figure 4.8: a causal network with common background factors, but private 
evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In figure 4.9, agent 3 receives all the information available.  The only 
information 1 or 2 have is already possessed by agent 3.  If these represent all 
the causes then the conditional probability of 1 or 2 voting correctly given the 
vote of 3 will be 1 or 0 i.e. there is no randomness in their probability of voting 
correctly, conditional on common factors.  In this example, it may be more 
appropriate to make 3 the dictator rather than rely on majority voting involving 
all three agents.  This is provided of course that agent 3 can prove to the others 
x 
#% 
! ! !  
#$ # % #Y% 
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(of the social planner) that she knows something they don’t, that she can prove 
her competence is the highest in the group.   
 
Figure 4.9: a causal network where a single agent receives all the information.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, figure 4.10 will be more typical.  Here every agent has four causes, two 
evidential causes and two background causes.  Each agent has one evidential 
and one background cause in common, but because they have private evidential 
and background information, majority rule can aggregate the information.   
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Figure 4.10: a causal network with both private and common evidence and 
background factors.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has focussed on how the inputs to judgement aggregation 
procedures form.  It was argued that whether competence is transparent or not 
depends on contingencies in the circumstances of particular social choice 
problems.  An agent will have competence 
 > 1/2 if they receive evidential 
signals and if the combination of evidential and background causal factors 
influencing their vote are overall truth-conducive.  The votes of agents will be 
independent (and have some randomness), conditional on common factors, if 
agents have at least some causal factors influencing their votes (either evidential 
or background) that are held privately by them.   
 
But agents do not have evidential and background factors a priori.  To complete 
the justification of aggregation procedures as truth-tracking mechanisms we 
need to show how it is plausible that individual agents within a group will 
x 
#Y$ 
! ! !  
# $ #{% #$ #$ #|% #}% #~% 
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identify evidential and background factors and how they will identify factors not 
held by other agents.  In chapter 5 I present a general model of a group search 
procedure by which agents can search for and identify objects.  These objects 
could be the truth-conducive pieces of background and evidential information.   
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Chapter 5: Group search procedures. 
 
This chapter provides a general framework for search procedures involving 
groups of agents.  A single agent searching for an object of interest may only 
have a small probability of finding it.  But if we employ a group to search for 
the object the probability that at least one of the group members will find it can 
be significantly higher.  There are two different social epistemic mechanisms 
behind the epistemic performance of a group search procedure.  Firstly, 
increasing the number of agents can increase the number of locations visited by 
the group.  Secondly, increasing the number of agents can increase the 
probability that the object at a particular location will be recognised by a 
member of the group.   
 
I present a theorem that states under certain assumptions the probability that a 
group of agents will identify a particular object is increasing in group size and 
in the limit tends to certainty.  The assumptions of the theorem are modified to 
produce extensions of the theorem.   
 
I then develop a model of a group search procedure to investigate the dynamics 
of group search.  In the model there is a set of locations, one of which contains 
the object of interest.  Individual agents engage in a search for the object by 
moving from location to location.  The locations an agent visits are determined 
by four agent-specific variables: the agent’s initial partitioning of the search 
space, the convention the agent employs for ordering the locations, the start 
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point of the agent’s search and the agent’s search heuristic.  The objects an 
agent finds are determined by the locations the agent visits and the agent’s 
capacity to recognise objects at those locations.  If there are differences in the 
locations visited by agents and / or differences in the ability of agents to 
recognise objects then as group size increases the probability that a member of 
the group finds the object of interest increases and in the limit reaches 
certainty. 
 
The model of the group search is reproduced in the computer program 
‘NetLogo’ and subjected to simulations.  The results of the simulations confirm 
both the claims of the search theorem and the conceptual arguments of the 
search model: as group size increases the probability an object will be found 
increases and tends to certainty.  The simulation results also show the impact 
on a group’s search performance of adjusting the agent-specific search 
variables.  I also present a proof of the theorem.   
 
Search procedures 
 
Suppose someone has lost their car keys.  They may be able to narrow down 
where they lost their keys to their home.  To find their keys a person needs to 
engage in a search, to move from location to location to see if that is where the 
keys were left.  If their home is large it may take a very long time to find the car 
keys.  And if we limit the time available for the search, for example if the 
person has to be at work in thirty minutes, then it is possible that they keys will 
not be found at all.  But as we may know from our own experiences, the chance 
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of finding a set of car keys can be improved if we increase the number of people 
looking for them.  Someone who needs to find their car keys so that they can be 
at work in thirty minutes should ask the other members of their household to 
help search for them.  Provided that each household member has at least some 
chance of finding the keys, and provided there are some differences in the way 
each agent searches, then a group of people will be far more likely to find the 
car keys than a single individual would be.   
 
A search procedure does not have to be limited to the search for physical 
objects.  In fact many of the more interesting applications of a search procedure 
apply to objects that are pieces of information.  For example, suppose a 
philosopher is looking for an obscure Wittgenstein reference.  They may look in 
the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations but still not be able to locate it.  
Their chances of finding the reference will be improved if they email their 
colleagues asking for help.  A group of philosophers are more likely than an 
individual philosopher to find the Wittgenstein reference, provided of course 
that each group member has at least some chance of finding it (for example each 
group member should be familiar with the main works of Wittgenstein) and 
provided there are some differences in the search behaviour of the philosophers.   
 
A search procedure can be construed as a function which assigns to each agent a 
corresponding set of objects.  Individual agents have their own search 
procedure.  A group’s search procedure is comprised of the search procedures of 
the individual agents in the group and the success of a group at finding objects 
depends on the success of the individual search procedures.  A group search 
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procedure allocates subsets of objects from the total search space to individual 
members of the group. 
 
Figure 5.1: search procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The epistemic advantage to including agents in the search for information has 
been investigated, for example, by Kitcher (1990, 1993) who provides a model 
under the title of a ‘division of cognitive labour’ to account for how different 
individuals in a scientific community spread themselves out over different 
possible avenues for research.  Recently Weisberg and Muldoon (2009, 2011) 
have produced a model that more explicitly captures both the search involved in 
a division of cognitive labour, and the spatial aspect of a search.  Weisberg and 
Muldoon have shown how it is epistemically desirable, from the groups’ 
perspective, to have a mixture of ‘maverick’ and ‘follower’ agents in the search 
for successful scientific approaches.  The maverick agents strike out on their 
own, away from the research of others, to find research areas of epistemic 
significance.  Follower agents move towards the discoveries of other agents and 
help fully exploit the areas of epistemic significance identified by maverick 
agents.  Hong and Page (2004) also produce a spatial model of group search 
behaviour.  Through proofs and computer simulations they show that ‘diversity 
Input (agents, objects) 
Output (agent\ object groupings) 
Search procedures 
 185 
trumps ability’, that a group with varied but sub-optimal search heuristics will 
outperform a group with optimal but similar search heuristics.  The intuition 
behind their surprising result is roughly that the more varied a set of search 
heuristics, the more thoroughly a search space will be investigated and the more 
likely it is that the objects of interest will be identified. 
 
The aim of this chapter is more modest than those canvased in the papers above.  
I am not attempting to provide an analysis of the optimal institutional 
arrangements for certain search problems (although this is a very interesting 
area for future research, and should be possible given the framework I set out 
later in this chapter).  Instead the aim of this chapter is to make the case that in 
search problems, ceteris paribus, it is epistemically advantageous to include as 
many diverse agents in a group as possible.  This result can subsequently be 
applied to solve problems in epistemic accounts of democracy.   
 
Search Theorems 
 
There are two distinct possible explanations for how search procedures allow 
groups of agents to find objects that may be missed by individual agents.  These 
two explanations depend on how the differences in the search behaviour of 
agents are interpreted.   
 
Suppose the group of philosophers is searching the Tractatus for the 
Wittgenstein reference.  On one interpretation of the differences in search 
behaviour, one agent will search point 1, while a different agent will search 
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point 2, a further agent will search point 3, and so on.  The diversity in the 
locations searched by different agents in the group mean that a group of agents 
as a whole find objects missed by individual agents. 
 
Suppose instead that each agent in the group of philosophers searches the entire 
contents of the Tractatus, from point 1 to point 7.  One agent may read point 
4.012 and fail to take in its significance.  A second agent also reads point 4.012 
but again does not recognise it as being important.  A third agent reads point 
4.012 and does recognise its significance.  The differing abilities of agents to 
recognise an object at a particular location mean that a group of agents as a 
whole find objects missed by individual agents.   
 
Similarly with the example of searching for car keys, there are two explanations 
as to why a group will be more likely to find the car keys than an individual 
agent will be.  Firstly, there may be diversity in the locations searched by 
agents.  If time is short and a single agent can only search part of the house for 
the car keys then as we increase the number of agents we increase the 
proportion of the house that is subjected to a search.  Secondly, there may be 
differences in the ability of individual agents to recognise the car keys.  Some 
agents may miss the car keys even if they visit the room where the keys are 
located.  If all agents search the same locations in the house then, although some 
of the agents may fail to recognise the car keys this has no impact on the ability 
of subsequent agents to recognise the keys, and as the number of agents 
increases the probability that at least one of them will find the car keys also 
increases.   
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In what follows I present a series of theorems that capture in more formal terms 
the two kinds of search procedure.  I begin by presenting the combined theorem 
before considering the spatial search theorem and search recognition theorem 
separately.   
 
Combined Search Theorem 
Suppose we have a set of objects  which are the subject of search.   may be 
known by agents (for example the car keys are known to exist); or  may be 
unknown (for example, agents searching for the Wittgenstein reference may not 
be aware of all the utterances of Wittgenstein).   ∈  represents an individual 
object from the set of all relevant objects.  We also have a set of agents 
, , , … , ∈ . 
 
We have a finite set of locations .   ∈  represents a particular location from 
the set of all locations.  Each location is atomic and cannot be divided into 
smaller locations.  The set of locations  can be divided into jointly exhaustive 
subsets of locations70.  Each of these subsets of locations are visited by different 
agents and are indexed according to the agents, namely 
, : , … ⊆ .   
 
Each object occurs at a particular location.  The mapping from the set of all 
objects to the set of locations is - initially - unknown to agents in the group.  For 
example, w represents the location of object  but the subset of locations 
, , … ⊆  in which  occurs is unknown initially.  We might think of w as 
                                                 
70
 The subsets of locations can, in some circumstances, contain only a single member (a single 
location). 
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a random variable (epistemically speaking) with a uniform distribution on  so 
that each  ∈  is equally likely to contain .   
 
If an agent moves to the location of an object the agent will have a certain 
probability of recognising that object.   
 
We will consider the special case in which there is just one object  ∈  which 
is the subject of search.  The location ∗ of the object  and the subset of 
locations in which ∗	 occurs are initially unknown to the group.  Each agent is 
assigned one subset of locations.  Being assigned a subset of locations means 
that an agent visits each location in that subset as part of their search for the 
object .  Once the agent moves to a location in their subset of locations, they 
attempt to identify the objects located there.   
 
We write 
 for the event  ∈ 
.  We write 	
|
 for the event that an agent  
recognises the object, given that the object occurs in their set of locations.   
 
We will make four assumptions: 
 
Spatial Search Competence: For each agent, the unconditional probability that 
the object occurs in the agent’s subset of locations is uniformly bounded away 
from zero by some value  and is less than certainty.  Formally, for all  ∈ ,	 
0 <  < Pr
 < 1.   
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Search Recognition Competence: The conditional probability that an agent 
recognises the object, given the object is in the set of locations visited by the 
agent, is uniformly bounded away from zero and less than certainty.  Formally, 
for all , 0 <  < Pr	
|
 < 1. 
 
Spatial Search Independence: The events of the object occurring in the subsets 
of locations visited by different agents are independent. 
 
Search Recognition Independence: The events of different agents recognising 
the object, given that they visit the object location, are independent. 
 
Combined Search Theorem 
Given the above assumptions, the probability that a group of  agents finds the 
object is: 
• (non-limit claim) increasing in group size; and 
• (limit claim) in the limit approaches certainty71. 
 
The unconditional probability that a group of  agents finds the object  is 
given by72: 
 
,* == Pr	
 × Pr		
*
6 |
 
 
                                                 
71
 This result is driven by the zero-one law, and not the law of large numbers as in the case of 
the CJT.   
 
72
 Note that if the object does not occur in the subset of locations searched by an agent then 
there is no possibility that agent will recognise the object.  More formally,  Pr	
|¬
 = 0. 
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According to the combined search theorem, increasing group size is always 
epistemically advisable (provided the four assumptions hold).  By increasing the 
group size we increase the probability that at least one of the group members 
will visit the object’s location (they have at least some chance of recognising the 
object there).  By increasing group size we also increase the number of agents 
visiting the particular location of the object and so increase the probability that 
the object will be recognised by at least one member of the group.   
 
The Combined Search Theorem focuses on the search for a single particular 
object.  We can apply the Combined Search Theorem to all objects  ∈ .  As 
such, as group size increases the total number of objects found should also 
increase.   
 
To see the differences in the two types of search procedure, it is helpful to 
consider the two parts of the Combined Search Theorem separately.   
 
Spatial Search Theorem 
Here we abandon the Search Recognition Competence assumption from above.  
Instead we assume that the recognition competence of agents is perfect – if an 
agent visits the location of the object the agent is guaranteed to find the object73.  
We have two assumptions as follows: 
• Spatial Search Competence 
• Spatial Search Independence 
 
                                                 
73
 The Search Recognition Independence assumption now becomes irrelevant. 
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Spatial Search Theorem: Under the above assumptions the probability that a 
member of a group of 1,2, … ,  agents finds an object of interest is: 
• (non-limit claim) increasing in group size; and 
• (limit claim) in the limit approaches certainty. 
 
If )* is the probability that some member of a group of  agents finds the 
object, then: 
 
)* == Pr	
*
6  
 
The initial presentation of the Spatial Search Theorem makes the general 
epistemic case for increasing the number of agents involved in a search.  As we 
increase the size of the group we increase the probability that at least one of the 
group members will visit the location of the object (and recognise the object 
there).  The Spatial Search Independence assumption ensures that if the object 
does not occur in the subset of locations searched by one agent, it might still 
occur in the subset of locations searched by a different agent.   
 
If agents were to search exactly the same subset of locations, there would be no 
epistemic advantage to increasing group size, given the assumption that an 
agent will recognise the object if it occurs in the subset of locations they search.  
It is optimal for the group if each agent searches an exclusive set of locations.  
But if the sets of locations searched by agents are exclusive then the Spatial 
Search Independence assumption will not hold.  For example, if one agent fails 
to find the object (because the object does not occur in that agent’s subset of 
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locations) it makes it more likely that a different agent will find the object.  We 
can replace the Spatial Search Independence assumption with the following 
assumption, which captures the exclusivity of agent’s searches.    
 
Spatial Search Diversity: For any two agents	, :  ≠ , the events 
, : are 
mutually exclusive i.e. 
 ∩ : = Ø.  Informally, no agents have any locations in 
common and so it is impossible for two agents to find the object.   
 
Of course the assumption that the sets of locations visited by agents are 
exclusive is quite demanding.  If this assumption were to hold in practice, then 
it would require either a social planner to divide up the search space into non-
overlapping subsets; or it would require agents to communicate in the 
partitioning of the search space.   
 
The Spatial Search Diversity assumption can be weakened.  We can allow that 
there is some overlap in the locations visited by agents and therefore that the 
probabilities of different agents finding the objects are not independent.  The 
minimum amount of private search we require from agents can be characterised 
as follows: 
 
Spatial Search Diversity 2: Informally, although the intersection in the set of 
locations searched by two agents may be non-empty, each agent has at least 
some locations that they search privately.  Pr	⋃ 
*
6 − Pr	⋃ 
 > 0*
6 .   
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Search Recognition Theorem 
Here we abandon the Spatial Search Competence assumption from earlier.  
Instead we assume that the probability that the object occurs in the set of 
locations searched by each agent is certainty74.  We have two assumptions as 
follows: 
• Search Recognition Competence 
• Search Recognition Independence 
 
Search Recognition Theorem: The conditional probability that one of a group of 
agents recognises the object, given the object is in the set of common locations 
visited by the agents, is: 
• (limit claim) increasing in group size; and  
• (non-limit claim) in the limit tends to certainty. 
 
The conditional probability that a group of  agents recognises the object at a 
particular location, +*, is given by: 
+* == Pr		
|
)*

6
 
 
There may be some violations of Search Recognition Independence.  An agent’s 
ability to recognise objects could be caused by any number of factors.  For 
example, an agent’s ability to recognise Wittgenstein’s quotes could be caused 
by the seminars or tutorials they attended which focussed on particular aspects 
of Wittgenstein’s work.  If two agents share some recognition ability generating 
factors (if, for example, they attended the same seminars) then their recognition 
                                                 
74
 As such, the Spatial Search Independence assumption becomes irrelevant. 
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abilities will not be independent.  The probability of an agent recognising an 
object, given that their colleague has recognised the object, will be greater than 
the agent’s unconditional probability of recognising the object.  However 
independence in object recognition ability is secured by conditionalising on 
common factors as follows: 
 
Search Recognition Independence 2:  The events of different agents recognising 
the object are independent, conditional on the object being contained in the 
common set of locations and on factors held in common between agents.   
 
If Search Recognition Independence is violated and we use Search Recognition 
Independence 2 then in calculations of the probability of a group recognising 
the object we must use the values for agents’ search competence that are 
conditional on common factors.   
 
A taxonomy of searches, and trade-offs  
We can summarise the three types of search theorem in the diagram below: 
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Figure 5.2: a taxonomy of search mechanisms. 
 Search Recognition 
Yes No 
Spatial 
Search 
Yes Combined  
Search Theorem 
Spatial  
Search  
Theorem 
No Search 
Recognition 
Theorem 
N/A 
 
The two mechanisms driving the epistemic performance of the Search Theorem 
are, firstly, that different agents visit different locations (Spatial Search 
Theorem); and, secondly, that different agents visit the same location but have 
differing abilities to recognise the object located there (Search Recognition 
Theorem).  These two mechanisms pull in different directions.  If we encourage 
agents to disperse and visit different locations we decrease the probability that 
the objects at those locations will be recognised.  If instead we encourage agents 
to visit the same locations we increase the probability the objects at those 
particular locations will be recognised, but we decrease the probability of 
finding objects that occur at different locations.   
 
Both the Spatial Search and Search Recognition procedures could operate in 
political settings.  Suppose that the House of Lords must consider whether 
banning a certain recreational drug will be effective at reducing the number of 
deaths that result from this drug.  Suppose there is a crucial piece of 
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information, which should inform the decision making: when the drug was 
made illegal in the US, organised crime took over production of the drug, the 
quality of the drug decreased, drug users were reluctant to seek treatment and as 
a result the number of drug-related deaths actually increased.  It is unlikely that 
any member of the House of Lords would possess this information prior to the 
Bill being presented to them.  We would expect that at least the cross-bench 
members of the House of Lords would undertake some research before casting 
their votes.  The research can be construed as the conduct of a search procedure.  
 
It may be that a number of the Members hear the same submission from a 
member of the public that cites the US evidence.  There is every chance that a 
given member will fail to see the significance of the evidence – they may take a 
dislike to the member of the public presenting the evidence, or they may feel 
that the situation in the US is too dissimilar to the situation in the UK for the 
evidence to be relevant.  Provided that there is diversity in the capacity of agents 
to recognise  the evidence, then as the number of cross-benchers hearing the 
evidence increases, the probability that at least one of them will make use of the 
information in informing their judgement increases.   
 
Alternatively, it may be that no member of the public proactively offers the US 
evidence to members of the House of Lords – the members have to search for 
the information themselves.  Provided that there is diversity in the potential 
sources of information investigated by agents – for example if one Member 
consults the medical community, another consults the voluntary sector, while 
another consults the policing community - then as the number of cross-benchers 
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searching  for information increases, the probability that at least one of them 
will come across the US evidence increases.   
 
When we apply the two search procedures to the example of the House of Lords 
and US evidence of criminalising a drug, we can see again that the two search 
procedures pull in opposite directions.  If we encourage a number of Members 
to listen to the submission from the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan 
Police, they may not have time to consult representatives of the voluntary sector 
who may also have vital information.  Similarly, if we encourage different 
Members to consult different sources, we decrease the probability that the 
Members will pick up all the relevant information from a given source.   
 
A general model of a search procedure 
 
Chapter 2 showed how groups of agents employing various aggregation 
procedures, such as expert dictatorship, negative reliability unanimity rule and 
majority rule can track the truth (identify the true state of the world) as group 
size increases.  The Search Theorem also shows how groups of agents can 
accomplish epistemic tasks (find an object of interest) as group size increases.  
To investigate the normative implications of a search procedure we need to 
move beyond the Search Theorem and develop a more detailed model of the 
search.  In particular we need a more detailed account of how it is that different 
agents are able to visit different locations.   
 
 
 198 
The components of the model 
Any model of real world phenomena has to trade off tractability against 
descriptive accuracy (including the accuracy of predictions).  At one extreme, a 
model which captures all the features of the real world will be very accurate but 
very cumbersome to use.  Similarly at the other end of a spectrum, a model that 
captures few features of the real world will be very easy to use but is unlikely to 
be accurate.  The model of the search procedure I present here is intended to 
capture the variables that human agents would be aware of and would make use 
of.  The choice of variables is not just for the sake of predictive accuracy, but 
also so that the model is a plausible representation of actual agent and group 
behaviour.  Simpler models would be more elegant, but would not correspond 
as tightly to the target phenomena.  The model of a search procedure presented 
here takes inspiration from the models presented in Hong and Page (2004) 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009, 2011).  
 
All objects of a search, be they concrete objects like car keys or informational 
objects like a reference from Wittgenstein, will occur at certain locations.  For 
example the car keys might be located next to the telephone in the hallway; the 
Wittgenstein reference might be located at point 4.012 in the Tractatus.  The set 
of all possible locations for an object of interest comprises the search space.  
The size of the search space, the number of objects in the search space, the 
particular locations of particular objects, and the recognisability of the particular 
objects at particular locations are all factors beyond the control of any agent 
involved in a search.  The philosopher looking for the Wittgenstein quote has no 
control over where the quote is actually located, or how many of Wittgenstein’s 
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statements have been published, or how well the quote stands out.  Similarly 
someone searching for the car keys has no control over the number of locations 
the car keys could occur at, or the clutter that obscures a view of the keys.   
 
Although the search space will be beyond the control of agents, how they 
engage in a search is largely something that agents do have control over.  The 
particular locations an agent visits are determined by four agent-specific search 
variables: an agent’s initial partition, locational convention, start point and 
heuristic.   
 
From the perspective of an agent the search space could be too large, an agent 
may believe that some parts of the search space are more likely to yield the 
object than other parts, or an agent might think they need to double up on the 
search space visited by colleagues in case earlier searches missed objects.  If an 
agent is going to engage in an effective search for an object they may choose to 
limit the number of locations they search by employing an initial partitioning 
over the set of all possible locations.  For example, if an agent is searching for 
their car keys they may choose to only look in the rooms they visited since 
arriving home last night.  Similarly, a philosopher may choose to limit their 
search for the Wittgenstein quote to the Tractatus since she does not have a 
copy of the Philosophical Investigations on her book shelf.  In some cases, an 
agent may choose to search the entire search space.  This may be because it is 
sufficiently small in size, or because they have no reason to believe any part of 
the search space is more likely to contain the object, or because they do not 
want to ignore any location that might contain the object. 
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If an agent is to engage in a methodical search of their partition they need to 
employ a locational convention, a way of ordering the locations in their 
partition.  There is no objective locational convention, but some locational 
conventions will be of more use than others.  For example, an agent who is 
searching for their car keys could divide up the surface area in their home into 
10 cm2 squares and order these squares according to a grid reference.  A 
locational convention such as this could be communicated clearly to other 
agents and shared.  Alternatively an agent could employ a locational convention 
based on the spatiotemporal locations on the path they took last night between 
when they locked their car and when they went to bed.  Similarly, if an agent is 
looking for a Wittgenstein quote in the Tractatus, they could order the possible 
locations according to page number, or according to points 1 to 7.  The ordering 
from points 1 to 7 is a more useful locational convention for groups since the 
page on which a quote occurs will vary according to the typesetting of a 
particular publisher.   
 
The selection of a partition and imposition of a locational convention may occur 
simultaneously if an agent chooses a particular property to focus on.  For 
example, if an agent chooses to focus on the property of being on the path they 
walked through the house last night then this simultaneously selects a subset of 
locations out of the search space and generates a spatiotemporal ordering over 
those locations.  An agent could choose to search for the Wittgenstein reference 
by choosing the property of being in the Philosophical Investigations.  In doing 
 201 
so they narrow down the number of locations they will search and they are 
presented with a ready-made ordering from page 1 onwards. 
 
To commence a search within a partition an agent needs a start point.  The 
partition and locational convention chosen by an agent might imply a certain 
start point.  For example, if someone is looking for the Wittgenstein reference in 
the Philosophical Investigations then the natural place to start is on page 1.  But 
many searches could begin at a random point on a partition.  For example, if an 
agent is searching for car keys in a certain room, then any location in the room 
is an appropriate start point.   
 
Once an agent has a partition, locational convention and start point they can 
begin searching for the object of interest by employing a certain search 
heuristic75.  For example, suppose the agent is searching for the car keys, and 
they have decided to limit their search to their bedroom floor.  The possible 
locations for the car keys on the bedroom floor have a natural two-dimensional 
ordering according to the width and length of the room.  The agent has chosen 
the bedroom door as the start point.  This agent might then employ a search 
heuristic of looking from left to right at every space on the floor as they walk 
forward from the door.  Alternatively they could explore the edges of the room 
first, before moving inwards in a spiral.   
 
Suppose instead that an agent is looking for the Wittgenstein reference.  They 
have chosen an initial partition that limits their search to the contents of the 
                                                 
75
 The models of Hong and Page (2004) and Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) focus in particular 
on the specific types and combinations of heuristics that are optimal.   
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Philosophical Investigations, which is ordered according to page number, and 
they have decided to start their search on the first page.  One possible heuristic 
is to search very thoroughly page by page, line by line.  A different possible 
search heuristic is to read the first paragraph on each page and then read the 
remainder of the page that seems most likely to contain the reference. 
 
The combinations of agent search variables 
The combination of an agent’s initial partition, locational convention, start point 
and heuristic determines the locations that he or she will visit.  The objects an 
agent finds are determined by the locations he or she visits and the probability 
of recognising the objects at the locations.   
 
If agents have same initial partition, locational convention, start point and 
heuristic then they will visit the same locations.  It is also possible for agents to 
have different combinations of initial partitions, locational conventions, start 
points and/ or heuristics and yet still visit the same locations.  For example, one 
agent might limit their search for the Wittgenstein reference to the Tractatus, 
order the content of the Tractatus according to points 1 to 7, start at point 1, and 
have a heuristic of looking at each point in turn.  A different agent might also 
limit their search for the Wittgenstein reference to the Tractatus and order the 
content of the Tractatus according to points 1 to 7.  This second agent chooses a 
start point of point 7 in the Tractatus and a heuristic of moving in a reverse 
numerical order.  Although these two agents have different start points and 
different heuristics, at the end of the search process both of these two agents 
will have visited exactly the same locations.  In this case the Spatial Search 
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Theorem does not apply.  However, the Search Recognition Theorem may 
apply, provided that agent’s search recognition competence levels are less than 
perfect (as per the Search Recognition Competence assumption) and provided 
that the recognition capacities of agents are independent (as per the Search 
Recognition Independence assumption).   
 
It is also possible for the initial partition, locational convention, start point and 
heuristic of agents within a group to mean that some (but not all) of the 
locations visited by agents are identical.  For example, two agents might limit 
their search for the Wittgenstein reference to the Tractatus, order the content of 
the Tractatus according to points 1 to 7 and choose to start at point 1.  One of 
the agents chooses a heuristic of moving to the next prime number.  This agent 
will then visit points {1,3,5,7}.  The second agent chooses a heuristic of moving 
three points ahead.  This second agent then visits locations {1,4,7}.  In this 
simple example, the combination of agents’ search variables means they visit 
some common locations {1,7}, but each agent visits some locations not visited 
by the other agent ({3,5} for the first agent; {4} for the second agent).  If agents 
visit some locations visited by other agents, but also visit some of the locations 
not visited by other agents, then both the Spatial Search Theorem and Search 
Recognition Theorem of the Combined Search Theorem may apply.  Here the 
probability of finding the objects is due both to the different locations visited by 
agents and to the differing ability of agents to recognise objects at the same 
locations.   
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Finally it is possible that agents have different initial partitions, locational 
conventions, start points and/ or heuristics such that they visit entirely different 
locations.  For example, if we are coordinating a group of seven philosophers to 
search for the Wittgenstein reference, we might assign each philosopher a 
separate major point in the Tractatus to search.  Here the Search Recognition 
Theorem does not hold but the Spatial Search Theorem may hold.   
 
The set of locations visited by agents within a group would most likely only be 
identical or mutually exclusive if there is some coordination in the search 
behaviour of agents.  In the absence of such coordination the intermediate case 
is most likely, where there is some overlap in locations visited by agents but 
each agent visits some unique locations.  If a group of agents have some 
diversity in their initial partitions, locational conventions, start points and / or 
heuristics, they are likely to visit some different locations.  As we increase the 
number of diverse agents we increase the number of locations visited by group 
members and therefore increase the probability that the object of interest will be 
found.  In addition if agents recognition ability is independent then where there 
is overlap in the locations visited by agents we also increase the probability that 
the objects at the overlapping locations will be found.   
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Simulations 
 
The general model of a group search procedure outlined in the section above 
was reproduced in the computer program NetLogo 4.176.  The assumptions of 
the search theorem were satisfied and the model was tested to see if it confirmed 
the theorems.  Following the NetLogo conventions, the search space (set of all 
possible locations) or initial partition of the search space is represented in a two 
dimensional x and y tortoidal grid.  The locations77 in the grid are ordered (have 
a locational convention) according to a width and height coordinate.  The grid is 
37 locations wide and 37 locations tall meaning that there are a total of 1369 
locations in the search space/ partition.  Any of the locations could be a start 
point for an agent’s search78.  There are a variety of search heuristics agents 
could employ.  For example an agent could rotate a random number of degrees 
to the right, and then move forward one location.  Each simulation lasts 100 
agent moves.  In line with the simulations in both Hong and Page (2004) and 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2011) my simulations assumed that agents have 
identical initial partitions (to use my terminology).   
 
Firstly, I present the simulation results for the Spatial Search Theorem where 
both the Spatial Search Competence and Spatial Search Independence 
assumptions hold.  Secondly, I present the simulation results for the Spatial 
                                                 
76
 Wilensky, U. (1999).  The code for the simulations is based on the tutorial models provided 
by NetLogo with minor modifications.  Code for the simulations is available on request. Note 
that Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) also use NetLogo in their simulations.   
 
77Or 'patches' in NetLogo terminology. 
 
78
 Agents are 'turtles' in NetLogo terminology. 
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Search Theorem where the Spatial Search Competence and Spatial Search 
Diversity assumptions hold.  Thirdly, I present sample calculations for the 
Search Recognition Theorem.  Finally I present simulation results for the 
Combined Search Theorem.   
 
In each simulation model the number of agents in the group was varied, 
generally from 10 to 100 in intervals of 10 agents.  The experimental result is 
the proportion of locations visited at the end of the 100 moves79.  The object of 
interest could occur on any one of the 1369 locations.  In the limit, if all the 
locations are visited, the object of interest is guaranteed to be found.  Therefore 
as the proportion of locations visited by a group of agents increases the 
probability that the object will be found also increases.   
 
For the sake of illustration, a screen shot of the first simulation model, before 
the simulation is run, is seen in the figure 5.3 below.  Here ten agents are placed 
on the search space at random locations: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79
 The experiment for each group size was run ten times, and the results reported are the average 
proportion of the locations visited. 
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Figure 5.3: a screen shot of the first simulation, before agents move.   
 
 
At the end of the simulation (at the end of 100 agent moves), the locations 
visited by agents have changed colour and the path taken by agents is traced.  
This is shown in figure 5.4 below: 
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Figure 5.4: a screen shot of the first simulation, after 100 agent moves.   
 
 
I now present the results of the two simulation models. 
 
Simulation results 
 
Simulation model 1: Spatial Search Theorem (Spatial Search Independence 
applies) 
Here the Spatial Search Competence assumption holds since each agent in the 
group is placed on a location in the search space and any of these locations 
could contain the object of interest.  The start point of agents is determined 
randomly.  Each agent in the group employs the same type of search heuristic 
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whereby they rotate a random number of degrees to the right before moving 
forward one location.  There is no restriction on agents exploring locations also 
visited by other agents, thus the Spatial Search Independence assumption holds.  
The results of the simulation are seen in the table and figure below: 
 
Figure 5.5: simulation 1 results.   
Group size 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Proportion 
of 
locations 
visited 
0.31 0.53 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 
 
Figure 5.6: graph of simulation 1 results 
 
 
As can be seen in the figures above, the probability that an agent in the group 
will visit the location of the object (and by assumption find the object) is strictly 
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increasing and in the limit tends towards certainty.  This simulation provides 
confirmation for the Spatial Search Theorem.  
 
Simulation model 2: Spatial Search Theorem, exclusive searches (Spatial 
Search Diversity assumption) 
Here the start point of agents is determined randomly.  Since each agent visits at 
least one location they have at least some probability of visiting the location of 
the object and so the Spatial Search Competence assumption holds.  Each agent 
in the group employs the same type of search heuristic whereby they look at the 
location in front of them: if the location has not been visited before the agent 
moves forward; if the location has been visited before the agent rotates a 
random number of degrees to the right before looking at the next location in 
front of them.  Thus the events of two agents visiting the same locations and 
identifying the same object are mutually exclusive and the Spatial Search 
Diversity assumption holds.  The results of the simulation are seen in the table 
and figure below: 
 
Figure 5.7: simulation 2 results.   
Group size 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Proportion 
of 
locations 
visited 
0.15 0.27 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.63 
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Figure 5.8: graph of simulation 2 results. 
  
 
As can be seen, as group size increases the probability that each location is 
visited by at least one agent is strictly increasing and in the limit tends towards 
certainty.  Thus the simulation results confirm the Spatial Search Theorem, this 
time where the search spaces of agents are exclusive and the probability of 
agents finding the object are not independent.   
 
It is interesting to note that in this simulation the convergence towards certainty 
for finding the object was not linear but approximately exponential.  This means 
that as group size increases the agents in the larger group do not have the same 
marginal capacity to search for objects that agents in smaller groups do.  But 
this is to be expected, and is related to the finite nature of the search space.  
Suppose that all agents have an equal capacity to explore the search space.  If 
we focus on the marginal contribution that each agent makes to the group search 
(the locations searched uniquely by the agents) then at most each agent explores 
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
* of the search space.  As group size  increases, the proportion of the search 
space available to each agent, *, decreases.   
 
Interestingly the convergence towards a certainty of finding the object is much 
more rapid in the first simulation than in the second.  We can see why this might 
be the case by considering the screen shots of the second simulation in figure 
5.9 below with the screen shot from the first simulation in figure 5.4.   
 
Figure 5.9: a screen shot of simulation 2, after 100 agent moves.   
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If agents are prevented from crossing into locations already visited by other 
agents (as per the second simulation) then this can box them in and limit the 
proportion of the search space that is accessible to the agents.  We can see in 
figure 5.4 that agents are able to move quite some distance over the search space 
whereas in figure 5.9 agents are prevented from moving far when they run up 
against the search of other agents.  In more concrete examples this shows that it 
can be desirable to allow some overlap in the locations visited by agents.  For 
example, suppose two agents are looking for the Wittgenstein quote in the 
Tractatus.  One agent starts at point 1 and employs a heuristic of moving to the 
location that is double their current point.  A second agent starts at point 2 and 
employs a heuristic of moving 1, 2, 3 points ahead.  If we permit agents to visit 
the same locations then the first agent visits locations {1, 2, 4} and the second 
agent visits locations {2, 3, 6} meaning between them they visit locations {1, 2, 
3, 4, 6}.  If however we prevent agents from visiting common locations then the 
first agent will be prevented from moving away from their start point and the 
total number of locations visited will be {1, 2, 3, 6}.   
 
Similarly if a group of people are searching for the car keys they are more likely 
to be successful if they are not prevented from moving to other rooms to 
continue their search.   
 
Sample calculations for the Search Recognition Theorem 
The simulations presented thus far assess the Spatial Search Theorem in 
isolation.  We now assess the Search Recognition Theorem in isolation via 
sample calculations.  Here, to isolate the effect of additional agents on the 
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probability of recognising the objects at particular locations, we assume that all 
the agents in the calculations have reached the same location.  Firstly we vary 
the value of search recognition competence Pr	
|
) to see the impact this has 
on the probability of a member of the group recognising the object.  Secondly 
we vary the number of agents to see the impact that this has on the probability 
of a member of the group recognising the object.    
 
Figure 5.10: the probability an object will be recognised, as recognition 
competence varies.   
Note: group size fixed at 10 agents 
¢£(¤¥|¦¥) 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
§¤¨ 0.096 0.4013 0.6573 0.8926 0.9718 0.9940 0.9990 
 
Figure 5.11: the probability an object will be recognised, as group size varies.   
Note: agent competence fixed at Pr(	
|
) = 0.05 
¨ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
§¤¨ 0.401 0.642 0.785 0.872 0.923 0.954 0.972 0.984 0.990 0.994 
 
The main result to take away from these sample calculations is that even when 
recognition competence is low and even when the number of agents is small, the 
probability that at least one member of the group recognises the object will be 
high.  For example, if an agent only has a 50% chance of recognising an object, 
if we place nine extra agents on that same location then it is close to certain that 
at least one of the agents will recognise the object at the location.  Similarly 
when recognition competence is even lower and agents only have a 5% chance 
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of recognising the object, when 50 agents visit that same location there is a 
better than 90% chance than at least one of the agents will recognise the object.   
 
Simulation model 3: combined Search Theorem 
Finally I present the results of a simulation that models the Combined Search 
Theorem.  Here the start point of agents is determined randomly.  Each agent in 
the group employs the same type of search heuristic whereby they rotate a 
random number of degrees to the right before moving forward one location.  
Spatial Search Competence holds under these circumstances.  There is no 
restriction on agents exploring locations also visited by other agents.  As such, 
Spatial Search Independence holds.  Firstly we set agents level of recognition 
competence to 0.5 (and so Search Recognition Competence holds80).  The 
results are shown below in figures 5.12 and 5.13. 
 
Figure 5.12: simulation 3 results, recognition competence Pr	
|
 = 0.5.   
¨ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Proportion 
of all 
objects 
identified 
0.22 0.40 0.53 0.63 0.71 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.90 0.92 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 The probabilities of agents recognising the object are independent, so Search Recognition 
Independence holds.   
 216 
Figure 5.13: a graph of simulation 3 results, recognition competence 
Pr	
|
 = 0.5.   
  
 
If we compare figure 5.13 with figure 5.8, we can see that (as expected), when 
the recognition competence of agents is less than perfect, the rate at which 
agents find the objects in a search space is much lower.    
 
In the next simulation we set recognition competence to a much lower value of 
0.05.  Because the probability of agents recognising the object is much lower 
now group sizes need to be much greater if they are to be likely to find the 
object.  Note that group size now ranges from 100 to 1000 agents.  The results 
are seen in the two figures below. 
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Figure 5.14: simulation results 3, recognition competence 	
|
 = 0.05. 
¨ 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
Proportion 
of all 
objects 
identified 
0.29 0.50 0.65 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.96 0.97 
 
Figure 5.15: a graph of simulation 3 results, recognition competence 
	
|
 = 0.05. 
  
 
As can be seen, when recognition competence is low, it takes many more agents 
for the group as a whole to find the object.  However these latter two 
simulations do confirm the more general Combined Search Theorem: the 
probability that a member of the group will identify an object of interest is 
increasing in group size and tends to certainty in the limit.   
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Proof of the Search Theorems 
 
Here I set out a proof of the Combined Search Theorem.  Please note that this 
proof is based on a proof by Franz Dietrich and so should not be considered 
original work.   
 
We have four assumptions: 
 
Spatial Search Competence (SSC): For each agent, the unconditional probability 
that the object occurs in the agent’s subset of locations is uniformly bounded 
away from zero by some value  and is less than certainty.  Formally, for all 
 ∈ ,	 0 <  < Pr
 < 1.   
 
Search Recognition Competence (SRC): The conditional probability that an 
agent recognises the object, given the object is in the set of locations visited by 
the agent, is uniformly bounded away from zero and less than certainty.  
Formally, for all , 0 <  < Pr	
|
 < 1. 
 
Spatial Search Independence (SSI): The events of the object occurring in the 
subsets of locations visited by different agents are independent. 
 
Search Recognition Independence (SRI): The events of different agents 
recognising the object, given that they visit the object location, are independent. 
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Combined Search Theorem 
Given the above assumptions, the probability that a group of  agents finds the 
object is: 
• (non-limit claim) increasing in group size; and 
• (limit claim) in the limit approaches certainty. 
 
The unconditional probability that a group of  agents finds the object  is 
given by81: 
 
,* == Pr	
 × Pr		
*
6 |
) 
 
We write ©
 for the event that agent  finds the object .  An agent will find the 
object if and only if the object occurs in the subset of locations visited by the 
agent and the agent recognises the object.   
 
The probability that agent  finds the object  is given by: 
 
Pr(©
) = Pr	
 × Pr		
|
) 
 
 
Proof of the non-limit claim 
For each , ⋃ ©
*
6 ⊆ ⋃ ©
*
6  hence by the monotonicity of probability, 
Pr	⋃ ©
*
6  ≤ Pr	⋃ ©
*
6 . 
                                                 
81
 Note that if the object does not occur in the subset of locations searched by an agent then 
there is no possibility that agent will recognise the object.  More formally,  Pr	
|¬
) = 0. 
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Proof of the limit claim 
The probability that  agents do not find the object is given by 1 − Pr	©
*.  
By SSC and SRC, 1 > Pr©
 >  > 0.  It follows that: 
	1 − Pr©
* ≤ 1 − * 
 
As  → ∞, 1 − * → 0.  Therefore, as  → ∞, 1 − Pr	©
* → 0.   
 
If the probability that  agents do not find the object tends to zero, the 
probability that at least one agent from a group of  agents do find the object 
tends to certainty. 
 
Comments on search procedures 
 
Similar results from other models  
The Combined Search Theorem and model of a group search procedure show 
that there are epistemic gains from increasing the number of agents involved in 
the search for objects.  As stated earlier in this chapter, the search theorems and 
model of a search procedure are inspired in particular by the models of Hong 
and Page (2004) and Weisberg and Muldoon (2009, 2011).  These authors come 
to similar conclusions about the epistemic importance of increasing group size.   
 
Hong and Page (2004) prove a lemma that a collection of agents will find the 
optimal solution (visit the location containing the object that is the optimal 
solution) with certainty as the group becomes large.  If agents are drawn 
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independently from a wider population it is unlikely that they will have 
common local optima (it is unlikely that they will have initial partitions, 
locational conventions, start points and heuristics such that they visit identical 
locations).  Therefore as group size increases, the probability that they will have 
common local optima decreases to zero (the probability of all agents in the 
group visiting the same locations tends to zero). 
 
Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) ran simulations that, inter alia, considered the 
epistemic impact of increasing group size.  Firstly they considered ‘control’ 
agents who follow a search heuristic that pays no attention to the actions of 
other agents.  In their simulations, a group of 10 control agents who have 
different randomly determined start points found the peaks on the epistemic 
landscape (found the locations with the objects or scientific discoveries of the 
most significance) 95% of the time.  As group size in the simulations increased 
the probability that the peaks were discovered also increased, but with 
decreasing marginal returns.  Furthermore when looking at areas of epistemic 
significance (at all locations with objects or scientific discoveries of importance, 
not just peaks) there is a linear relationship between the number of controls 
(agents) and average epistemic progress of the community (the percentage of 
locations with significant discoveries visited by agents).  However progress at 
identifying these areas of epistemic significance can be slow since agents do not 
have the opportunity to learn from each other.  These results again confirm the 
epistemic gains from increasing the number of agents involved in a search.   
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Interdependence of agents – balancing negative and positive correlations 
Balancing the positive and negative correlations in the probability of agents 
visiting a particular location is important both in the model of the search 
procedure and the search theorem I presented.  Group epistemic gain in the 
search for objects comes both from agents in the group visiting different 
locations and from agents in the group visiting the same location.  When agents 
are guaranteed to recognise objects at particular locations then it is best if agents 
probabilities of visiting the same location are negatively correlated i.e. the fact 
that one agent visits a location should mean that a second agent will not visit 
that location.  When it may be difficult for individual agents to recognise 
objects at particular locations there are epistemic advantages to positive 
correlations in the probability of agents visiting the same location i.e. the fact 
that one agent visits a location should mean that a second agent is more likely to 
visit that same location, since the more agents visit the location the more likely 
it is that at least one of them will recognise the object there.  Of course positive 
correlation comes at the expense of negative correlation – we trade off the 
number of locations visited by the group as a whole against the increased 
likelihood of recognising the objects at the locations that are visited by the 
group.   
 
The epistemic advantage of positive correlation in the search behaviour of 
agents is first identified in the model of List et al. (2008).  List et al. provide an 
agent-based model of nest site selection by hives of honey bees.  Their model 
proposes a mechanism to account for why the bee hives are so successful at 
identifying the best nest sites.  In their model individual bee agents have a 
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certain probability of flying to a particular nest site.  The probability of finding 
the best site depends both on how likely the bee is to find the site on their own 
and the extent to which the bee finds the nest site based on the communication 
of other bees.  Once the bees visit a potential nest site they assess the nest site’s 
quality.  A consensus for a particular nest site can emerge when more than twice 
the numbers of bees choose that site than the second most popular site and more 
than 20% of the bees choose that site. 
 
The model of List et al. combines a search and aggregation procedure.  The 
search procedure of their model includes both of the search mechanisms I have 
identified.  There is a spatial component to search, where different bees may 
visit different locations or nest sites.  There is also a recognition competent to 
the search.  A single bee may be unreliable at recognising the quality of a nest 
site, but if lots of bees visit the same site there are lots of opportunities for the 
group to get an accurate reading of the nest site quality.  The information the 
bees have regarding the quality of the nest site is then aggregated via the rules 
for consensus.  The mechanism that allows the bees to pool their judgements 
regarding the nest site quality is Condorcetian in nature.   
 
If the reliability of bee agents at recognising the quality of a nest site is better 
than random but not perfect (i.e. they have some ability) then the best way for 
the group to assess the quality of that nest site is by employing plurality rule.  
For plurality rule to track the truth the bee agents need to be independent in their 
assessment of the nest site quality.  By assumption the bee agents are 
sufficiently competent (reliable) at assessing nest site quality.  The remaining 
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requirement for plurality rule to track the truth (to identify the true quality of the 
nest site) is increasing the number of bee agents visiting the site.  For the 
number of bees visiting the site to increase, they need to be interdependent82: 
the fact that one bee visits the nest site and reports its location to the other bees 
should increase the probability that subsequent bees visit that same site.   
 
The model of Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) also considers the balance between 
positive and negative correlations in the search behaviour of agents.  While the 
search heuristics of control agents pay no attention to the behaviour of other 
agents, the heuristics of ‘maverick’ agents instruct the agents to avoid other 
agents (and so create negative correlations in the search behaviour of agents) 
and the heuristics of ‘follower’ agents direct the agents to move towards the 
searches of other agents (and so create positive correlations in the search 
behaviour of agents).  The results of simulations show that homogeneous 
populations of followers are worse than homogeneous populations of control 
agents, who are worse in turn than homogeneous populations of mavericks at 
identifying the best scientific approaches (the objects of search).  Homogeneous 
populations of mavericks, which are analogous to the agents in the Spatial 
Search Theorem, do quite well at identifying objects but not as well as 
heterogeneous populations of followers and mavericks83.  It is best to have some 
                                                 
82
 List et al. acknowledge that total ‘interdependence’ (totally positive correlation) is 
epistemically bad for the group since it runs the risk of ignoring or missing the best sites. 
 
83
 Note that Weisberg and Muldoon explicitly acknowledge the difference between the 
‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ of a search space.  Exploration involves moving from location 
to location (or in their model from approach to approach) whereas exploitation involves making 
full use of the scientific results at that approach (of recognising the object at that location).  
Their model focuses on the exploration of the landscape and assumes that the scientist agents 
will identify all the scientific results at the locations they visit.  However there are still group 
epistemic advantages to positive correlations in the searches of the agents in the Weisberg and 
Muldoon model.  This is because in the search space generated by Weisberg and Muldoon, 
 225 
agents in the group who move away from other agents and find new areas of the 
search space and to have some agents who move towards other agents and look 
more carefully at the new areas of the search space.   
 
The balance or trade-off between positive and negative correlations in the 
search behaviour of agents is a subtle one.  Where the search recognition 
competence of agents is less than perfect, then a wholly negative correlation in 
the search behaviour of agents (so only one agent ever visits a given location) or 
a wholly positive correlation in the search behaviour of agents (so all agents 
visit the same locations) are both epistemically bad.  In the former case, there is 
a real risk that the one agent visiting the location containing the object of 
interest will fail to recognise it.  In the latter case, there is a real risk that the 
group will not visit the location of the object at all. 
 
Negative and positive correlations in the search behaviour of agents may be 
more or less relevant at different times.  For example, at the beginning of a 
search process agents will have no idea which locations are likely to contain 
objects.  Therefore at the early stages of search there is no advantage to 
encouraging agents to visit the same locations (there is no advantage to positive 
correlations in the search behaviour of agents).  In fact at the early stages of 
search there are some advantages to encouraging agents to spread out and visit 
as many different locations as possible (there are advantages to negative 
correlations in search behaviour).  Once agents have engaged in search 
                                                                                                                                            
locations with epistemically significant objects are clustered together.  The positive correlations 
in agent search behaviour are not required so as to put multiple agents on the same location (as 
per the List et al. model) but rather so as to put agents on adjacent locations.   
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behaviour and have some idea which locations contain potential objects then 
there are advantages to encouraging fellow agents to visit those same locations 
(there are advantages to positive correlations).   
 
There will be cases where a high degree of positive correlation in search 
behaviour is important.  As both List et al. (2008) and Weisberg and Muldoon 
(2009) show, positive correlations in search behaviour can rapidly increase the 
rate at which objects are identified.  This is because the positive correlations 
help concentrate the search behaviour of agents on promising locations (perhaps 
at the expense of missing some locations altogether).  List and Vermeule (2010) 
show that for some types of problems this trade-off is desirable, in particular 
where there are time pressures on making a decision.  For example a bee hive 
must choose a new nest site within a particular time period if it is to survive.  
Similarly, they cite the example of the US Supreme Court which considers on 
average 80 important cases each year.  Arguably the processes by which cases 
are chosen by the US Supreme court closely resemble the nest site selection of a 
hive.  If the selection of cases considered by the court was slower, if there was 
not the positive correlation in the court staffs’ searches for suitable cases, far 
fewer important cases would be considered by the court.  However List 
Vermeule (2010) suggest that in basic scientific research “…it is better that 
things be settled right, eventually, than things be settled today” (p.27).  Positive 
correlation in the searches involved in basic scientific research would be 
epistemically harmful.   
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Communication between agents  
Often encouraging positive correlations in the search behaviour of agents will 
require communication between agents.  Bees, for example, are able to 
communicate the location and quality of the nest site via their dance 
behaviour84.  Scientists are able to articulate their approaches (their research 
methods and results) in their journal publications85.  However in some cases 
agents will be unable to clearly communicate the results of their search.   
 
My model of search largely ignores communication between agents (although it 
is consistent with communication between agents).  The reason that 
communication between agents is put to one side is that the model will be used 
subsequently to account for how agents find information such that the 
competence and independence assumptions of the CJT hold.  The aim is to 
extend the explanation of how majority voting tracks the truth beyond the 
mechanism articulated in chapter 2 of this thesis.  The CJT framework does not 
specifically require communication (or deliberation) and so the model of search 
which generates the judgement-generating factors of competence and 
independence for the aggregation procedures should not require deliberation 
(although deliberation is consistent with the search).  The aim is to specify the 
minimal conditions under which a search will be successful, and an account of 
the mechanism by which the search will be successful.   
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 List et al. (2008). 
 
85
 As per the assumptions of Weisberg and Muldoon (2009).  
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Summary 
If the group task is to find a particular object, the two types of search procedure, 
as captured by the Spatial Search Theorem and Search Recognition Theorem 
respectively, are additive models of group productivity, according to the Steiner 
(1966) taxonomy.  If one agent fails to find the object a different agents may be 
successful at finding the object.  If we increase the size of the group then we 
increase the probability that one or other of the group members will find the 
object. 
 
The next chapter will articulate how search procedures relate to judgement 
aggregation procedures.   
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Chapter 6: The link between search 
procedures and aggregation procedures.   
 
Thus far this thesis has argued that truth-tracking by groups of political agents 
occurs via two procedures.  Standard epistemic defences of democracy often 
focus on aggregation procedures such as majority rule, which pool the 
information individual agents have regarding the true state of the world.  I also 
put the case for groups of agents employing search procedures to find 
information in the first place.  The institutional features of search procedures 
and aggregation procedures amount to social epistemic mechanisms.  This 
chapter discusses how the search and aggregation procedures link up.  Search 
procedures allow groups of agents to extract information from the environment.  
But at the conclusion of a search the information will be dispersed across 
different agents.  Aggregation procedures allow individual agents within a 
group to share the information they have extracted from the environment with 
the wider group.   
 
The linking of search procedures to aggregation procedures fills two gaps in 
current epistemic defences of democracy that rely on aggregation procedures.  
Firstly, current accounts of aggregation procedures specify the types of 
judgement-generating factors (competence, independence, and transparency) 
required for a group to track the truth but they are silent on how the judgement-
generating factors form.  Search procedures can be used by agents to search for 
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evidential and background information to develop their levels of competence.  
Diversity in the search procedures of individual agents will generate the 
dependence relations in the group.  Secondly, search procedures can be 
employed by a group to find possible alternatives and to set the agenda for a 
social choice.   
 
Once our framework for group truth-tracking joins search and aggregation 
procedures together we can consider the interaction between the two.  We can 
see how contingencies in the way a search procedure is conducted mean 
particular aggregation procedures will be optimal at tracking the truth.  
Similarly, if an institutional decision is made in advance to use a particular 
aggregation procedure then this will influence the way in which a search 
procedure should be conducted so that it generates the appropriate levels and 
distributions of competencies and independence relations. 
 
 
A two-staged process for group truth-tracking involving search and 
aggregation procedures 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis presented an analysis of different kinds of aggregation 
procedure, including expert dictatorship, negative reliability unanimity rule and 
majority rule, which generate a collective judgement or social choice as a 
function of individual judgements.  Aggregation procedures have the ability to 
pool information contained in the judgements of individual group members.  
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However the aggregation procedures are silent on where the individual 
judgements come from.   
 
Chapter 4 considered how the judgement-generating factors of competence 
levels, distribution of competencies, transparency of competence and 
independence relations form.  It was argued that the probability that an agent 
votes for the correct alternative (the agent’s competence) is determined by a 
combination of causes, including causes which are informational.  These causes 
could be evidential or background, truth-conducive or misleading and private or 
common.  The events of two agents voting for the correct alternative will be 
independent (conditional on the state of the world) if all their competence-
generating causes are private.  If agents have some competence-generating 
factors in common, independence can be regained by conditionalising on any 
common factors.  An agent’s level of competence will be transparent if the 
causal factors generating her competence can be shared with other agents or the 
social planner. 
 
In the model I presented, the agents’ final judgements are deterministic and are 
governed by the combination of causes they receive.  The randomness in the 
judgements of agents, the reason we consider the probabilities of agents voting 
for the correct alternative to be strictly between 0 and 1, is that the observer or 
social planner is aware of some but not all of the causes of agents’ judgements.   
 
Chapter 5 set out a model for a group search procedure.  The objects of interest 
occur at locations.  The combination of an agent’s search variables of initial 
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partitioning, locational convention, start point and heuristic determine the 
locations the agent will visit.  The locations an agent visits, along with their 
probability of recognising an object at a location, determine the objects he or 
she will find.   
 
If the objects of search are the evidential and background information that 
produce the judgement-generating factors then by joining the search and 
aggregation procedures, we extend the explanation of how groups of agents can 
tack the truth.  Information which could help an agent vote for the correct 
alternative is dispersed across a set of locations.  To develop his or her 
competence an agent needs to engage in a search for information, to move from 
location to location to collect informational objects.  The set of locations may be 
too large for a single agent to search on their own.  Moreover, it may be that a 
single agent would have a probability less than certainty of extracting the 
information from the locations she visits.  As such there may be epistemic gains 
to be had from increasing the number of agents involved in the search for 
information, provided of course that there are differences in the agents’ search 
behaviour.  Agents’ different search variables mean different agents visit 
different locations and find different pieces of evidential and background 
information.  Some overlap in the locations visited by agents mean the pieces of 
information missed by one agent may be picked up by another agent.  The 
combination of information collected by agents from the environment produces 
the agents’ judgement generating factors including their levels of competence.  
The information collected by agents can then be shared (indirectly) with the 
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group via the aggregation procedure.  The complete model of group truth-
tracking is shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 6.1: the complete, two-staged, model of group truth-tracking. 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     
 
    
 
 
 
The competence of an agent will change over time as the agent moves from 
location to location and incorporates the information they receive at those 
locations86.  The competence of agents at the time they cast their vote (express 
their judgement) will be determined by the combination of information they 
have received up till that point.  The independence relations between agents will 
                                                 
86
 Or more particularly, if the competence of an agent represents the epistemic uncertainty of an 
observer or social planner then the competence of an agent will vary as the observer is aware of 
the agent moving from location to location and incorporating the information they receive.   
Input (individual judgements) 
Aggregation procedure 
Output (collective judgement) 
Input (agents, evidential/ background information) 
Output (agent/ information groupings) 
Search procedures 
Judgement-generating factors 
(competence, independence, transparency) 
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also vary as they visit common locations and identify the same pieces of 
information.  Again it is the independence relations at point in time which 
agents cast their votes which is of greatest interest.   
 
Informally, the amount of diversity87 in the group search procedure determines 
the independence relations in the aggregation procedure.  This is because the 
amount of diversity determines the locations agents will jointly visit, which in 
turn determines the information held in common, which in turn determines the 
probability of voting correctly, given the votes of others.  The amount of 
diversity in recognition capability also determines whether different agents 
visiting the same location find the same object.   
 
Informally, the level of spatial search competence and search recognition 
competence determine the levels of aggregation competence88.  This is because 
the level of search competence determines the amount of information an agent 
will find, which in turn determines the agent’s level of aggregation competence. 
 
A group’s ability to track the truth is determined by the informational 
environment and the institutional features of both the search and aggregation 
                                                 
87
 The diversity in search behaviour was characterised by the following assumptions: Spatial 
Search Independence, Spatial Search Diversity, Spatial Search Diversity 2, Search Recognition 
Independence, and Search Recognition Independence 2.   
 
88
 Here we assume that the level of spatial search competence and search recognition 
competence for finding a piece of information is identical for all pieces of information.  It is 
more likely that an agent’s ability to recognise a piece of information depends on what type of 
information it is.  For example, some agents may be better at reading evidence than hearing 
evidence.   
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procedures.  The quality and quantity of truth-conducive information89 in the 
environment places a limit on the ability of groups of agents to track the truth.  
These limits are discussed in the next chapter.  This thesis has already 
considered the institutional features of aggregation procedures and search 
procedures in isolation.  This chapter will consider how the institutional features 
of search and aggregation procedures impact on each other.  But before we 
consider this, we will pause to consider how the joining of search and 
aggregation procedures helps address two problems with the use of the 
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) for epistemic defences of democracy. 
 
Two problems with the CJT – setting the agenda and forming competence 
 
The classic CJT provides a clear epistemic justification for widening the 
democratic franchise since as we include more and more voters in the group the 
probability of a correct majority verdict is monotonically increasing.  But 
arguably the classic CJT rests on unstable foundations.  Firstly the existing 
account of the CJT states that if the competence and independence assumptions 
hold then majority voting is likely to select the correct alternative as the social 
choice.  In other worlds, the CJT only gives conditional support to the epistemic 
performance of majority voting.  What is lacking is a justification for the 
antecedent of the conditional, a justification for how the competence and 
independence assumptions might plausibly be fulfilled.  The current account 
begins at the point at which agents have already received private truth-
conducive information such that the competence and independence assumptions 
                                                 
89
 Or more generally the amount of truth-conducive causal factors, including those that are non-
informational in nature.   
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hold.  But agents may not have private truth-conducive information, relevant to 
a particular agenda, a priori.  We lack an account for how agents might come 
across pieces of truth-conducive information not shared by other agents.   
 
The second concern with the foundations of the CJT is that the classic CJT is 
simply silent on how the two-placed agenda is set.  The CJT implies that 
majority voting will tend to select the correct alternative as the social choice if 
the correct alternative is on the agenda.  If the correct alternative is not on the 
agenda then the group will not be able to select it as the social choice.  The 
epistemic challenge for a group of political agents is not just determining which 
alternative is correct when two alternatives are placed in front of them, but also 
determining which alternatives should be put in front of the group in the first 
place.  Defences of epistemic democracy based on the CJT need an account for 
how the agenda is set in such a way as to include the correct alternative90. 
 
The model of a search procedure and the search theorem as presented in chapter 
5 can be used to address these two problems with the CJT.  In doing so we not 
only secure the foundations of existing epistemic defences of democracy based 
on the CJT, but deepen our explanation of how groups of agents are able to 
track the truth using majority rule.   
 
The development of competence and independence in a CJT framework 
Whether the competence and independence assumptions of the CJT hold is a 
contingent matter.  In some social choice problems there will be misleading 
                                                 
90
 The problem of agenda setting is also raised by Fuerstein (2008). 
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evidence and so the competence assumption of the CJT will not hold.  In other 
cases agents will have identical information and so independence assumption 
will be violated.  If the competence and independence assumptions hold it will 
be because agents receive at least some truth-conducive information and they 
have at least some information not held by other agents.  We could leave the 
analysis here, that it is just a happy accident that in a particular social choice 
problem the competence and independence assumptions happen to hold.  But 
the group search procedure set out in the previous chapter can help explain why 
the competence and independence assumptions of the CJT hold, when they do 
hold.  
 
Suppose there is a consensus in a parliament that the high level of drug use is 
causing harm to society.  There are high levels of drug addiction, drug users are 
suffering health problems associated with use and there are high levels of crime 
attributed to drug use as it encourages the involvement of criminal gangs in 
supply and theft by addicts.  Given a shared goal of reducing the harm to society 
caused by drug use, the members of a parliament need to implement policies 
that will be successful at reducing these costs.  Suppose the most successful 
policy for reducing the social costs of drug use is decriminalisation and suppose 
the members of a parliament are facing an agenda of (decriminalise drug use/ do 
not decriminalise drug use).  A vote will be taken to determine which alternative 
will be implemented and the vote will be decided by majority rule.  The CJT 
implies that as more and more members are included in the voting group, the 
probability that the correct alternative of decriminalising drug use will be the 
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majority winner increases.  This is provided of course that the competence and 
independence assumptions of the CJT hold.   
 
The competence assumption will hold in this example if the members of 
parliament are more likely to vote for ‘decriminalise drug use’ than for the other 
alternative.  For this to be the case, each member must receive some truth-
conducive information that tells them that ‘decriminalise drug use’ is the best 
alternative.  This information could take the form of a fact finding mission to 
other countries that have decriminalised possession, or the advice of a local 
police officer who is concerned that arresting drug users makes the problem 
worse.  Truth-conducive information could also include advice from medical 
professionals that drug addicts will not come forward for treatment if drug use 
remains illegal.  
 
The independence assumption holds in this example if different members 
receive at least some different pieces of information91.  For example, if one 
member receives the truth-conducive information from a fact finding mission to 
other countries, and a different member receives the advice of a local police 
officer then the votes of these members will be independent.  If instead all 
members receive identical information, for example a submission from a 
medical expert, and this information determines their voting behaviour then we 
lose all randomness in the votes: the probability that one member votes 
correctly given that other agents vote correctly is certainty. 
                                                 
91
 Agents may have some common background factors (such as common beliefs) which means 
the events of agents voting correctly will not be independent conditional just on the state of the 
world.  However, if agents have receive some different pieces of information then once the 
common factors are conditionalised on the agents will be independent and there will still be 
some randomness left in their votes.   
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For the competence and independence assumptions of the CJT to hold, the 
members of parliament need to search for truth-conducive information that will 
tell them which of the alternatives on the agenda is correct.  Competence will 
hold if agents find some truth-conducive information.  Independence will hold if 
agents find some information which is different to that found by other members.  
We can think of the pieces of information as having a location.  The information 
that decriminalisation worked in other countries could be located within the 
government of that country itself, or in reports written about such case studies.  
The view of the local police officer on what works in reducing the impact of 
drug use can be accessed by visiting her at the police station, or via email. 
 
The members of parliament can search for the truth-conducive information by 
choosing an initial partition, locational convention, start point and heuristic.  If 
there is diversity in the initial partition, locational convention, start point and/ or 
heuristics that the members use then different agents will typically visit different 
locations and receive different pieces of truth-conducive information.  If this is 
the case then the independence assumption of the CJT will hold when the 
members of parliament cast their votes.  If the members of parliament have a 
certain level of search competence then as they search they will tend to find 
pieces of evidential and background information, their probability of voting for 
the correct alternative will be greater than a half, and so the competence 
assumption of the CJT will hold92.   
                                                 
92
 In the model I present in chapter 4, the prior competence of agents is the probability that 
agents will vote for the correct alternative given no evidential information whatsoever.  In a 
dichotomous choice the prior competence of agents will be 
 = 0.5.  If agents receive any 
piece of truth-conducive evidence as a result of their search their posterior competence will be 
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As the size of the group increases, the amount of truth-conducive information 
possessed by the group increases and in the limit all possible pieces of truth-
conducive information are received by at least one member of the group.  As 
such the group is able to extract the maximum amount of information regarding 
the true state of the world from the environment.  This information can then be 
shared via the aggregation procedure of majority rule.   
 
Agenda setting  
The classic CJT begins at the point at which we have an agenda comprising two 
alternatives, one of which is correct.  The classic CJT is silent on how this 
agenda is set.  This should be of concern to anyone who wants to use the CJT to 
defend an epistemic conception of democracy.  In the absence of an explanation 
for how the best alternative secures a place on the agenda, the CJT merely 
implies that the better of the two alternatives will be the social choice.  And if 
the agenda is comprised of two mediocre alternatives, the majority winner will 
be a mediocre alternative.   
 
As argued above if members of a parliament are faced with an agenda of 
(decriminalise drug use/ do not decriminalise drug use) and if the competence 
and independence assumptions of the CJT hold, then the parliament is likely to 
                                                                                                                                            
greater than 0.5 and the CJT competence assumption holds.  Of course it is not enough for the 
CJT that the competence of agents is greater than 0.5, we also need to establish that the 
distribution is symmetric about the mean.  But if there are differences in the amount of 
information extracted by agents, as group size increases we should expect the distribution of 
competencies to begin to approximate a truncated normal distribution, which is symmetric about 
the mean.  It is also possible that agents receive misleading information during the course of 
their searches, meaning their competence levels are below 0.5.  The issue of misleading 
information is dealt with in the next chapter.   
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vote for the correct alternative: a majority of the parliament will vote to 
decriminalise drug use.  But how do the alternatives of (decriminalise drug use/ 
do not decriminalise drug use) make it onto the agenda?  Presumably if there is 
a consensus that something needs to be done to reduce the societal harm of drug 
use then there are any number of possible policy responses.  Parliament could 
decide to increase the penalties for drug possession or increase the resources 
provided to police.  More effort could be put on intercepting the supply of drugs 
into a country, or there could be more public advertising regarding the risks of 
drug use, or drug treatment services could be improved.  The epistemic 
challenge is in fact two-fold.  Firstly, the possible alternatives may not be 
immediately apparent to the members of parliament.  They may need to do 
some work to find out the extent to which public advertising is a plausible 
solution to reducing drug use.  Secondly, even when the members of a 
parliament are aware of all the possible alternatives, there remains a challenge 
of determining which two alternatives are the best and so deserve one of the two 
places on the agenda for a majority vote.  We can think of agenda setting as a 
separate social choice problem in itself, with these two epistemic challenges of 
finding the alternatives and then choosing the alternatives to place on the 
agenda corresponding to a search procedure and aggregation procedure 
respectively. 
 
A solution to this second epistemic challenge, of narrowing down the possibly 
large set of alternatives to the two allowed a place on the classic CJT agenda, 
comes from the various extensions of the CJT to cope with multiple alternatives, 
as discussed in chapter 3.  List and Goodin (2001) extend the classic CJT to 
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cope with multiple alternatives by moving from majority rule on a two-placed 
agenda to plurality rule on a many-placed agenda.  Young (1998) details a 
Condorcetian extension of the classic CJT to multiple alternatives via a series of 
pair-wise social choices.  In chapter 3 I argue that the List and Goodin extension 
risks decreasing the aggregation competence of agents and the Condorcetian 
extension can require too many elections.  I argue for a mixed approach, with 
multiple elections, variable group sizes and agendas of multiple alternatives.  If 
the concern is that we cannot narrow down our large set of possible alternatives 
to the two most likely to be correct, the solution is to place all possible 
alternatives on an agenda.  This way we are guaranteed that if the correct 
alternative is identified by an agent, it will secure a place on the agenda.  We 
can allow agents to place any plausible alternative they have found on the 
agenda because the costs of a placing the wrong alternative in the agenda are 
low, since once the agenda is set there will be a separate social choice to 
determine the final social choice alternative.   
 
The remaining epistemic challenge is to find all the possible alternatives in the 
first place.  This is where we can apply the model of the group search 
procedure.  Although the set of possible alternatives are initially unknown to the 
members of the parliament, and as a consequence do not yet have a place on the 
agenda, each alternative will have a location.  For example, the alternative of 
decriminalising drug use might have been put forward by a think tank in a 2009 
report.  The alternative of more police resources could be advocated by the chief 
of police.  Public advertising may have been successful at reducing problem 
drinking in one city and so officials in that city would be able to propose this as 
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an alternative for dealing with drug use.  It is unlikely that a single member of 
parliament will be able to locate each of the alternatives, given the disparate 
locations of the alternatives.  However the group as a whole may be able to 
identify all the possible alternatives by engaging in a search.  The Search 
Theorem implies that as the size of the group involved in the search increases 
the probability that all the alternatives are identified is strictly increasing and in 
the limit reaches certainty, provided that each member of parliament has at least 
some chance of finding an alternative and provided that there is some diversity 
in the locations explored by agents.   
 
The Spatial Search Competence assumption of the search theorem, as applied to 
this example, is fulfilled if each member of parliament engages in a search for 
alternatives.  The crucial Spatial Search Independence assumption holds if there 
is some difference in the way members search for alternatives.  If they all listen 
to the same submission at a hearing on drug use then the Spatial Search 
Independence assumption may not hold.  But the Spatial Search Diversity 2 
assumption of the Search Theorem would hold if the members of parliament 
choose different initial partitions.  For example, if one member looks for 
legislative solutions and another member looks for best practice in other 
countries then, although there may be some overlap in the alternatives 
discovered by each agent, they are also likely to come up with some unique 
alternatives.  The Spatial Search Diversity 2 assumption of the Spatial Search 
Theorem would also hold in this example if agents have the same initial 
partition but different start points, locational conventions and/or search 
heuristics.  For example, the members of parliament may all share the same 
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initial partitioning of parliamentary constituencies.  But if each member begins 
searching for alternatives in their own constituency, then diversity is secured.  
Similarly diversity is secured if agents employ different heuristics in the search 
for alternatives.  Perhaps one member searches for alternatives by holding an 
open meeting in their constituency, another member may search for alternatives 
by commissioning a literature review and a further member may search for 
alternatives by consulting public officials. 
 
We could also apply the Search Recognition Theorem to the example of finding 
policy solutions for dealing with drug use.  A select committee might hold 
hearings on the issue of the social costs of drug use and invite members of the 
community to offer solutions.  Some members of the committee may ignore 
some of the proposed solutions if the solutions conflict with the member’s 
political prejudices.  However, if there is diversity in the political makeup of the 
committee, if different parts of the political spectrum are represented, then the 
different members will have independent recognition capacities and all 
proposed solutions will be recognised by at least one committee member.   
 
Note that in applying the search procedure to the problem of identifying 
alternatives I have assumed that the objects of search are the alternatives 
themselves.  However it could be argued that all objects of search, for any 
search procedure, are in fact evidential and background pieces of information.  
Consider the alternative of decriminalising drug use which is put forward by a 
think tank in a 2009 report.  An agent who visits the location that is the 2009 
think tank report will find the alternative of decriminalising drug use.  
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Equivalently, an agent who visits the location that is the 2009 think tank report 
receives evidential signals and background information which increases the 
probability that this agent will correctly judge that decriminalising drug use is 
an alternative that deserves a place on the agenda.  Similarly, the alternative of 
more police resources could be advocated by the chief of police.  If an agent 
visits this location (they communicate with the chief of police) then the agent 
will find the alternative of increasing the amount of police resources.  
Equivalently if an agent visits this location (they communicate with the chief of 
police) then they will receive evidential signals, auditory and visual pieces of 
information that are indirect causal relatives of the true state of the world, 
namely that increasing police resources is an alternative that deserves a place on 
the agenda.   
 
Nested social choice problems 
With the discussion thus far we have already seen that every social choice 
problem involves a two-staged process of a search procedure followed by an 
aggregation procedure.  The search procedure allows agents to extract 
information from the environment.  The aggregation procedure allows agents to 
share the information they have extracted with the group. 
 
We have also seen that a given social choice problem may in fact exist within a 
nest, or sequence of other social choice problems.  For example, the final social 
choice of a policy for dealing with the social costs of drug use can only occur 
after the separate social choice to determine which alternatives for dealing with 
the social costs of drug use should be placed on the agenda.   
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This nesting of social choice problems can in some cases be expanded beyond 
the two levels of setting the agenda and selecting the final alternative.  For 
example, before a group addresses the problem of setting an agenda with policy 
alternatives for dealing with the social costs of drug use, it needs to come to a 
consensus regarding how the quality of policy alternatives are assessed.  Some 
agents might believe that the success of a policy at dealing with social costs of 
drug use should be assessed solely in terms of the wider costs to the tax payer.  
A different agent might believe that the success of a policy at dealing with 
social costs of drug use should be assessed in terms of the impact on people’s 
health.  If different agents within a group assess alternatives according to 
different metrics we run the risk that the group will select the wrong alternative 
as the social choice93.  The solution to this problem, of securing a common 
metric for assessing the quality of policy alternatives, is to have additional 
social choice exercises.  Firstly, agents can search for possible metrics for 
assessing policies aimed at addressing the social cost of drug use, such as the 
wider costs to tax payers and the impact on people’s health.  These possible 
metrics can then be placed on a shared agenda.  There can then be a separate 
social choice exercise to determine a common metric for the group.  This 
separate social choice exercise will encompass both a search procedure whereby 
agents search for information which will tell them what metric on the agenda is 
best, and then an aggregation procedure where agents share their judgement as 
to which metric is best. 
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 For example if half of the agents use the metric of low costs to the taxpayer for measuring 
social costs then they will tend to vote for the alternative of public advertising.  If the other half 
of agents use the metric of health costs for measuring the social costs of drug use then they will 
tend to vote for the alternative of increasing health resources.  In these circumstances we would 
tend to get a tie.   
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The nesting of social choice problems can be extended even further.  Before 
agents begin to consider which metric should be used to assess policy 
alternatives for dealing with the social costs of drug use, there needs to be 
agreement as to the policy area they are dealing with.  A parliament only has a 
limited amount of time and so they must make a decision to focus on the issue 
of the social costs of drug use rather than, say, how to increase educational 
attainment or how to reduce the costs of health care, or the extent to which 
nuclear weapons should feature in defence policy.  Again, this further social 
choice problem of determining the policy area that parliament will focus on can 
be addressed, firstly, by a search procedure for identifying possible policy issues 
and placing these on a shared agenda.  Given a common agenda there can then 
be a separate search procedure where agents can search for information to tell 
them which of the policy areas on the agenda should be the focus of 
parliamentary time.  The information obtained by individual agents regarding 
which policy areas are most important can be shared with the group via plurality 
rule: the policy area that receives the most votes in its favour will be the focus 
for the group.   
 
In the remainder of this chapter we will consider the interaction of search and 
aggregation procedures: how institutional decisions over the choice of 
aggregation procedure impact on how search procedures should be conducted; 
and how the outputs of search procedures impact on the type of aggregation 
procedure that is optimal.   
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The relationship between search and aggregation procedures 
 
The choice of aggregation procedure and its impact on the group search 
procedure 
The institutional decision over which aggregation procedure to use may be 
made before a search procedure has been conducted and therefore before the 
type of judgement-generating factors of agents are formed.  If the type of 
aggregation procedure has been set then we know the type of judgement-
generating factors that are required for a group to track the truth (the level and 
distribution of competence in the group, independence relations and 
transparency of competence).  This in turn implies what the search procedure 
needs to deliver in terms of the distribution of information across the agents in 
the group.   
 
A group might make an institutional decision to use the aggregation procedure 
of negative reliability unanimity rule if there are high costs associated with 
wrongly deciding a false alternative is true.  For example, it might be considered 
better to preserve a nation's status quo constitutional arrangements, even if they 
are not optimal, rather than take the risk of moving to new constitutional 
arrangements that are flawed.   
 
A group might use the aggregation procedure of dictatorship if the costs of 
including a lot of agents in a decision are high and if it is likely that the dictator 
will have high competence.  For example, a Government might delegate some 
decisions in the defence portfolio to the Minister of Defence.  There are simply 
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too many day to day decisions for the Cabinet to make as a group (via 
unanimity or majority rule).  Moreover the Minister of Defence will have a 
large ministry to provide policy analysis to the Minister, so that her decisions 
are very likely to be correct.   
 
Finally a group may choose to use the aggregation procedure of majority rule if 
there is symmetry in the costs of false positives and false negatives and if the 
costs of including a large number of agents in the group are sustainable.  For 
example, for ordinary pieces of parliamentary legislation (such as liquor 
licensing laws) the costs of staying with the current bad legislation might be 
equal to the costs of moving to a new piece of bad legislation. Furthermore, 
requiring all members of parliament to vote does not impose additional costs as 
parliament has already set aside legislative time.   
 
The combination of judgement-generating factors required for the different 
aggregation procedures to track the truth was discussed earlier in the thesis in 
Chapter 2, figure.  2.17 
 
All three aggregation procedures considered in this thesis require the group 
search procedure to result in agents having at least some private evidential and 
background information.  The institutional design of the search procedure 
should therefore simply aim for agents to find as much private truth-conducive 
information as possible.   
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It is perhaps best for a social planner (or a group of self-organising agents) to 
treat a search procedure as occurring in two phases.  The distribution of 
information across the locations in a search space may be unknown ex ante.  
Similarly the extent to which information is easily extracted from locations may 
not be known ex ante.  In the first phase of a search it may help to survey the 
entire search space to identify concentrations of information or locations where 
the information cannot be easily extracted by an agent.  To optimise the initial 
phase of search the social planner should encourage some spatial search 
diversity in the group so as to identify the spread of information across the 
search space.  The initial search should also involve some overlap in the 
locations visited by agents so as to identify the extent to which information is 
easily extracted from locations.  Once the social planner has some idea of the 
distribution (and recognisability) of information in the search space they can 
organise subsequent searches so as to increase the amount of information 
extracted from the environment.  For example, if some agents report that they 
find information at a particular location and other agents report that they found 
no information at this location then this suggests there is a need to organise 
subsequent searches so that there is some overlap in the locations visited by 
agents.  Similarly if agents report that there is a cluster of locations containing 
significant amounts of information, the social planner may decide to concentrate 
the subsequent searches of agents on this patch of the search space.   
 
What a search procedure can deliver to an aggregation procedure 
It may be that a search procedure has already been conducted and that there is 
now a distribution of information across agents in the group.  If the aggregation 
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procedure employed by the group is sensitive to the distribution of information 
across agents in the group then the probability the group makes the correct 
social choice can be optimised.  The same post-search distribution of 
information across agents could be caused by many different combinations of 
initial distributions of information in the environment and different mixtures of 
agent-specific variables of search (the initial partition, locational convention, 
start point and heuristic of agents).  Therefore the following discussion of how 
institutional decisions regarding search procedures impact on aggregation 
procedures does not focus on the ‘inputs’ to the search procedure (the 
informational environment and the combinations of agents’ search variables) 
but rather on the output from the search procedure.   
 
The taxonomy of the distribution of information across agents set out below 
ignores whether the information is evidential or background, truth-conducive or 
misleading and common or private.  Both evidential and background 
information can increase the competence of agents, as argued in chapter 4 of 
this thesis.  The issue of misleading information is discussed in the next chapter.  
Whether information is common or private determines the independence 
relations between agents.  I will argue in the next chapter that agent’s level of 
competence should be conditional on the causal factors they receive.  Thus, 
provided that we conditionalise on common factors, the violations of 
independence do not pose problems.   
 
The outputs from the search procedure can be categorised according to whether 
agents find lots of information during their search, whether all or only some 
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agents find information, and whether agents find partial or complete pieces of 
information.  This is summarised in figure 6.2 below.   
 
Figure 6.2: a taxonomy of the post-search spread of information across agents 
in a group. 
Complete info 
 
Incomplete info 
All agents have 
information 
Some agents have 
information 
Lots of 
information 
 
1 
                            2 
3 
                           4 
Little 
information 
 
5 
                           6 
7 
                          8 
 
If agents find lots of information during the search their competence will be 
high; if agents find little information their competence will be relatively low.  If 
all agents find information then every agent has something to contribute to the 
aggregation procedure; if only some agents receive information only some of 
the group members will have information to contribute to the aggregation 
procedure.  Finally while many pieces of information will have truth-conducive 
value on their own, there may be some pieces of information that only have 
truth-conducive value in conjunction with other pieces of information.   
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To illustrate this final case, suppose that one agent discovers during their search 
for information that decriminalising drug use will decrease the cost of drugs.  
The fact that the cost of drugs will drop does not on its own imply that 
decriminalising drug use will decrease the social costs of drug use.  Suppose a 
separate agent discovers during their search that most of the social costs of drug 
use are caused by addicts committing acts of theft to pay for their drugs.  On its 
own this piece of information does not imply that decriminalising drug use will 
reduce the social costs.  However in combination the two pieces of information 
discovered by two different agents do imply that decriminalising drug use will 
reduce the social costs.   
 
If all agents receive some complete information (cell 5) then majority voting 
will be the optimal aggregation procedure.  Here the information that agents 
receive means they have a competence level that is better than random but less 
than certainty.  No single agent can reliably identify the true state of the world 
on their own.  However by sharing their judgements with the wider group the 
aggregation procedure of majority rule can weed out the error in agent’s 
judgements and utilise the information agents have found. 
 
If some of the agents have a lot of complete information (cell 3) then 
dictatorship would be the obvious aggregation procedure (provided of course 
that their competence was transparent)94.  Here the large amount of information 
received by the minority of agents means their competence levels will be high.   
 
                                                 
94
 Alternatively, the group could employ form of oligarchy, where only those agents with high 
competence (those agents who have received a lot of information) cast votes.   
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If many agents have lots of complete information (cell 1) then either majority 
rule or dictatorship are appropriate aggregation procedures.  If only a handful of 
agents receive a small amount of information (cell 7) then there may simply be 
insufficient information for any aggregation procedure to determine the true 
state of the world.  I consider this issue in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
In cells 2, 4 and 6 there is sufficient information dispersed among agents that 
indicates the true state of the world.  However the way in which the signals are 
dispersed in the group means that no individual agent has sufficiently high 
competence.  Agents need to share the partial pieces of information if they are 
to make use of it, perhaps via a deliberative procedure.  For example if one 
agent has discovered that most of the social costs of drug use are caused by 
addicts committing acts of theft to pay for their drugs and another agent has 
discovered that decriminalising drug use will decrease the cost of drugs, then 
the agents need to share what they know if the information is to have any truth-
conducive value.  Aggregation procedures, as characterised in this thesis, are 
unable to aggregate the truth-conducive information that does not directly 
increase agent’s competence levels.  This is because the aggregation procedures 
do not directly pool the information held by agents.  Rather, the truth-conducive 
information held by agents generates the judgements of agents, which are then 
aggregated into the social choice.   
 
The taxonomy in figure 6.2 helps illustrate three different reasons why we might 
want to consult a group in making a decision.  Suppose a group of hikers is 
walking through a forest and they see movement ahead.  If all agents in the 
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group clearly saw what caused the disturbance (cell 1 in figure 6.3) then there is 
no need to consult the wider group.  However if it is not obvious to all the 
agents what caused the disturbance they might consult the wider group.  There 
are three explanations as to why the group as a whole may be successful in this 
task.  Firstly, it may be that each group member got an independent view of the 
object that was good but not perfect.  We ask each person what they saw.  If one 
after the other says something like 'I think I saw a bear'...'It looked a bit like a 
bear'...'Maybe a bear'... then we will have a certain amount of confidence that 
the thing ahead is indeed a bear (this corresponds to cell 5, where the 
information can be pooled via the aggregation procedure of majority rule).  
Secondly, it may be the case that only one of our group members saw the object.  
The view of most of our group may have been obscured by foliage.  But if we 
ask enough of our group eventually we will come across a group member who 
got a clear view of the object and is able to confirm it was a bear (this 
corresponds to cell 3, where the optimal aggregation procedure will be expert 
dictatorship).  Finally, it may be the case that each member of the group only 
saw a part of the object (cells 2,4,6).  For example, one person saw that the 
object had brown fur, so it had to be an elk, wolf or bear.  Another person saw 
that the object had sharp teeth, so it had to be either a bear or a wolf.  Finally 
someone else saw that the object was tall, so it must be a bear.  In this last case 
agents must discuss what they saw for the group to identify the animal.  
Standard aggregation procedures cannot aggregate the truth-conducive 
information possessed by agents.  Agents must share their information via 
deliberation of they are to identify the true state of the world.   
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There are three types of outputs from search procedures which deliver what is 
required for an aggregation procedure to track the truth.  Firstly, where many 
agents have some complete pieces of information we can employ majority rule.  
Secondly where some agents have many complete pieces of information (or 
where many agents have many complete pieces of information) we can employ 
expert dictatorship.  However where the group search procedure has produced 
an output where agents only have incomplete information, standard aggregation 
procedures will not track the truth.  Agents need to share their incomplete pieces 
of information before they cast their votes.   
 
Summary 
Thus far the chapters in this thesis have discussed aggregation procedures, 
search procedures and the interaction between the two.  We have considered the 
impact of institutional decisions regarding the choice of the aggregation 
procedure and the conduct of search procedure.  We have also considered the 
agent-specific variables that are relevant for the aggregation procedures95; and 
we have considered the agent-specific variables relevant for the search 
procedures96.  The remaining issue is how contingencies in the informational 
environment – in particular the possibility of misleading information and finite 
information – impact on the ability of a group to identify the true state of the 
world.   
                                                 
95
 The competence levels, independence relations and transparency of competence. 
 
96
 Including spatial search and search recognition competence levels, and the spatial search and 
search recognition independence relations.   
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Chapter 7: The limits of the informational 
environment. 
 
This final substantive chapter focuses on contingencies in the informational 
environment which place restrictions on the absolute epistemic performance of 
aggregation procedures.   
 
I begin by addressing the problem of the possibility of misleading information.  
A small but significant literature on this topic has developed quite recently, 
focussed on majority rule and the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  The analysis in this 
literature shows that the mere possibility of misleading evidence and 
background factors means the asymptotic limit of the Condorcet Jury Theorem 
is not certainty, but some value less than certainty.  This means that the 
absolute epistemic performance of majority rule may be too low: groups using 
majority rule as an aggregation procedure may not be very reliable at 
identifying the true state of the world.  The possibility of misleading information 
affects the aggregation procedures of expert dictatorship and negative 
reliability unanimity rule in different ways.  Here I apply existing results to my 
two-staged framework.   
 
I also address the problem of finite information.  So far as I am aware, this 
problem has not yet been addressed by other authors.  In some social choice 
problems there may simply be insufficient information for a group to determine 
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the true state of the world, no matter what search or aggregation procedures 
the group employs.  I consider what institutional responses a group might 
employ to maximise the probability of a correct social choice when the amount 
of information is limited.  In particular I argue for the sharing of information 
between agents, via deliberation.  I show how the sharing of information can 
boost the levels of competence in agents, while still preserving independence 
relations.   
 
 
Search procedures allow agents within a group to extract evidential and 
background information from the environment.  Aggregation procedures allow a 
group of agents to pool the information they have found during their search 
procedures.  Institutional decisions over the conduct of the search procedure and 
over the type of aggregation procedure will affect the probability that the group 
identifies the true state of the world.  For example, if it is known that the pieces 
of information can easily be extracted from locations then a coordination of the 
search procedures of agents to ensure they are mutually exclusive is optimal.  
Similarly if it is known that there is variability in the capacity of agents to 
extract information from locations, then coordinating the agent’s search 
procedures to ensure some overlap in the locations visited would be 
epistemically advisable.  If it is known, after the search procedure, that many 
agents have found pieces of information then majority rule may be the most 
appropriate aggregation procedure to employ.  However, if at the end of the 
search procedure it is known that one agent has found all the relevant pieces of 
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information, then expert dictatorship may be the most appropriate aggregation 
procedure.   
 
The extent to which a group (or social planner) can make institutional decisions 
over the aggregation procedure to employ depends on the extent to which the 
competence of agents is transparent and the extent to which the group is aware 
of the independence relations.  Even when a group is aware of these features, 
the choice of aggregation procedure can only influence the group epistemic 
performance to a certain extent.  The level of competence of agents places an 
upper limit on the epistemic performance of aggregation procedures.  The level 
of competence of agents is in turn (partly) determined by the search procedures. 
 
The extent to which a group can make institutional decisions regarding the 
conduct of search procedures depends on the extent to which the group (or a 
social planner) is aware of the spread of information in the environment and the 
extent to which the group is aware of the search skills of individual agents.  
Even when a group is aware of these features, and coordinates the searches of 
individual agents optimally, there can be limits placed on the ability of groups 
to extract information from the environment.  These limits are generated by 
features of the informational environment itself, by the quality and quantity of 
information available.   
 
Chapters 2 and 5 of the thesis discussed aggregation and search procedures 
respectively.  Chapter 6 discussed the interaction between search and 
aggregation procedures, how institutional decisions over search procedures 
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impact on aggregation procedures and vice versa.  This chapter (chapter 7) 
discusses the final limit that is placed on the ability of a group to track the truth.   
 
Firstly, I briefly summarise the recent literature on the possibility of misleading 
evidence in a Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) framework.  I consider the 
implications for this analysis on other aggregation procedures.  I then move on 
to consider the issue of finite evidence and the institutional decisions that might 
be made to maximise the probability of a correct social choice where the 
amount of truth-conducive information is limited.   
 
The possibility of misleading evidence 
 
Majority rule and the CJT 
The possibility of misleading evidence is a standard concern with the CJT.  For 
example, Grofman et al. (1983) note that if the competence of agents is below 
0.5 (if agents have on average received misleading information) then the 
probability of a correct majority verdict is decreasing in group size and in the 
limit approaches 0.  Dietrich and List (2004) provide a new model of a jury 
theorem where the possibility of misleading evidence is conditionalised on.  
Here agents in a group do not have private pieces of evidence; rather the group 
shares a common body of evidence intermediate between the agents and the 
state of the world.  If a group of agents faces a common, intermediate body of 
evidence then this places an upper limit on the probability of a correct majority 
winner.  As the size of the group increases, more and more background 
information is added to the group so the ability of the group to appropriately 
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interpret the evidence increases.  However the probability that the group will 
identify the true state of the world (the probability of a correct majority verdict) 
is limited to the probability that the common evidence is non-misleading. 
 
Dietrich and Spiekermann (unpublished a) produce a more general model.  It is 
not just the possibility of misleading evidence that poses a problem for the 
classic CJT but the possibility of any sort of common circumstance (including 
both background and evidential information) that poses a problem.  The classic 
independence assumption of the CJT requires that the events of agents voting 
correctly are independent conditional on the state of the world.  Dietrich and 
Spiekermann note that this requirement will hardly ever be met – agents are 
likely to have at least some evidential and background factors in common.  To 
recover independence in the votes of agents they propose a new independence 
assumption, which requires that the votes of agents are independent conditional 
on the state of the world and any factors held in common.  The combination of 
the state of the world and common factors they term the ‘problem’.  With a 
problem-specific notion of independence secured, the classic CJT competence 
assumption needs to be revised.  With the new independence assumption, the 
scope of the CJT has shifted to a fixed problem (with a fixed state of the world 
and a fixed set of (common) causes on agent’s votes).  The competence 
assumption must also refer to this same fixed problem, and the competence of 
agents must also be conditional on these (common) causes.  The new 
competence assumption of their model requires that the problem specific 
competence of agents (the competence of agents given the state of the world and 
the common causes) is more likely to be greater than 0.5 than less than 0.5.  In 
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other worlds, the new competence assumption requires that the combination of 
common causes is more likely to be truth-conducive than misleading.   
 
If the new independence and new competence assumptions of the revised CJT 
model hold, then the new jury theorem states that as the group size increases the 
probability of a correct majority verdict increases and in the limit tends to the 
probability that the combination of common causes is not misleading.  As there 
is at least some possibility of a combination of misleading information, the 
maximum probability of a correct majority verdict in the new jury theorem is 
strictly less than certainty.  A world in which most problems are misleading is 
unstable (Dietrich, 2008) and so the asymptotic limit of the new jury theorem is 
greater than ½.   
 
The models of Dietrich and List (2004) and Dietrich and Spiekermann 
(unpublished a) show that the possibility of misleading information in social 
choice problems places restrictions on the absolute epistemic performance97 of 
groups in a CJT framework.  These restrictions, the fact that a group using 
majority rule may be significantly less likely than certain to identify the true 
state of the world, is not something that can be overcome.  If it were possible to 
identify a piece or combination of information as misleading it would not be 
misleading.  As Dietrich (2008) notes, a piece of information is misleading if 
receiving this information means an agent is less likely to vote for the correct 
alternative.  To know if a piece of information is misleading the social planner 
needs to know what the true state of the world is.  But if the social planner 
                                                 
97
 According to the definition set out in chapter 2, absolute epistemic performance requires that 
an aggregation procedure is good at identifying the true state of the world.   
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knows the true state of the world, there is no need to consult the judgements of 
individual agents.   
 
The problem of misleading information is a particular problem for the 
aggregation procedure of majority rule because of the important threshold level 
of agent competence.  If the combination of causal factors on agent’s votes 
mean the competence of agents drops even slightly below 0.5, then as the size 
of the group increases the probability of a correct majority verdict tends towards 
zero.  Neither expert dictatorship not negative reliability unanimity rule faces 
this problem, as I show below.   
 
Negative reliability unanimity rule 
Agents will have a prior competence of 
 = 0.5 (according to my model 
assumptions, as discussed in chapter 4).  Even if no agent receives any 
information whatsoever the aggregation procedure of negative reliability 
unanimity rule is increasingly likely to avoid the incorrect social choice as 
group size increases.  The probability of avoiding the incorrect alternative is 
given by: 
 
 = 1 − 1 − 
*	 
 
If 
 = 0.5 then:   
 
 = 1 − 1 − 0.5* = 1 − 12* 
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and as  → ∞, ⁻ → 1. 
 
Agents may receive truth-conducive or misleading pieces of information.  
Misleading information may mean that the competence of an agent is 
 < 0.5.  
However, provided the information is not so misleading that the competence of 
agents is 
 = 0, then misleading information does not pose a problem for the 
aggregation procedure of negative reliability unanimity rule.  Provided that 
agents are not totally incompetent (provided that 
 is not zero) then as 
 → ∞,⁻ → 1. 
 
The possibility of misleading information does not pose a problem for the 
baseline98, relative99 or absolute epistemic performance of negative reliability 
unanimity as an aggregation procedure.  The upper limit of group epistemic 
performance is still certainty.  Misleading information merely reduces the rate at 
which adding group members increases the probability of avoiding the incorrect 
social choice. 
 
Expert dictatorship 
The aggregation procedure of expert dictatorship only tracks the truth if the 
competence of agents is transparent.  Here we need to be careful about how we 
interpret transparency.  If competence is transparent, then ‘misleading’ 
information which decreases an agent’s competence to below 0.5 is not 
misleading at all.  An agent whose competence is 
 = 0.5 − 0.2 = 0.3 tells us 
                                                 
98
 As defined in chapter 2, baseline epistemic performance requires that a group using an 
aggregation procedure is better than random at identifying the true state of the world.   
 
99
 As defined in chapter 2, relative epistemic performance requires that a group using an 
aggregation procedure is better than an individual at identifying the true state of the world. 
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just as much about the true state of the world as an agent whose competence is 
: = 0.5 + 0.2 = 0.7.  If a group (or social planner) makes agent  dictator and 
accepts their judgement as the social choice then the probability of a correct 
social choice is 0.7.  If the group instead makes agent  the dictator and makes 
the opposite of agent ′ judgement the social choice then again the probability 
of a correct majority verdict is  = 1 − 0.3 = 0.7.  In fact, misleading 
information is just as epistemically virtuous for the aggregation procedure of 
expert dictatorship as truth-conducive information.  The most epistemically 
difficult case is one in which agents receive no vote-determining causal factors 
at all and their level of competence remains at 
 = 0.5.  The most 
epistemically helpful factors are the ones that push an agent’s level of 
competence as far away from 0.5 (in either direction) as possible.   
 
The possibility of misleading information (that is, information which decreases 
the competence levels of agents) does not pose a problem for the baseline or 
absolute epistemic performance of expert dictatorship as an aggregation 
procedure.  The upper limit of group epistemic performance is still certainty.   
 
The real problem for the aggregation procedure of expert dictatorship is that the 
level of agent competence may not be transparent.  This issue was discussed in 
chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis.   
 
The problem of misleading information is related to the problem of finite 
information.  If agents have access to all the information about the true state of 
the world then they cannot be misled as to the true state of the world.  For the 
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problem of the possibility of misleading information to have any purchase, it 
must be the case that either agents have access to an infinite but restricted pool 
of information, or agents only have access to a finite pool of information.  The 
next section in the chapter is concerned with cases where agents have access to 
a finite pool of information but where there is no possibility of that pool of 
information being misleading.   
 
Finite information 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analysed how the judgement-generating factors of 
competence, transparency of competence and independence relations form.  It 
was argued that agents need both evidential and background information for 
their competence to be better than random, for 
 > 0.5.  In the absence of any 
evidential information whatsoever (including the absence of even the detail of 
the agenda agents are facing) agents have no clue which of the two alternatives 
on an agenda is correct and they will be forced to cast a vote at random.  In 
these circumstances the competence of an agent will be 
 = 0.5.  Similarly 
agents need at least some background information to be able to interpret the 
evidence they have.  For example, if an agent is told that the agenda comprises 
the alternatives (elephant/ not elephant) but the agent does not possess the 
background information that tells them what an elephant is, then again they will 
be forced to choose an alternative at random and their competence will be 

 = 0.5.   
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If an agent has at least some evidential information and some relevant 
background information then his or her competence can be greater than 0.5 
(provided that the combined effect of these factors is truth-conducive).  For the 
aggregation procedure of expert dictatorship to have baseline epistemic 
performance100 at least one agent has to receive enough background and 
evidential information (whose combined effect is truth-conducive) such that 
their competence is greater than 0.5.  For the aggregation procedure of expert 
dictatorship to have absolute epistemic performance101 at least one agent has to 
receive enough background and evidential information (whose combined effect 
is truth-conducive) such that the agent’s competence is very close to 1.0.  In 
addition, for expert dictatorship, the information received by the dictator must 
be of a kind such that the competence of the expert dictator is transparent.   
 
For the aggregation procedure of majority rule to have good baseline and 
relative epistemic performance102, agent’s must have at least some evidential 
information and some relevant background information (whose combined effect 
is truth-conducive), and at least some of this information must be held uniquely 
by them103.  If a given agent lacks evidential or background information their 
competence will be 0.5, and they will make no marginal contribution to group 
epistemic performance when added to the group (and in fact will add ‘noise’ to 
                                                 
100
 Baseline epistemic performance requires that a group using a particular aggregation 
procedure is better than random at selecting the correct alternative.   
 
101
 Absolute epistemic performance means a group using a particular aggregation procedure is 
good at selecting the correct alternative.   
 
102
 Relative epistemic performance requires that a group using a particular aggregation 
procedure is better than an individual at selecting the correct alternative.   
 
103
 Here we rely on the CJT to support the claims of absolute and relative epistemic 
performance. 
 268 
the group).  If all the information an agent has is also held by another agent in 
the group then all randomness in vote of the new agent will disappear, the 
conditional probability of the new agent voting for an alternative given the vote 
of another agent is 1.  Here again such agents will make no marginal 
contribution to the group epistemic performance when added to the group.  For 
the aggregation procedure of majority rule to have absolute epistemic 
performance, the probability of a correct majority verdict must be close to 
certainty.  For the probability of a correct majority verdict to be close to 1.0, 
there either needs to be an approaching infinite number of agents who have 
received enough private background and evidential information such that their 
competence is greater than 0.5; or alternatively (irrespective of group size) the 
agents must have received enough background and evidential information such 
that the competence of agents is close to 1.0.   
 
A lack of evidential or background information is not a problem for the 
epistemic performance of negative reliability unanimity.  Even if the 
competence of agents is 
 = 0.5 then as the number of agents increases the 
probability of a correct social choice tends to certainty (assuming the votes of 
agents are conditionally independent).  Negative reliability unanimity rule only 
fails to track the truth when the votes of agents are sufficiently dependent, or 
when the competence of agents is 0.  For the posterior competence of an agent 
to drop from 
 = 0.5 to 
 = 0 the agent must receive enough background and 
evidential information whose combined effect is severely misleading.   
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Finite evidence 
There will be many cases where the amount of truth-conducive evidence 
available to agents is limited.  For example, in a jury trial only a small amount 
of evidence (factors that are indirect causal relatives of the state of the world) 
may reach the jurors.  There will only be so much forensic evidence left at the 
crime scene and only a finite number of witnesses to the actual crime.  Let h% 
represent the total body of finite evidence available as to the true state of the 
world.  The truth-conducive strength of signals from the body of evidence 
depends on the prior competence level of agents receiving those signals.  For 
example, it takes a lot more information to increase an agent’s competence level 
from 
 = 0.7 to 
 = 0.9 than it does to increase an agent’s competence level 
from 
 = 0.5 to 
 = 0.7.  Suppose that if one agent  were to receive all of h% 
then the agent’s competence increases from 
 = 0.5 to 
 = 0.9.  If two agents 
,  each receive half of h% then the competencies of these agents would 
increase from :, o = 0.5 to :, o = 0.75. I will briefly explain how the 
competence level for an agent with a portion of the body of evidence is 
calculated.  h
% = h:% ∩ ho%  and  is the true state of the world.  The likelihood 
ratio (LR) = ª«	¬O
­|®O6)
ª«	¬O­|®O6¬) =
ª«	¬ ­¯|®¯6)
ª«	¬ ­¯|®¯6¬) ×
ª«	¬°­|®°6)
ª«	¬°­|®°6¬) = 	

 by independence.  
To update the odds (in line with Bayes’ rule): (!
 = |h
%) = () ×
ª«i¬O­j®O6k
ª«i¬O­j®O6¬k
= (!
 = ) × 	 = .. =
.{
.{ × 	

.  Therefore,  
(!
 = |h
%) = 3 =
ª«	®O6|¬O­)
ª«	®O6¬|¬O­) .  Therefore Pr(!
 = |h

%) =  Y = 0.75.   
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We want to see the maximum possible level of epistemic gain for the group 
given the finite body of evidence, so we will assume that all pieces of evidence 
are truth-conducive (none are misleading).  We also assume that no agents have 
factors in common and therefore agents are independent, conditional on the 
state of the world.   
 
h% is divided into  non-overlapping parts of equal strength h% , h% , … , h*%.  
Each agent  receives h
%. 104 The competence of agents depends on the pieces of 
evidence that they receive out of h%.  The prior competence of agent  is 

 = 0.5.  Agent ′ posterior competence given h
% is: 
 

 = Pr	!
 = |, h
%) 
 
Competence decreases as  increases because the amount of information in h
% 
decreases.  Furthermore, as  → ∞, 
 → 0.5 because the amount of information 
in h
% tends to zero as  → ∞. 
 
On standard interpretations of the CJT finite evidence may pose a problem.  As 
the number of voters tends towards infinity (as per the asymptotic CJT), voter 
competence tends towards 0.5.  So as the number of voters tends towards 
infinity competence levels decrease towards a point where the competence 
assumption of the CJT no longer holds.  If the competence assumption does not 
hold, the asymptotic CJT does not hold and we no longer have justification for 
the absolute epistemic performance of majority voting as an aggregation 
                                                 
104
 As such, agents receiving the evidence will be conditionally independent. 
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procedure.  Put another way, according to the asymptotic CJT a requirement for 
majority voting approaching the upper epistemic limit of certainty is an 
approaching infinite number of voters whose competence is greater than 0.5 on 
average and who are independent in a formal sense.  For this to be the case there 
needs to be an approaching infinite amount of evidence.  If evidence is finite the 
upper asymptotic limit will never be approached.  In cases where there is finite 
evidential information the upper asymptotic limit will always be some value less 
than 1.0.  Furthermore, as the amount of evidential information decreases, the 
upper asymptotic limit of the probability of a correct majority verdict tends to 
0.5.  The CJT is inapplicable in the plausible cases in which competence levels 
depend on group size, or where evidence becomes common as group size 
increases, undermining independence.   
 
Finite evidence also poses a problem for the aggregation procedure of expert 
dictatorship.  Even if all the evidence available is given to the expert dictator 
there may be so little evidence that the competence of the dictator (and hence 
the probability of a correct social choice) is very low. 
 
Finite background information 
If finite evidential information poses a problem for the asymptotic limit of the 
CJT we can look to background information as a way out.  Recall that the 
competence of an agent is determined by the combination of the evidential and 
background factors the agent receives.  Although the background factors are by 
definition not causal relatives of the state of the world and therefore do not 
directly indicate which alternative on an agenda is correct, the background 
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factors do have a causal impact on the votes of agents.  Because background 
factors have a causal impact on the votes of agents they can either be misleading 
(if receiving a given background factor makes an agent less likely to vote for the 
correct alternative), or truth-conducive (if receiving a given background factor 
makes an agent more likely to vote for the correct alternative).  While the 
amount of evidential information may well be finite (and in many cases 
extremely limited), there is likely to be much more background information that 
the group of agents can utilise.  The background information helps agents 
interpret and make use of the evidential information and so obtaining 
background information can increase the competence of agents.  If different 
agents obtain (or already have) different pieces of background information they 
will be (conditionally) independent.   
 
For example, suppose a group of jurors must decide if a defendant is guilty of 
an act of murder.  Juror ′ degree in biochemistry was in no way caused by the 
state of the world (the act of murder committed by the defendant).  Furthermore, 
the fact that a juror has a degree in biochemistry is not indicative of the true 
state of the world.  Nevertheless juror ′ degree in biochemistry helps an agent 
interpret the evidential information placed before them, such as DNA evidence.  
The juror’s degree in biochemistry, combined with the DNA evidence, means 
that the competence of this juror will be greater than 0.5.  A separate juror  
may have studied botany rather than biochemistry, and as such has slightly 
different background factors than the first agent.  The background in botany of 
juror  allows them to accurately interpret the DNA evidence, but in a way that 
is slightly different to the first juror.  The background factors of an education in 
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botany, combined with the DNA evidence, means that the competence of the 
second juror is also greater than 0.5.  The slightly different way in which the 
second juror interprets the evidence means that the judgements of the two jurors 
are conditionally independent, i.e. the fact that the jurors have evidence in 
common means the fact that one votes for the correct verdict makes it more 
likely that a second juror votes correctly, however once we conditionalise on the 
common evidence the vote of one juror tells us nothing about how the second 
juror will vote.    
 
Even if the amount of evidential information in an environment is finite and 
quite limited, there may be a significant amount of background information at 
the group’s disposal.  As such even a jury trial that suffers from a lack of 
evidence can be very likely to reach the correct verdict, provided that the jurors 
bring with them sufficient background information of sufficient quality such 
that they are able to correctly interpret the limited evidential information.   
 
However the amount of background information may still also be finite.  Let h 
represent the total body of truth-conducive information available in an 
environment.  h encompasses both evidential and background information and 
h is finite.  h is divided into  non-overlapping parts of equal truth-conducive 
strength h , h , … , h* . Each agent  receives h
.  The competence of agents 
depends on the pieces of information that they receive out of h.  The prior 
competence of agent  is 
 = 0.5.  Agent ′ competence given h
  is: 
 

 = Pr	!
 = |, h
) 
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Competence decreases as  increases because the amount of information in h
  
decreases.  Furthermore, as  → ∞, 
 → 0.5 because the amount of information 
in h
  tends to zero as  → ∞.  The finite amount of truth-conducive 
information (evidential and background) appears to place a limit on the absolute 
epistemic performance of majority rule.   
 
Limited background information also places a limit on the absolute epistemic 
performance of expert dictatorship.  The amount of relevant background 
information may be so low that the competence of the expert dictator may be 
very close to 
 = 0.5.		 
 
Possible solutions to finite information 
We will now consider what routes there may be through this further 
bottleneck105 to absolute group epistemic performance generated by finite 
information.  To help illustrate the solutions I will assume that there are two 
groups of agents.  These agents have extracted all the information from the 
environment that there is.  One of the groups has homogeneous levels of 
competence of 0.6, while the other group has heterogeneous levels of 
competence which are symmetric about the mean competence of 0.6.  The two 
groups are presented below: 
 
, ,   = 0.6, 0.6, 0.6 
 ,  ,    = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
                                                 
105
 The first bottleneck to the absolute group epistemic performance of a group is generated by 
the possibility of misleading evidence, as first identified in Dietrich and List (2004). 
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The first approach I consider for coping with finite information is the choice of 
aggregation procedure.  The lesson from this approach will be that judgement 
aggregation procedures, such as majority rule, do not directly pool information.  
Rather, information generates the competence of agents which in turn generates 
the judgements of agents.  The competence of agents should be interpreted as an 
epistemic capability.  Secondly, I consider disaggregating a social choice and 
employing a premise-based aggregation procedure.  The lesson from this second 
approach is that competence is a modular epistemic capability which can be 
used by the same agent on different agendas without violating independence.  
Thirdly, I consider the redistribution of information.  The lesson from this 
approach is simply that it is indeed feasible for a social planner to allocate 
information across agents in a group as he or she pleases.  Finally I consider the 
sharing of information.  This combines the lessons of the three previous 
approaches, namely that competence is an epistemic capability that can be 
modular across agents.  Because competence is a modular epistemic capability 
it can be used repeatedly to increase the probability of a correct social choice, 
even when the information generating the competence is limited.   
 
The selection of aggregation procedure 
Where the amount of information is finite we might be able to maximise its 
impact on the probability of a correct social choice by selecting the appropriate 
aggregation procedure.  This point was made in the previous chapter where it 
was argued that the institutional decision over the aggregation procedure to 
employ should be sensitive to the post-search distribution of competencies in 
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the group.  First let’s consider the case where the competence of agents is 
homogeneous.  The probability of a correct social choice, given the aggregation 
procedures of majority rule, unanimity rule106 and dictatorship are as follows: 
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.648 
¶*±*
·
³	+´µ% = 0.216 
¸ v%²	¹
±²ºG
v = 0.6 
 
Clearly, when the competence levels of agents are homogeneous majority rule is 
the optimal aggregation procedure.  Dictatorship is epistemically superior to 
unanimity rule since the event of a single agent voting correctly is more likely 
to occur than the events of all three agents voting correctly.  Majority rule is 
epistemically superior to both unanimity rule and expert dictatorship because of 
its tolerance for mistakes.  The correct alternative will be the majority winner if 
only two out of the three agents vote correctly.  By contrast, with unanimity rule 
or dictatorship, if any of the voters make a mistake and vote for the wrong 
alternative the correct alternative will not be the social choice. 
 
However, things may be different if the competence levels of agents are 
heterogeneous.  Where the competence levels in our group are heterogeneous 
the probability of a correct majority verdict given the aggregation procedures of 
majority rule, unanimity rule107 and expert dictatorship are as follows: 
 
                                                 
106
 Here we are considering the positive reliability of unanimity rule, not negative reliability 
unanimity rule.   
107
 Here again we are considering the positive reliability of unanimity rule, not negative 
reliability unanimity rule.   
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n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.656 
¶*±*
·
³	+´µ% = 0.21 
¸ v%²	¹
±²ºG
v = 0.8 
 
If we compare the results for heterogeneous competence immediately above 
with the previous results for homogeneous competence we can see that both 
majority rule and expert dictatorship do better with heterogeneous competencies 
while unanimity rule does worse.  Expert dictatorship does better with 
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous competence since heterogeneous 
groups contain individuals with high competence.  Majority voting does better 
with heterogeneous competencies for small group sizes, but these differences 
will wash out as the size of the group increases.    
 
When the amount of truth-conducive information is finite, it may be better in 
some cases to use expert dictatorship rather than majority rule as the 
aggregation procedure.  If expert dictatorship is to be employed as the 
aggregation procedure then the competence of agents must be transparent.  But 
if the competence of agents is transparent then we can choose to give more 
emphasis to the judgements of high competence agents and less weight to the 
judgements of low competence agents, in line with the following weights108:  
 
H
 ∝ log	 
1 − 
 
 
                                                 
108
 Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) Theorem XIII, as discussed in chapter 2. 
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If we apply these weights to the aggregation procedure of majority rule then we 
get weighted majority rule, which represents the maximum possible probability 
of a correct social choice given fixed levels of competence.  With weighted 
majority rule, any agent whose level of competence is not 0.5 can make an 
epistemic contribution to the group.  With weighted majority rule the 
probability of a correct social choice is:   
 
»%
¼G%½	n±:²
³	+´µ% = =8
81− 


∉)
∈))⊂@
 
 
where the sum is taken over all subsets  ⊂ :∑ H
 > ∑ H

∉)
∈) .  109 
 
The probability of a correct social choice given the aggregation procedure of 
weighted majority rule is: 
 
	»%
¼G%½	n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.8 
 
Majority rule can be thought of allowing a group to extract the signal from the 
judgements of agents while filtering out the noise (List, 2008).  In the case of 
the group with heterogeneous competencies  ,  ,    = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 the 
noise of agent 1 is drowning out the signal from agent 3.  Applying weights in 
proportion to the competencies of agents means agent 1’s vote is given a weight 
of H = −0.40547 whereas agents 2 and 3 are given weights of H = 0.40547 
                                                 
109
 Bradley, R. and Thompson, C. (2012), adapted from Owen, G., Grofman, B. and Feld, S.L. 
(1989), as discussed in chapter 2. 
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and H = 	1.3863 respectively110.  Applying weights means we have greater 
confidence in the epistemic ability of some of the agents.   
 
Judgement aggregation procedures do not pool information directly.  Rather, 
information (evidential/ background, private/ common and truth-conducive/ 
misleading causal factors) generates the competence of agents.  The competence 
of agents represents the agents’ epistemic capabilities; it is a measure of their 
ability to identify the correct alternative on the agenda.  These epistemic 
capabilities of agents can be utilised more or less effectively by different 
aggregation procedures.  Weighted majority rule represents the maximum 
possible probability of a correct social choice, given fixed levels of competence.  
In employing weighted majority rule we acknowledge that some agents have 
greater epistemic capabilities than others (since they have received more truth-
conducive information).  Of course, if we choose to employ weighted majority 
rule, we dispense with equality of participation, which is also a virtue of 
democratic decision making.   
 
Epistemic gains from disaggregation 
The epistemic advantages to disaggregating a social choice into a set of 
premises and then holding majority rule decisions on each premise has been 
addressed by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), List (2006) and List (2008).  Here 
I rehearse the main results and apply them to our group of a fixed size, where 
the amount of information is also fixed.  I will argue that the mechanism that 
                                                 
110
 Note that in this particular example expert dictatorship is identical to weighted majority rule 
since the weight given to agent  is so much greater than that given to any other agent.  
However in other cases this will not be true.  For example, if we have a group with 
heterogeneous competences of 
 , : , o , µ = 0.6,0.6,0.6,0.7 then under the aggregation 
procedure of weighted majority rule no agent will be dictator.     
 280 
accounts for the increased epistemic capacity that comes from disaggregation is 
that the competence of agents is a modular capacity that can be applied to 
different agendas.  This important observation will be applied in the later 
solution for dealing with finite evidence: the sharing of information.   
 
Any proposition is logically equivalent to a conjunction of other propositions.  
For example the proposition:  
	 = the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. 
 
May be equivalent to:  
 = the cause of death was blood loss due to being stabbed. 
¾ = the defendant stabbed the victim. 
&¾ ↔ 	 = the defendant is guilty of manslaughter if and only if 
they stabbed the victim and this stabbing caused the victim’s death. 
 
The social choice can be made either by voting on the ‘conclusion’ 	 or by 
voting on each of the ‘premises’ , ¾ and (&¾) ↔ 	 and accepting the 
conclusion 	 if and only if , ¾ and (&¾) ↔ 	 are accepted.  As authors such 
as List (2006), List (2008) and Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) have shown, 
there can be epistemic gains from using a premise-based approach.   
 
Agents will not have the same level of competence on conclusions as they will 
on premises.  Knowing that the defendant is guilty is equivalent to knowing that 
the cause of death was blood loss due to stabbing AND the defendant stabbed 
the victim AND these two facts are necessary and sufficient for the defendant 
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being guilty.  Therefore we should expect that the level of competence on the 
premises will be higher than on the conclusion.  If the homogeneous level of 
competence on the conclusion 	 is  = 0.6 then the homogeneous level of 
competence on each of these premises should be ÁÂ = √0.6Â = 0.84343.  The 
probability that three agents with competence  = 0.84343 choose the correct 
alterantive via majority rule on a premise is Ä²%·
º% = 0.93413.  The 
probability that agents choose the correct conclusion 	, given a premise-based 
approach, is the probability that they make the correct majority choice on all 
three premises.  This is given by Ä²%·
º%$±º%½	v²%½´²% = 0.93413 =
0.81512.  We can compare the conclusion-based and premise-based decision 
procedures: 
 
¬*µ´º
*$±º%½	v²%½´²% = 0.648 
Ä²%·
º%$±º%½	v²%½´²% = 0.81512 
 
In the case where competence levels are homogeneous there are clear epistemic 
advantages to a premise-based procedure.   
 
Where the heterogeneous competence levels of agents on the conclusion are 
 ,  ,   = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, the competence levels of the three agents on the 
premises will be  ,  ,   = 0.73681, 0.84343, 0.92832.  The probability 
that this group makes the correct majority choice on a premise will be 
Ä²%·
º% = 0.93461 and the probability that the group makes the correct choice 
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on the conclusion via a premise-based procedure is Ä²%·
º%$±º%½	v²%½´²% =
0.93461 = 0.81638.  111 
 
We can compare the conclusion-based and premise-based decision procedures 
for groups with heterogeneous competencies: 
 
¬*µ´º
*$±º%½	v²%½´²% = 0.65 
Ä²%·
º%$±º%½	v²%½´²% = 0.81638 
 
In the case where competence levels are heterogeneous there are clear epistemic 
advantages to a premise-based procedure.   
 
Disaggregating a social choice problem into premises and a conclusion and then 
using a premise-based decision procedure is epistemically superior to both 
majority rule and expert dictatorship.  What can account for the epistemic gain 
that comes from disaggregation, given that the inputs (the number of agents, and 
their truth-conducive factors) are fixed?  I offer three explanations.  Firstly, as 
noted by List (2006), the competence level on the conclusion can decrease 
rapidly as the number of premises increase.  If competence drops below 0.5 then 
the probability of a correct majority will be less than the probability a single 
agent makes the correct judgement. 
 
                                                 
111
 Weighted majority rule makes no improvement in this particular case since the competence 
levels of agents on the premises are so similar.   
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Secondly, let  represent the number of premises.  The probability of a correct 
premise-based verdict is given by: 
 
Ä²%·
º%$±º%½ = = DℎF G1 − *G
*
GB*
± 
 
The probability of a correct conclusion-based verdict is given by: 
 
¬*µ´º
*$±º%½ == DℎF ±G1 − ±*G
*
GB*/  
 
If we keep the level of competence on a premise  fixed but increase the 
number of premises  then this will have a detrimental effect on the probability 
of a correct social choice whether we use a premise-based procedure or a 
conclusion based procedure.  Increasing numbers of premises decreases the 
probability of a correct social choice via a premise-based procedure because the 
final social choice is the product of the decisions on each premise.  Increasing 
numbers of premises decreases probability of a correct social choice via a 
conclusion-based procedure because the level of competence on the conclusion 
is the level of competence on a premise to the power of the number of premises.  
The probability of a correct premise-based procedure is always greater than the 
probability of a correct conclusion-based procedure.  This is shown in the figure 
below, where the number of agents is held fixed at three agents and the 
competence of agents on a premise remains fixed at  = 0.6.  The figure shows 
that as the number of premises increases, the probability of a correct premise-
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based procedure (top line) will always be greater than the probability of a 
correct conclusion-based procedure (bottom line).   
 
Figure 7.1: the probability of a correct social choice, given a premise-based or 
a conclusion-based procedure,  = 0.6.   
 
 
The third explanation for why a premise-based procedure is epistemically 
superior to a conclusion-based procedure is that competence can be modular.  I 
have assumed in all the calculations above that votes of agents are independent 
across premises.  For example, the fact that agent  votes for the correct 
alternative on the premise  (the cause of death was blood loss due to being 
stabbed) makes it neither more nor less likely that agent  votes correctly on 
premise ¾ (the defendant stabbed the victim).  Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) 
defend this type of proposition-wise independence on the basis of the 
modularity of competence.  For example, an agent’s physiological expertise at 
determining whether a victim died of blood loss (relevant for premise ) is 
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different from that same agent’s expertise at assessing witness statements that 
report the defendant stabbed the victim (relevant for premise ¾). 
 
I will argue that competence can be modular in a different sense.  The same 
background factors can be used by the same agent on different premises to help 
them identify the correct alternative, while still retaining some premise-wise 
independence.  For example, the background experience of paying close 
attention to complicated testimony may have a truth-conducive impact on agent 
competence levels on a variety of different agendas.  Agent 1 might have a 
competence level of  = 0.84343 on proposition  in part because of the 
background factor of experience of paying close attention to complicated 
testimony, in combination with the evidential factor of the testimony of the 
pathologist.  Agent 1 might have a competence level of  = 0.84343 on 
proposition ¾, in part because of the background factor of experience of paying 
close attention to complicated testimony, in combination with the evidential 
factor of a witness statement.  Because agent 1’s votes on propositions  and ¾ 
have a common causal factor, the events of agent 1 voting correctly on 
propositions  and ¾ are not independent.  The fact that agent 1 votes correctly 
on proposition  means agent 1 is more likely to vote correctly on proposition 
¾.  However, the probability of agent 1 voting correctly on proposition  is 
independent of 1’s vote on ¾, conditional on the common background factor of 
experience of paying close attention to complicated testimony.  Agent 1’s vote 
on proposition  is in part generated by the evidential factor of the testimony of 
the pathologist.  Agent 1’s vote on proposition ¾ is in part generated by the 
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witness statement.  As such the vote of agent 1 on proposition  is independent 
of the vote of agent 1 on proposition ¾.   
 
This type of modularity of competence means that even when the amount of 
information is finite we can, in effect, increase the number of agents and 
increase the amount of information available to the group.  In the calculations 
above there are three agents.  With a conclusion-based procedure we aggregate 
one vote each from three agents.  With the premise-based procedure, we 
aggregate three votes from three agents which (given conditional independence) 
is mathematically equivalent to aggregating a single vote from nine agents.   
 
The law of large numbers, which accounts for the force of the CJT, is often 
explained by reference to coin tosses112.  Suppose we have a slightly biased coin 
– perhaps there is a malfunction in the mint which creates a rounded edge of the 
coin on the ‘tails’ side, so that if the coin lands on its edge it will fall on ‘tails’ 
side not the ‘heads’ side.  As a consequence of this bias the coin has a 0.51 
probability of landing ‘heads’.  If the coin is tossed 100 times we should be very 
surprised if we get heads exactly 51 times.  However if the same coin is tossed 
an infinite number of times we should get exactly 0.51 heads.  The law of large 
numbers implies that the sample mean tends towards the population mean as the 
sample size increases.   
 
We might use this slightly biased coin to decide if we should have an entrée at a 
restaurant (‘heads’ means ‘yes’ since we slightly prefer to have an entrée).  We 
                                                 
112
 See for instance List and Goodin (2001) and Estlund (2008).  
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might also use that same coin to decide whether we should have a desert at the 
restaurant (again, ‘heads’ means ‘yes’ since we slightly prefer to have a desert).  
We are therefore 0.51 likely to have an entrée and 0.51 likely to have a desert.  
The fact that we order an entrée should make it neither more nor less likely that 
we order a desert, since each coin toss is independent.   
 
The background factor of experience of paying close attention to complicated 
testimony is analogous to the defect in the coin.  In each case the causal factor 
(the background experiences or the defect in the coin) generates a bias.  In each 
case, the bias can have a causal impact on different agendas without violating 
independence across agendas.   
 
Redistributing information 
The next approach for increasing the upper limit of group epistemic 
performance, given finite information, is the redistribution of information.  Thus 
far it has been assumed that our two groups of agents have already conducted a 
search procedure and all the information in the environment has been extracted 
by the agents in the respective groups.  To recap, the distributions of 
competencies in the groups are as follows: 
 
, ,  = 0.6, 0.6, 0.6 
 ,  ,   = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
 
But agent competence levels do not have to be fixed.  It may be possible for a 
social planner to control how the information is distributed across agents in a 
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group.  A social planner may be able to arrange a search so that only one agent 
receives all the information.  Alternatively a social planner might organise a 
period of deliberation post-search so that the information extracted by agents 
can be redistributed across agents optimally.   
 
A social planner might decide to maximise the competence of a single agent and 
make that agent the dictator.  If a social planner can redistribute information 
across agents then there only needs to be enough finite information to increase 
the competence of a single agent from 
 = 0.5 to 
 = 1.0.  If this agent  is 
made the expert dictator then the group will be able to identify the true state of 
the world with absolute certainty.   
 
A social planner might choose instead to use the aggregation procedure of 
majority rule.  While the CJT requires that the distribution of competencies in 
the group is symmetric about the mean, majority voting does not require any 
particular distribution of competencies.  Grofman et al. (1983) Theorem IX 
shows the distribution of competencies that will maximise the probability of a 
correct majority where the amount of information is fixed:113: 
a. if ′ > +12  set a majority of individual agents’ competencies to 

 = 1.0 
                                                 
113
 Grofman, B., Owen, G. and Feld, S.L. (1983) p.270. 
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b. if +12 ≥ ′ ≥ 2−0.2 set 
 = 0 for *  of the group and set : =
 D **F for the remaining *  group members114 
c. if * − 0.4 ≥ , set 
 =  for all  
where  represents the average competence levels and  represents the number 
of agents. 
 
So the two groups of: 
 
, ,  = 0.6, 0.6, 0.6 
 ,  ,   = 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 
 
both come under the (b) category of Grofman et al.  According to their approach 
we should adjust the competence of agents such that: 
 
, ,   = 0.0, 0.9, 0.9 
 
The probability of a correct majority verdict given this distribution of 
competencies is  
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.81 
 
                                                 
114
 Note that there appears to be a typo in their proposal.  They actually state : =  D **F i.e. 
they use a homogeneous level of competence.  I presume they mean to use the average level of 
competence, which is more general. 
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However, I wish to note three problems with the Gofrman et al. approach.  
Firstly, there is a conceptual problem with adjusting the levels of competence as 
they propose.  Note that in a dichotomous choice the prior competence of 

 = 0.5 represents a position of ignorance, a situation in which the agent has 
no evidential information whatsoever.  It will always be possible to shift an 
agent’s level of competence back to 
 = 0.5 by giving the information that 
would have gone to agent  to another agent.  However it may not be possible to 
shift an agent’s competence level to 
 = 0.0.  An agent with competence 

 = 0.0 is entirely unreliable and just as valuable to a social planner as an 
agent whose competence is : = 1.0.  It will only be possible to shift an agent’s 
competence to 
 = 0.0 if agent  can be given the misleading information that 
would have gone to another agent.  If there happens to be no misleading 
information in a group, no agent can have a competence less than 0.5 no matter 
how the information in the group is redistributed.   
 
Under a more realistic interpretation of the Grofman et al. approach we can set 
the competence levels of a minority of agents to a position of ignorance 

 = 0.5 and redistribute the remaining fixed quantum of competence from 
these ignorant agents evenly among the remaining majority of agents.  
Following this approach means the competence of agents in our group will be 
adjusted to , ,  = 0.5,0.65,0.65 and the probability of a correct majority 
verdict is: 
  
n±:²
³	+´µ%	 = 0.65 
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It may be that when the point of ignorance is redefined as 
 = 0.5 rather than 

 = 0.0, that the calculations in the Grofman et al. approach also need to be 
revised.   
 
The second problem with the Grofman et al. approach to a fixed sum total of 
competence (a finite amount of truth-conducive information) is that they 
presume additivity in the levels of competence.  As I argued earlier, the truth-
conducive strength of signals from the body of evidence depends on the prior 
competence level of agents receiving those signals.  It takes a lot more 
information, for example, to increase an agent’s competence level from 

 = 0.7 to 
 = 0.9 than it does to increase an agent’s competence level from 

 = 0.5 to 
 = 0.7.  The revised calculations in the Grofman et al. approach 
would need accommodate the fact that increased amounts of information have 
decreasing marginal impacts on an agent’s level of competence.   
 
The third, more significant, concern with the Grofman et al. approach to dealing 
with fixed amounts of competence is that it places an undue importance on 
preserving independence in the votes of agents, conditional just on the state of 
the world.   
 
Sharing information 
The section immediately above proposed redistributing information across 
agents in a group to maximise the possibility of a correct social choice.  It was 
assumed that all information must be held privately by agents.  For one agent to 
receive an extra piece of information it must be taken away from a separate 
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agent.  But there may be more significant gains to be had by agents sharing 
information.  Sharing information would mean that all truth-conducive 
information would be held in common between agents.  
 
Consider the case where agents have homogeneous levels of competence.  In 
this case each agent received separate pieces of information that increased their 
levels of competence from , ,   = 0.5, 0.5, 0.5 to , ,   = 0.6, 0.6, 
0.6).  If all the information is given to a single agent then the competence of that 
agent will be 
 = 0.77.115  If this same information is also given to agent’s  
and  then the competence of agents  and  will also be : = 0.77, o = 0.77.  
If the social choice is to be decided by the aggregation procedure of majority 
rule then the probability of a correct social choice will be: 
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.86563 
 
The sharing of information, before judgements are aggregated via majority rule, 
is by far the most effective approach for maximising the probability of a correct 
social choice when truth-conducive information is finite.  It makes more of a 
difference to the probability of a correct social choice than the choice of 
aggregation procedure, the use of a premise-based procedure or the 
redistribution of information.   
 
                                                 
115
 The likelihood ration (LR) = ª«	¬O
­|®O6)
ª«	¬O­|®O6¬) =
ª«	¬ ­¯|®¯6)
ª«	¬ ­¯|®¯6¬) ×
ª«	¬°­|®°6)
ª«	¬°­|®°6¬) ×
ª«	¬Å­|®Å6)
ª«	¬Å­|®Å6¬) =
D .|.|F
 
= 3.375.  (!
 = |h
%) = (!
 = ) × 	.  Therefore Pr(!
 = |h
%) = 0.77 
. 
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The calculations immediately above assume that the votes of the three agents 
are independent.  There may be a concern that since agents have shared 
information, and now have information in common, the votes of agents are no 
longer independent.  The more general worry is that if agents share all their 
causal factors they will have identical vote-determining causal factors and the 
votes of agents will be entirely dependent: there will be no randomness in the 
vote of an agent, conditional on the vote of another agent.  As such, the 
probability of a correct majority verdict will be identical to the probability of a 
single agent voting correctly (the agent’s competence) and adding agents to the 
group will make no difference.  However I will show in the section below why 
the competence of agents, conditional on common factors, retains some 
randomness.   
 
Case 1 
Consider three agents , , .  The prior levels of competence for these three 
agents will be: 
 

 = Pr!
 = | = 0.5 
: = Pri!: = jk = 0.5 
o = Pr!o = | = 0.5 
 
Suppose that these three agents receive similar (but different) packages of 
information, as represented in the figure below.   
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Figure 7.2: a causal network with three private packages of information.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The posterior competence of the three agents is as follows: 
 

 = Pri!
 = j, #$ , #{%k = 0.6 
: = Pri!: = j, #$ , #Y%k = 0.6 
o = Pri!o = j, # $ , #|%k = 0.6 
 
In other words, the combined effect of the two causal factors, received privately 
by each agent, is to increase the competence level of each agent by +0.1.  If the 
social choice is decided by the aggregation procedure of majority rule then the 
probability of a correct majority verdict given the votes of , ,  is  = 0.648. 
 
Case 2 
Now consider a slightly different situation as represented in figure 7.3 below.  
 
 
x 
#% 
!:  !
 !o 
#% # % #{$ #Y$ #|$ 
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Figure 7.3: a causal network with one common package of information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here all the agents receive the same two pieces of information.  The prior 
competence of agent  will be 
 = Pr!
  |  0.5.  We need to update the 
competence of agent  in light of the information that they have received.  The 
posterior competence of agent  is 
  Pri!
  j, #% , #$k  0.6.  Agents  
and  are not independent of agent  since they have common causal factors.  
Once we know the way agent  votes this will increase the probability that 
agents  and  vote in the same way.  Formally, :  Pri!:  j, !
k 2 : 
Pri!:  jk.  However once we conditionalise on the common factors, we 
regain independence between the three agents.  The posterior competencies of 
agents  and  conditional on the evidential and background information they 
receive are as follows: 
 
:
  Pri!:  j, #
% , #
$k  0.6 
o
  Pri!o  j, #
% , #
$k  0.6 
 
x 
#
$
 
!:  !
 !o 
#
%
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We can see that independence has been regained by conditionalising on 
common factors by noting, inter alia, that : = Pri!: = j, #% , #$ , !
k = : =
Pri!: = j, #% , #$k=0.6.  116 
 
Dietrich and Spiekermann (unpublished b) provide a general form of 
Reichenbach’s common cause principle: 
 
“Common Cause Principle (stated informally).  Phenomena which do not 
causally affect each other are probabilistically independent conditional on their 
common causes.” (p.5) 
 
In the example above the votes of agents do not causally affect each other.  We 
have conditionalised on the common causes of agent’s votes, so the votes of 
agents will be probabilistically independent.   
 
If the social choice in case 2 immediately above is decided by the aggregation 
procedure of majority rule then the probability of a correct majority verdict 
given the votes of , ,  is  = 0.648. 
 
In case 1 there were three packages of background and evidential information 
which each had a truth-conducive value of +0.1 (that each increase an agent’s 
competence level by a value of 0.1).  In the case 2 there was one package of 
background and evidential information that had a truth-conducive value of +0.1.  
There is three-times as much information available to the group in case 1 as 
                                                 
116
 And if agent  votes for alternative ¬ it makes it neither more nor less likely that agent  
will vote for alternative ¬.   
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there is in case 2 and yet the probabilities of a majority verdict in each case are 
identical.  It seems as if the distribution of information among agents in case 1 
is suboptimal.   
 
Case 3 
Suppose we face the same set of causes as in case 1.  However in case 3, instead 
of dividing up the information among different agents, all information is 
common.  We can represent this in the figure below: 
 
Figure 7.4: a causal network with three common packages of information.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The posterior competence of the three agents is: 
 

 = Pri!
 = j, #% , #% , # % , #Y$ , #{$ , #|$k = 0.77 
: = Pri!: = j, #% , #% , # % , #Y$ , #{$ , #|$k = 0.77 
o = Pri!o = j, #% , #% , # % , #Y$ , #{$ , #|$k = 0.77 
x 
#% 
!:  !
 !o 
#% # % #{$ #Y$ #|$ 
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Because we have conditionalised on all the common factors, the votes of agents 
,  and  are independent.  As can be seen, there is randomness in each of their 
votes.  This randomness comes from whatever competence-generating factors 
the agents hold privately.  If the social choice is decided by the aggregation 
procedure of majority rule then the probability of a correct majority verdict 
given the votes of , ,  is  = 0.86563.  There are clear epistemic advantages 
to sharing truth-conducive information. 
 
In an earlier section on premise-based procedures I argued that the increased 
epistemic performance generated by taking a premise-based approach is due in 
part to the competence of agents being modular across propositions.  The 
modularity of competence across propositions means the vote of a single agent 
is independent across propositions.  The same truth-conducive background 
factor, such as experience of paying close attention to complicated testimony, 
may generate high levels of competence for an agent in several different social 
choice problems.   
 
The examples of information sharing, immediately above, show that 
competence can also be modular across agents.  The same competence-
generating factors of background and evidential information can be shared by 
different agents and in the process boost their levels of competence, while 
preserving independence conditional on the common factors.   
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We can explain the modularity of competence across agents by analogy with the 
coin-toss.  Tossing the same flawed coin with a 0.51 bias 100 times is 
equivalent to tossing 100 identical coins with a 0.51 bias produced from the 
same flawed die at the mint117.  The flaw in the die at the mint which places a 
+0.01 bias towards heads on each coin is analogous to the truth-conducive 
background factor of experience of paying close attention to complicated 
testimony, which places a +0.1 bias towards the truth on the judgements of 
agents.  Agents can share this same truth-conducive background factor and yet 
still be independent.   
 
There is one final point to be said in favour of the proposal of sharing 
information among agents.  The classic CJT requires that the competence levels 
of agents are homogeneous and that agents are independent conditional on the 
state of the world.  Neither of these assumptions is plausible in real-world social 
choice problems.  When agents share information we exchange independence 
conditional on the state of the world with independence conditional on the state 
of the world and common factors118.  If agents share information then their 
levels of competence conditional on the common factors will be homogeneous, 
as per the classic CJT.  The sharing of information between agents provides a 
justification for the assumption of homogeneous levels of competence.   
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 As Estlund (2008) states “Now obviously the same would be true if instead of one coin 
flipped repeatedly, we consider many coins, all weighted the same way, each having a 51 
percent chance of coming up heads.” (p.224) 
118
 See Dietrich and Spiekermann (forthcoming a,b) 
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Problems with information sharing 
I will present two concerns with the solution to the problem of finite 
information of information sharing: it may not be possible to share all the truth-
conducive causal factors and there remains a possibility of misleading 
information.   
 
I have argued that the reason there is still some independence in the votes of 
agents, conditional on common factors, is that at least some of the competence-
generating factors are held privately and not shared with other agents.  There 
may be many types of truth-conducive competence-generating factors which, 
from the perspective of group epistemic performance it is desirable that agents 
share, but which they are unable to share.  For example, while background 
factors such as textbooks on pathology or courses in how to be a juror, can be 
shared between agents it may be that the background factor of experience of 
paying close attention to complicated testimony is just the sort of background 
competence-generating factor that cannot be shared between agents.  This 
background factor is built up over a lifetime and cannot be passed on to other 
jurors during the trial.  Similarly, while evidential factors such as fingerprint 
evidence may be shared between agents, a witness may not be able to share with 
jurors the evidential factor of the precise colour of the shirt the defendant was 
wearing.   
 
Secondly, there remains an intuitive concern with the argument that 
competence-generating factors can be shared by agents and boost the 
competence levels of agents, while retaining some independence in the agent’s 
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votes.  I have argued that if we have a group with competence levels 
, : , o =
0.6,0.6,0.6 then it makes no difference to the probability of a correct majority 
verdict whether their competence levels were generated by three private 
packages of information (case 1) or whether they share the same package of 
information (case 2).  But surely there must be some epistemic advantage to 
having three different sources of information.  We can account for this intuition 
in part, as I have done above, with the assertion that there is just more 
information in the group with three different packages of information than there 
is in the group with one package of information.  If the three different packages 
are held privately then this is just a sub-optimal distribution of information.   
 
There is however a more significant concern with the competence of agents 
being generated by the same truth-conducive factors.  Thus far I have assumed 
that the competence-generating factors are instantiations of random variables.  
If, for example, an agent has the background factor of experience of paying 
close attention to complicated testimony then it was assumed that this had a 
truth-conducive influence on an agent’s level of competence.  However we can 
also treat causal factors as random variables that can take two values.  For 
example, the factor of experience of paying close attention to complicated 
testimony could either be truth-conducive and increase an agent’s competence; 
or the factor of experience of paying close attention to complicated testimony 
could be misleading in which case it decreases an agent’s level of competence.  
If our group of three agents shares the same package of information (case 2) and 
this turns out to be misleading then each agent will have competence 

, : , o < 0.5.  If however each of our three agents has a different, private 
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package of information (case 1) then it will only be the case that the competence 
of each agent is 
, : , o < 0.5 if each of these packages of information turns 
out to be misleading.  It is more likely that a single package of information turns 
out to be misleading than for three separate packages of information to turn out 
to be misleading.  Separate sources of evidence hedge against the possibility of 
misleading evidence.   
 
We can use sample calculations to consider the differences between cases 1, 2 
and 3 when we allow for the packages of information to be truth-conducive 
(increase competence) or misleading (decrease competence).   
 
Case 1: three private packages of information 
• If all three packages of information are truth-conducive then the competence 
of all agents is 
,:,o = 0.6 and the probability of a correct majority verdict is 
 = 0.648. 
• If one of the packages of information is misleading then the competence of 
agents is 
, :, o = 0.4,0.6,0.6 and the probability of a correct majority 
verdict is  = 0.552.  There are three ways in which this situation could arise: 
the information of the first, second or third agent could be misleading. 
• If two of the packages of information are misleading then the competence of 
agents is 
, :, o = 0.4,0.4,0.6 and the probability of a correct majority 
verdict is  = 0.448.  There are three ways in which this situation could arise: 
the information of the first, second or third agent could be truth-conducive. 
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• If all three packages of information are misleading then the competence of all 
agents is 
, :, o = 0.4 and the probability of a correct majority verdict is 
 = 0.352 
 
Let h represent the case where the first package of information is truth-
conducive and ¬h represent the case where the first package of information is 
misleading.  Æh|h represents the case that there is a majority for the correct 
alternative given that the first package of information is truth-conducive.  The 
probability of a correct social choice is given by: 
 
ÇPr(h&h&h ) × PriÆh│h&h&h kÉ +
3ÇPr(h&h&¬h ) × PriÆh│h&h&¬h kÉ + 3ÇPr(h&¬h&¬h ) ×
PriÆh│h&¬h&¬h kÉ + [Pr(¬h&¬h&¬h ) × PriÆh│¬h&¬h&¬h k] 
 
Suppose the probability of a given package of information being misleading is 
0.6.  The probability that a group with three private packages of information 
choose the correct alternative via majority rule is: 
 
(0.6³ × 0.648) + (3(0.6² × 0.4) × 0.552) + (3(0.4² × 0.6) × 0.448) + (0.4³
× 0.352) = 	0.52998	
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Case 2: one common package of information 
• If the information is truth-conducive then the competence of each agent will 
be 
, :, o = 0.6 and the probability of a correct majority verdict will be 
 = 0.648. 
• If the information is misleading then the competence of each agent will be 

, : , o = 0.4 and the probability of a correct majority verdict will be  =
0.352 
 
Suppose the probability of a given package of information being misleading is 
0.6.  The probability that a group with one common package of information 
choose the correct alternative via majority rule is: 
 
0.6 × 0.648 + 0.4 × 0.352 = 	0.5296 
 
Case 3: three common packages of information 
• If all three packages of information are truth-conducive then the competence 
of each agent will be 
, : , o = 0.77 and the probability of a correct majority 
verdict will be  = 0.86563 
• If two of the packages of information are truth-conducive and one of the 
packages of information is misleading then the competence of each agent will 
be 
, :, o = 0.6 and the probability of a correct majority verdict will be 
 = 0.648.  There are three ways in which this situation could occur: the first 
package of information is misleading, or the second is misleading, or the third is 
misleading.   
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• If one of the packages of information is truth-conducive and two of the 
packages of information are misleading then the competence of each agent will 
be 
, :, o = 0.4 and the probability of a correct majority verdict will be 
 = 0.352.  There are three ways in which this situation could occur:  the first, 
or second, or third package of information is truth-conducive.   
• If all three packages of information are misleading then the competence of all 
agents is 
, :, o = 0.23 and the probability of a correct majority verdict is 
 = 0.13437 
 
Suppose the probability of a given package of information being misleading is 
0.6.  The probability that a group with three common packages of information 
choose the correct alternative via majority rule is: 
 
0.6³ × 0.896 + 30.6² × 0.4 × 0.648 + 30.4² × 0.6 × 0.352 + 0.4³
× 0.104 = 	0.5815	
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Figure 7.5: the probability of a correct majority verdict. 
Probability 
that a 
package of 
info. is 
truth-
conducive 
Case 1: three 
private packages 
Case 2: one 
common package 
Case 3: three 
common packages 
0 0.352 0.352 0.13437 
0.1 0.38102 0.3816 0.20185 
0.2 0.41043 0.4112 0.2731 
0.3 0.44013 0.4408 0.34716 
0.4 0.47002 0.4704 0.42311 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
0.6 0.52998 0.5296 0.57689 
0.7 0.55987 0.5592 0.65284 
0.8 0.58957 0.5888 0.7269 
0.9 0.61898 0.6184 0.79815 
1.0 0.648 0.648 0.86563 
 
 
What can we infer from these sample calculations?  There are two questions that 
we should ask.  Firstly, given that each agent receives a fixed amount of 
information, is it best if this information is private or held in common with other 
agents?  This first question is addressed by comparing the results for case 1 
(each agent receives a fixed, private amount of information) and case 2 (each 
agent receives a fixed, common amount of information).  The second question 
to ask is given a fixed amount of information, is it best if this information is 
held in common between agents or parcelled out in private packages?  This 
second question is addressed by comparing case 1 (the information is parcelled 
out in private packages) and case 3 (the information is held in common between 
agents).   
 
The results for case 1 (where each of three agents receives one private package 
of information) are very similar to case 2 (where each of three agents shares one 
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common package of information).  If anything, case 1 is slightly less reliable 
when information tends to be misleading but slightly more reliable when 
information tends to be truth-conducive.  Intuitively there are two forces that 
pull in opposite directions.  If agents have different packages of information 
generating their competence levels we hedge against the possibility of 
misleading information.  If a piece of information does turn out to be misleading 
it will only affect the competence of a single agent.  On the other hand, where 
agents have different factors generating their competence there is just more 
information in the group and so there is a greater chance of some of that 
information being misleading.   
 
The comparison between case 3 and case 1 is much clearer.  If the packages of 
information tend to be truth-conducive then it is best if shared among agents 
(case 3); if the packages of information tend to be misleading then it is best if 
they are held privately (case 1).  Again, if packages of information tend to be 
misleading then by parcelling them out to different agents we quarantine their 
impact on agent competence levels.  If packages of information tend to be truth-
conducive then the impact of this information is maximised by applying it 
multiple times to different agents.   
 
Summary  
Given finite amounts of information, what is the best institutional response to 
maximise the probability of a correct social choice?  The choice of aggregation 
procedure can make a significant difference.  In particular, weighted majority 
rule or expert dictatorship will maximise the probability of a correct social 
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choice.  If it is possible to disaggregate a social choice into premises then 
employing a premise-based procedure with majority rule (or weighted majority 
rule) can also make a significant difference.   
 
It is the sharing of information between agents that can have the greatest impact 
on a group’s ability to identify the true state of the world.  When the 
information in a group is truth-conducive there are obvious advantages to 
sharing this information between agents and there are no disadvantages to 
sharing information.  If there is a possibility that the information might be 
misleading, then provided the information is more likely to be truth-conducive 
than misleading, again the information should be shared.   
 
The mechanism that accounts for the boost to group epistemic performance that 
comes from a premise-based procedure or the sharing of information is that the 
competence of agents is a modular epistemic capacity.  As such it is possible to 
“reapply” the truth-conducive impact of finite amounts of information.   
 
Suppose that as the result of a search procedure a group of three agents has 
identified truth-conducive information of a strength such that the competence of 
agents increases from 
 = 0.5 to 
 = 0.6.  If post-search this information is 
shared by the three agents the competence levels of each of these agents will be 

 = 0.77.  If the social choice is determined by the aggregation procedure of 
majority rule then the probability of a correct social choice will be: 
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.86563 
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If this same information is shared among 11 agents then the probability of a 
correct majority verdict will be: 
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 0.977 
 
If this same information is shared among 101 agents then the probability of a 
correct majority verdict will be119: 
 
n±:²
³	+´µ% = 1.0 
 
The fact that each agent has some private, background, competence-generating 
factors means that votes of the agents will be independent.  And the fact that 
these private, background, competence-generating factors are unknown to the 
social planner means the competence levels of agents are less than 1.0, that 
there is still some randomness in the votes of agents.   
 
Provided that each agent in the group has some private background factors and 
provided that the agents share the known truth-conducive evidential and 
background factors, then there only needs to be a small amount of truth-
conducive information (evidential and background) for a group to come 
extremely close to identifying the true state of the world using majority rule.  As 
we have seen in the sample calculation immediately above, all we need is 
evidence of +0.27 truth-conducive value and 101 agents with some private 
                                                 
119
 Allowing for rounding. 
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background competence-generating factors for the group to be close to certain 
to identify the true state of the world.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
 
This thesis has addressed the social epistemic mechanisms operating in groups 
of political agents; the institutional arrangements employed by groups of 
political agents that allow the group to track the truth.  I have argued that social 
choices in political settings occur via a two-staged process.  Firstly, there are 
search procedures by which agents find truth-conducive information.  Secondly, 
there are aggregation procedures by which agents pool the information they 
have found.  I have identified five social epistemic mechanisms that can operate 
during this two-staged process: two that can operate during the search procedure 
and three that can operate during the aggregation procedure.  For each of these 
social epistemic mechanisms, increasing group size is epistemically virtuous.   
 
During the search procedure there are, firstly, the institutional arrangements as 
captured by the Spatial Search Theorem.  If every agent has at least some 
possibility of moving to the location of a piece of information and each agent 
searches some different locations then as the size of the group increases, the 
probability of finding the piece of information also increases.  Relatedly, as the 
size of the group increases the amount of information identified by the group 
increases.  In the introduction I highlighted the taxonomy of models of potential 
group productivity presented in Steiner (1966).  This first social epistemic 
mechanism can be characterised as an additive model of group productivity.  As 
the group size increases the probability the object is found is the sum of the 
probabilities that individual agents in the group find the object.   
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The second social epistemic mechanism operating during the search procedure 
is captured by the Search Recognition Theorem.  If each agent has some 
possibility of recognising an object at a particular location and the recognition 
capacities are independent then as the number of agents visiting the location 
increases the probability of at least one agent recognising the object also 
increases.  This second social epistemic mechanism can again be characterised 
as an additive model of group productivity, according to the Steiner taxonomy. 
 
In this thesis I considered three types of aggregation procedures, the 
institutional features of which amount to social epistemic mechanisms.  Firstly, 
expert dictatorship can be characterised as a disjunctive model of group 
epistemic productivity.  Under dictatorship the probability the group identifies 
the true state of the world is limited to the competence of the most competent 
member of the group.  If competence in the wider population is heterogeneous 
then as group size increases the competence of the most competent member of a 
group should increase.  Unanimity rule can be characterised as a conjunctive 
model of group epistemic productivity.  Increasing group size generally 
decreases the probability of a unanimous choice, since all agents must perform 
the same action and the probability of them all doing so decreases with group 
size.  However negative reliability unanimity rule is more and more likely to 
track the truth as group size increases since the probability of all agents voting 
for the incorrect alternative decreases as group size increases.  Negative 
reliability unanimity rule can be characterised as a disjunctive model of group 
productivity since it only requires a single agent to vote for the correct 
alternative for the group to avoid the incorrect alternative as the social choice. 
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The institutional features of the aggregation procedure of majority rule mean a 
group using majority rule are increasingly likely to track the truth as group size 
increases.  Therefore, the institutional features of majority rule also amount to a 
social epistemic mechanism.  Majority rule can be classed as a compensatory 
model of group productivity, according to the Steiner taxonomy.  Although 
some agents may make a mistake and vote for the wrong alternative, their votes 
can be offset by other agents voting for the correct alternative.  If agents are 
sufficiently competent then as group size increases it becomes increasingly 
likely that there will only be a minority voting for the wrong alternative, whose 
votes are offset by a majority voting for the correct alternative.    
 
The Steiner taxonomy of models of group productivity cannot be thought of as 
being exhaustive.  For example, there may be further models of group 
productivity that are exponential in nature- as the number of agents increases 
the institutional features of an aggregation procedure may mean that the 
probability of a correct social choice increases rapidly.  Similarly the five 
different social epistemic mechanisms I have identified as operating during the 
two stages of search then aggregation should not be thought of as exhaustive.  
There are 2* possible aggregation procedures for a dichotomous choice120 and 
conceivably many more than three of these possible aggregation procedures will 
have institutional features that allow a group to track the truth as group size 
increases.  There may also be other, different, models of search procedure 
whose institutional features allow a group to find the objects of search.  
                                                 
120
 Christian List, unpublished lecture notes. 
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Furthermore there may be social epistemic mechanisms, formal or informal 
institutional arrangements in groups of agents, that allow the groups to track the 
truth, that do not fit within the two-staged framework of search and aggregation.  
For example, Vermeule (2009) proposes, inter alia, an evolutionary account of 
‘many-minds’ arguments in legal theory.  Here, the judgements of a group of 
agents will, over time, weed out unfit policies through a process of evolution.  
In a political setting, the combined wisdom of a series of parliaments should, 
over time, work to weed out unsatisfactory parts of the law.  This iterative 
improvement does not fit into the one-shot framework of search followed by 
aggregation that I propose.  Similarly, some types of deliberation may be 
successful at tracking the truth as group size increases, but deliberation is not a 
necessary component of the two-staged framework of search and aggregation 
procedures.   
 
Interestingly, the institutional arrangements in the five social epistemic 
mechanisms identified seem to be of two kinds: in some cases we want to 
encourage agents to act differently and to capture the influence of outliers.  In 
other cases we want the agents to act in a similar fashion so as to weed out the 
influence of outliers.  A spatial search procedure requires agents to perform 
different tasks and relies on an agent visiting a location no other agent visits.  
Increasing the size of the group increases the probability the group will contain 
such an exceptional agent.  The search recognition procedure requires agents to 
perform a similar task.  As we increase the size of the group the probability that 
one of the group performs the task properly (recognises the object) increases.   
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The five social epistemic mechanisms can provide epistemic justifications for 
various democratic virtues, including widening participation in political 
decision making, free speech and freedom of association, and for diversity or 
pluralism in the population.  By increasing the size of the group participating in 
political decision making we increase the probability of finding particular pieces 
of evidential and relevant background information.  We also increase the total 
amount of information available to the group.  Freedom of association prevents 
arbitrary restrictions on the search procedures of individual agents.  Free speech 
can alert fellow agents to locations containing new or difficult to recognise 
pieces of information.  In general it is best to include as many varied agents as 
possible as the variety of initial partitions, locational conventions, start points 
and search heuristics means these group members are able to identify different 
pieces of information.    
 
Increasing the size of a group participating in political decision making is also 
epistemically virtuous when it comes to the aggregation of judgements, no 
matter which of the three aggregation procedures are used.  Increasing group 
size increases the probability of a correct majority verdict, a correct judgement 
of an expert dictator and increases the probability of avoiding a unanimous 
verdict for the incorrect social choice (given appropriate competence levels and 
independence relations).   
 
The only model of potential group productivity (in this case epistemic 
productivity) identified by Steiner and not occurring in the two-staged 
framework of search and then aggregation procedures is a complementary 
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model.  Under a complementary model different parts of a task are performed 
by different agents.  In an epistemic setting, different propositions whose 
conjunction deductively entails a conclusion may be possessed by different 
agents.  It was argued in chapter 6 of the thesis that the post-search distribution 
of information across agents could mean different agents possess partial pieces 
of information.  The partial pieces of information may be sufficient for the 
group to determine the true state of the world.  However none of the aggregation 
procedures I have presented can appropriately pool these pieces of information, 
since the partial pieces of information do not directly increase the competence 
levels of agents.  In such cases neither dictatorship, nor negative reliability 
unanimity rule, nor majority rule will correctly identify the true state of the 
world.  The information dispersed among agents can only be pooled into a 
correct social choice by sharing it directly, perhaps via deliberation.   
 
I also argued in chapter 7 that the truth-conducive impact of finite information is 
maximised by sharing that information between agents.  A period of 
deliberation, post search but prior to aggregation, would allow for the sharing of 
this information.   
 
Unfortunately there are a number of potential problems with deliberation and 
information sharing, including information cascades, group think and group 
polarisation.  I will touch on these very briefly.   
 
Sunstein (2002) discusses the phenomena of ‘group polarisation’ where the 
judgements of agents post-deliberation are more extreme than their pre-
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deliberation judgements.  A juror who pre-deliberation supports a fairly long 
prison sentence for an offender can support an extremely long sentence after 
discussing the issue with their fellow jurors.  Sunstein cites three possible 
explanations for group polarisation: an initial skew in the makeup of a group, a 
desire to fit in with the group and overconfidence of agents with extreme views.   
 
Closely related to group polarisation is ‘group think’, as studied by Janis (1972), 
where the group engaging in deliberation excludes information that would 
disrupt the consensus.  Group think can lead to a group making the wrong 
decision even if the judgements of the group are not subjected to the shift seen 
in group polarisation.  Group think could be caused by the homogeneity of the 
group and the desire for cohesion.  An agent might withhold from the group a 
proposition that could disrupt a consensus on the (incorrect) alternative.  Agents 
may not contribute their partial pieces of information identified during their 
searches if doing so would disrupt the consensus.   
 
Finally, information cascades can occur when agents ignore their own private 
information and instead base their judgements on the judgements of other 
agents, who in turn based their judgements on the judgements of other agents.  
Information cascades can be problematic since although it seems as if an agent’s 
judgement is based on the large body of information contained in the 
judgements of previous agents, the amount of information may in fact be quite 
small (see Goodin and Spiekermann, 2011).   
 
 318 
Identifying the social epistemic mechanisms operating in deliberative practices 
(the institutional arrangements for discussion and debate that facilitate 
information sharing) while avoiding the traps of information cascades, group 
think and group polarisation, is the focus of the next phase of my research.   
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